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Abstract
This thesis examines the security issues of Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) technology, one of the most promising technologies in the field of
ubiquitous computing. Indeed, RFID technology may well replace barcode
technology. Although it offers many advantages over other identification
systems, there are also associated security risks that are not easy to address.
RFID systems can be classified according to tag price, with distinction
between high-cost and low-cost tags. Our research work focuses mainly
on low-cost RFID tags. An initial study and analysis of the state of the
art identifies the need for lightweight cryptographic solutions suitable for
these very constrained devices. From a purely theoretical point of view,
standard cryptographic solutions may be a correct approach. However,
standard cryptographic primitives (hash functions, message authentication
codes, block/stream ciphers, etc.) are quite demanding in terms of circuit
size, power consumption and memory size, so they make costly solutions
for low-cost RFID tags. Lightweight cryptography is therefore a pressing
need.
First, we analyze the security of the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 stan-
dard, which is considered the universal standard for low-cost RFID tags.
Secondly, we cryptanalyze two new proposals, showing their unsuccessful
attempt to increase the security level of the specification without much fur-
ther hardware demands. Thirdly, we propose a new protocol resistant to
passive attacks and conforming to low-cost RFID tag requirements. In this
protocol, costly computations are only performed by the reader, and secu-
rity related computations in the tag are restricted to very simple operations.
The protocol is inspired in the family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authenti-
cation Protocols (UMAP: M2AP, EMAP, LMAP) and the recently proposed
SASI protocol. The thesis also includes the first published cryptanalysis of
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SASI under the weakest attackermodel, that is, a passive attacker. Fourthly,
we propose a new protocol resistant to both passive and active attacks and
suitable for moderate-cost RFID tags. We adapt Shieh et.’s protocol for
smart cards, taking into account the unique features of RFID systems. Fi-
nally, because this protocol is based on the use of cryptographic primitives
and standard cryptographic primitives are not supported, we address the
design of lightweight cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we propose
a lightweight hash function (Tav-128) and a lightweight Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (LAMED and LAMED-EPC). We analyze their security
level and performance, as well as their hardware requirements and show
that both could be realistically implemented, even in low-cost RFID tags.
This document is submitted as PhD thesis in the Computer Science Pro-
gramme 2007-8 at Carlos III University of Madrid.
Resumen
Esta tesis se centra en el estudio de la tecnología de identificación por ra-
diofrecuencia (RFID), la cual puede ser considerada como una de las tec-
nologías más prometedoras dentro del área de la computación ubicua. La
tecnología RFID podría ser el sustituto de los códigos de barras. Aunque la
tecnología RFID ofrece numerosas ventajas frente a otros sistemas de iden-
tificación, su uso lleva asociados riesgos de seguridad, los cuales no son
fáciles de resolver.
Los sistemas RFID pueden ser clasificados, atendiendo al coste de las
etiquetas, distinguiendo principalmente entre etiquetas de alto coste y de
bajo coste. Nuestra investigación se centra fundamentalmente en estas úl-
timas. El estudio y análisis del estado del arte nos ha permitido identi-
ficar la necesidad de desarrollar soluciones criptográficas ligeras adecuadas
para estos dispositivos limitados. El uso de soluciones criptográficas es-
tándar supone una aproximación correcta desde un punto de vista pura-
mente teórico. Sin embargo, primitivas criptográficas estándar (funciones
resumen, código de autenticación de mensajes, cifradores de bloque/flujo,
etc.) exceden las capacidades de las etiquetas de bajo coste. Por tanto, es
necesario el uso de criptografía ligera.
A continuación, se resume la motivación de este trabajo, la metodología
seguida, las principales aportaciones de esta tesis y, finalmente, se mues-
tran las conclusiones más importantes.
0.1 Motivación
La tecnología RFID puede transformar los procesos de identificación, ofre-
ciendo numerosas ventajas frente a otros sistemas. Actualmente los sis-
temas de identificación más extendidos son los códigos de barra. La prin-
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cipal diferencia entre estas dos tecnologías radica en el nivel de identifi-
cación conseguido. Los códigos de barras permiten la identificación del
tipo, mientras que las etiquetas RFID permiten una identificación inequívoca.
En otras palabras, si se emplea la tecnología RFID se pueden distinguir dos
items del mismo tipo.
Sin embargo, no todo son ventajas. El uso de la tecnología RFID trae
asociado ciertos riesgos de seguridad. Privacidad y trazabilidad son los
más importantes, pero existen otros que es necesario mencionar: ataques
físicos, falsificación, denegación de servicio, etc. A su vez, el coste de las
etiquetas está retrasando la introducción de esta tecnología. Cada vez que
una nueva tecnología aparece (ej. bluetooth, wireless, etc.), las principales
preocupaciones son el precio y la operatividad dejando la seguridad a un
lado. Para evitar errores pasados, son necesarias soluciones criptográficas
con el objetivo de proporcionar un nivel de seguridad adecuado. Este nivel
de seguridad será diferente dependiendo de la clase del RFID. Es impor-
tante comprender que no todas las clases de RFID tienen porqué propor-
cionar el mismo nivel de seguridad.
Desde 2003, se han publicado numeros artículos centrados en la seguri-
dad. La gran mayoría de estas propuestas no abordan de forma realista
las fuertes limitaciones (ej. computacionales, circuitería, consumo, etc.) de
este tipo de dispositivos. A pesar que desde un punto de vista teórico estas
propuestas tienen sentido; en general no es posible su aplicabilidad en un
gran número de etiquetas RFID de bajo coste. Están basadas en primitivas
criptográficas, pero sin embargo no se sugieren primitivas criptográficas
ligeras y las primitivas criptográficas estándar exceden las capacidades de
las etiquetas. A su vez, a menudo, no se especifica para qué clase de eti-
queta son adecuadas las propuestas. La clase de la etiqueta determina un
gran número de parámetros tales como las operaciones soportadas en la
misma o el tipo de ataques frente a los que debe ser resistente.
En 2003, Vajda et al. publicaron el primer artículo en el que se pro-
ponía el uso de criptografía ligera. El año siguiente, Juels introdujo el con-
cepto de criptografía minimalista. En 2005, no hubo ninguna propuesta
en este área de investigación, por el contrario hubo numerosas propuestas
basadas en el uso de funciones resumen. Sin embargo, este área de inves-
tigación ha atraído cierto interés, recientemente, desde la publicación de
varios protocolos ligeros por parte del autor de esta tesis. Uno de estos
primeros trabajos fue publicado en la conferencia RFIDSec, considerada el
evento anual más importante sobre seguridad en dispositivos RFID. Desde
la publicación de estos trabajos, algunos autores, incluido el autor de esta
tesis, han intentado realizar avances en el desarrollo de la criptografía lig-
era para las etiquetas RFID de bajo coste.
0.2 Metodología y Planificación
El desarrollo de esta tesis se puede dividir en dos bloques fundamentales:
Tecnología RFID En primer lugar, fue necesaria una comprensión de la
tecnología RFID. Un buen punto de partida fue la lectura del libro
titulado: “RFID Handbook: fundamentals and applications in con-
tactless smart-cards and identification”. Al mismo tiempo, se con-
sultaron otros libros y muchos artículos. Además, se estudiaron los
estándares relacionados con esta tecnología con el fin de profundizar
en su conocimiento. Tomando en consideración la tecnología RFID,
consideramos oportuno centrar nuestra investigación en aspectos de
seguridad para este tipo de dispositivos. Durante este periodo, con-
sultamos, como un primer paso, el sitio webmantenido por G. Avoine
(http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/~gavoine/rfid/) el cual reúne un
gran número de artículos sobre privacidad y seguridad en sistemas
RFID. La lectura de estos artículos y muchos otros nos han permitido
conocer las ultimas novedades en este área de investigación. Puede
decirse que familiarizarse con estas tres áreas (Tecnología RFID, Es-
tándares RFID y Seguridad RFID) duraron aproximadamente un año
y medio. Esta fase es realmente un proceso continuo, especialmente
debido a que la tecnología RFID es un tema candente y se producen
nuevos avances y desarrollos constantemente.
Avances en Criptografía Ligera Después de haber comprendido y anali-
zado todas las propuestas publicadas, decidimos centrar nuestra in-
vestigación en las etiquetas de bajo coste. A partir de los estudios
mencionados anteriormente, identificamos la absoluta necesidad de
avanzar en el desarrollo de soluciones criptográficas ligeras. En primer
lugar, realizamos un análisis de seguridad del estándar EPC Class-1
Generation-2. Consideramos importante este análisis debido a que
esta especificación puede ser considerada como el estándar univer-
sal para las etiquetas de bajo coste. El análisis anterior mostró im-
portantes riesgos de seguridad. Algunos autores, siendo conscientes
de ello, han propuesto nuevos esquemas mejorados bajo el marco de
esta especificación. En esta tesis criptoanalizamos las dos propuestas
más recientes en esta área de investigación, identificando importantes
vulnerabilidades. En tercer lugar, diseñamos un protocolo resistente
frente a ataques pasivos y adecuado para las etiquetas de bajo coste.
Ya que el diseño de un protocolo nuevo no es una tarea fácil, fueron
realizadas diferentes propuestas hasta que alcanzamos el protocolo
finalmente propuesto en esta tesis. A continuación, nos planteamos
el reto de diseñar un nuevo protocolo resistente frente a ataques tanto
pasivos como activos. Este nuevo protocolo está inspirado en el pro-
tocolo para smart-cards diseñado por Shien et al., pero adaptado para
los sistemas RFID. Como el protocolo anterior se basa en el uso de
primitivas criptográficas, consideramos necesario el diseño de prim-
itivas criptográficas ligeras. Esta es un area de investigación en el
que apenas ha habido propuestas en el ámbito de las etiquetas de
bajo coste. En concreto, proponemos dos nuevas primitivas, una fun-
ción resumen y un generador de números pseudoaleatorios. Una vez
diseñados, analizamos su seguridad en profundidad. A su vez, los
requisitos hardware asociados fueron cuidadosamente examinados,
comprobando siempre que estos no superaban las capacidades de
las etiquetas de coste moderado. Este periodo de investigación duró
alrededor de 2 años y medio.
La Tabla 9 incluye la duración de cada actividad.
0.3 Principales Aportaciones
El resumen de las aportaciones novedosas de esta tesis pueden agruparse
en tres puntos fundamentales:
Estado de la Cuestión Comenzamos nuestro trabajo con un exhaustivo es-
tado del arte sobre la tecnología RFID. En primer lugar, en el Capítulo
1 estudiamos los sistemas RFID, componentes y métodos de comu-
nicación. En segundo lugar, en el Capítulo 2 examinamos los princi-
Table 9: Duración de las Actividades
Actividad Duración
Parte 1 Tecnología RFID 4 meses
A. Estándares RFID 3 meses
B. Seguridad RFID 10 meses
Parte 2 A. EPC 3 meses
B. Cryptoanálisis: EPC+ 6 meses
C. Protocolo: etiquetas de bajo coste 6 meses
D. Protocolo: etiquetas de coste moderado 6 meses
E. Función Resumen Ligera 5 meses
F. PRNG Ligero 5 meses
pales estándares relacionados con la tecnología RFID. En tercer lugar,
un estudio de los principales ataques relacionados con los sistemas
RFID se puede encontrar en el Capítulo 3. Por ultimo, en el Capítulo 5
revisamos y examinamos las principales propuestas -incluyendo una
extensa sección dedicada a criptografía ligera- cuyo objetivo es dotar
de seguridad a la tecnología RFID. De este trabajo resultó la publi-
cación de un artículo en la conferencia internacional “Personal Wire-
less Communications” [164] y dos capítulos publicados por Auerbach
Publications en el libro titulado: “Security in RFID and Sensor Net-
works” [170, 171].
Estándar EPC-C1G2 En el Capítulo 4, realizamos un completo estudio y
análisis del estándar EPC-C1G2 (ISO 18000-6C) debido a que éste
puede ser considerado como el estándar universal para las etiquetas
RFID de bajo coste. Parte de este trabajo fue publicado por Auer-
bach Publications como un capítulo en el libro titulado: “The Internet
of Things: From RFID to the Next-Generation Pervasive Networked
Systems” [169].
Criptografía Ligera: etiquetas RFID de no alto coste Para contribuir en el
avance del área de investigación conocida como criptografía ligera
para sistemas RFID proponemos las siguientes aportaciones relevantes
incluidas en el Capítulo 6.
Criptoanálisis del EPC+ Algunos autores han propuestos nuevos es-
quemas -sin alterar significativamente el marco del estándar EPC-
C1G2- para corregir el nivel de seguridad insatisfactorio de la
especificación original. Criptanalizamos las dos propuestas más
recientes concluyendo que ambas propuestas poseen importantes
fallos de seguridad. De esta investigación resultó la publicación
de un artículo en la revista “Computer Standards & Interfaces”
[168], y un segundo artículo en la conferencia internacional “RFID-
Sec” [172].
Protocolo Ultraligero Una parte importante de nuestra actividad in-
vestigadora se centró en el diseño de un protocolo de autenti-
cación ultraligero resistente frente a ataques pasivos. Debido
a que el diseño de una solución segura es un reto extremada-
mente difícil, fueron propuestos varios esquemas hasta que al-
canzamos el protocolo propuesto en esta tesis. En 2006, pro-
pusimos una familia de protocolos ultraligeros (denominados
genéricamente la familia de protocols UMAP para abreviar). La
familia de protocolos UMAP fueron publicados en varias con-
ferencias internacionales dentro de las cuales se incluye la pres-
tigiosa conferencia internacional “RFIDSec” [161, 162, 163]. Pos-
teriormente varios investigadores publicaron ataques activos y
pasivos contra la familia de protocolos ultraligeros UMAP. Final-
mente, Chien publicó el protocolo SASI fuertemente inspirado
en la familia UMAP. Este protocolo da un paso más hacia el obje-
tivo de diseñar un protocolo ultraligero seguro. Sin embargo, en
esta tesis mostramos un criptanálisis del protocolo SASI bajo la
débil suposición de un atacante pasivo. Este trabajo ha sido en-
viado a la revista “IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing” (Mayo del 2008). Por ultimo, a modo de conclusión
de toda esta investigación, proponemos un nuevo protocolo, lla-
mado Gossamer e inspirado tanto en SASI como en la familia de
protocolos UMAP.
Protocol Resistente a Ataques Activos Identificamos la necesidad de
diseñar un protocolo seguro para las etiquetas de coste modera-
do. En esta clase de etiquetas, son aplicables tanto los ataques
pasivos como los activos. En vez de empezar desde cero, pro-
ponemos un protocolo inspirado en el esquema para smart-cards
diseñado por Shieh et al., pero adaptado para las etiquetas de
coste moderado. De este trabajo resultó la publicación de un
artículo en la conferencia internacional “Security in Ubiquitous
Computing (SecUbiq)” [165].
Primitivas Ligeras En el Capítulo 5 realizamos un estudio completo
sobre primitivas criptográficas ligeras. El análisis revela que
mientras que ha habido un gran avance en el diseño de cifradores
de bloque/flujo ligeros, queda mucho trabajo por hacer en el
caso de funciones resumen ligeras y PRNG ligeros. Proponemos
dos nuevas primitivas criptográficas con el objetivo de avanzar
en este area de investigación. En primer lugar, debido a que el
protocolo que proponemos para las etiquetas de coste moderado
está basado en una función resumen, proponemos una nove-
dosa función resumen ligera, llamada Tav-128. Esta primitiva
ligera junto con el protocolo mencionado anteriormente fue pu-
blicado en la conferencia internacional “SecUbiq” [165]. En se-
gundo lugar, nos centramos en los PRNG ligeros ya que su uso
fue ratificado por el estándar EPC-C1G2. En esta especificación
se exigen tres requisitos al PRNG pero no se propone ningún al-
goritmo capaz de satisfacerlos. A pesar de que existen diversos
productos comerciales fabricados conformes al estándar, ningún
algoritmo ha sido hecho público. Avanzando en esta dirección,
proponemos dos novedosos PRNG ligeros (LAMED y LAMED-
EPC). De esta investigación resultó la publicación de un artículo
en la revista “Computer Standards & Interfaces” [166].
Por ultimo, nos gustaría hacer hincapié en el impacto en la comunidad
investigadora de todos nuestros trabajos publicados y relacionados con esta
tesis. Concretamente, estos artículos han sido citados en 64 ocasiones (Con-
sultado en Junio del 2008: http://scholar.google.es/scholar?hl=
es&lr=&q=pedro+peris-lopez&btnG=Buscar&lr=). Además, hemos
creado una páginaWeb (http://www.lightweightcryptography.com/)
con el objetivo de difundir nuestra actividad investigadora lo más amplia-
mente posible.
0.4 Conclusiones
La tecnología RFID es una tecnología prometedora que podría revolucionar
los sistemas de identificación. Actualmente, los códigos de barras son el
sistema de identificación más extendido. Esta es una tecnología muy con-
solidada, que está retrasando la implantación de la tecnología RFID. Sin
embargo, la tecnología RFID ofrece ventajas importantes sobre los códi-
gos de barras. La principal ventaja es que los items etiquetados mediante
tecnología RFID se pueden identificar de forma inequívoca. Otra carac-
terística importante es que no es necesaria la intervención humana. Como
veremos en el Capítulo 2, los datos pueden ser leídos de forma automática,
sin necesidad de visión directa, a una velocidad de cientos por segundo y
desde una distancia de varios metros.
Uno de los obstáculos que está retrasando la penetración de los sis-
temas RFID es su coste. El precio de las etiquetas para su implantación
masiva debe estar en el rango de 0,05 a 0,1 ¤. Para reducir el coste, los
expertos creen que este podría ser repartido a lo largo de todo su ciclo de
vida: producción, distribución, venta y reciclado. Actualmente, sin em-
bargo todos los costes recaen en la fase de producción. Además, todo cam-
bio tecnológico trae costes asociados a las empresas. La forma de abordar
este problema no es la misma en todas las compañías. Algunas empresas,
simplemente, esperan a ver que van a hacer sus rivales. Por el contrario,
en compañías avanzadas, los lideres empresariales están estudiando el re-
torno de inversion (ROI) asociado con este cambio tecnológico. De hecho,
la penetración de la tecnología RFID difiere significativamente de un país a
otro. En España, las compañías están principalmente desarrollando proyec-
tos pilotos para analizar el uso de esta tecnología (ej. Grupo Pascual, Grupo
KH Lloreda, etc.).
0.4.1 Riesgos y Amenazas
Existe un gran desconocimiento acerca de los riesgos reales asociados con
la tecnología RFID. La gran mayoría de los artículos encontrados en los
medios de comunicación dan descripciones incorrectas y frecuentemente
catastróficas de esta tecnología. Esto no significa que los sistemas RFID
no puedan ser atacados. La tecnología RFID es una tecnología inalám-
brica. Algunos de los ataques encontrados en esta tecnología son similares
a los que suceden en otras tales como wireless, bluetooth, etc. Además,
las etiquetas RFID tienen similitudes con las smart-cards debido a las li-
mitaciones del chip. Por lo tanto, no todos los ataques asociados con esta
tecnología son nuevos.
Cuando se pregunta a la gente acerca de los riesgos de seguridad aso-
ciados con la tecnología RFID, la mayoría dice lo mismo: “privacidad”. Se
trata de una respuesta evidente debido a que la tecnología RFID es una
tecnología pervasiva. Cuando nos referimos a privacidad, realmente con-
sideramos dos conceptos: datos y localización. Sin embargo, estos no son
las únicos problemas que deben ser tenidos en cuenta a la hora de diseñar
un sistema RFID. Como los sistemas RFID están compuestos de tres com-
ponentes principales (etiqueta, lector y base de datos), cada componente
debe ser analizado. En el Capítulo 3, realizamos un exhaustivo análisis de
cada uno de los posibles riesgos.
Otro aspecto importante es el nivel de seguridad de los sistemas RFID.
Desde un punto de vista teórico, es razonable que todos los sistemas sean
resistentes frente a ataques activos y pasivos. Sin embargo, existen dife-
rentes clases de etiquetas RFID y su área de aplicación no es la misma. De
hecho, el nivel de seguridad de un sistema será un balance entre confiden-
cialidad, integridad y disponibilidad.
0.4.2 Estándares y Soluciones Propuestas
La introducción de cualquier tecnología está asociada con el desarrollo de
estándares. Inicialmente, las empresas usaban soluciones propietarias de-
bido a la falta de armonización. Hoy en días las cosas están cambiando al
menos para las etiquetas de bajo coste. Esto se debe en parte a la impor-
tante labor realizada por las organizaciones EPCGlobal e ISO. Este trabajo
dio lugar al estándar EPC Class-1 Generation-2 ratificado por ambas orga-
nizaciones. El estándar puede ser considerado como el estándar universal
para las etiquetas de bajo coste. En el Capítulo 4, analizamos en detalle la
seguridad de este estándar, reflejando importantes fallos de seguridad. Mo-
tivados por este insatisfactorio nivel de seguridad, algunos investigadores
han publicado ligeras modificaciones del estándar. Sin embargo, todos los
esquemas fallaron en sus objetivos como veremos en los Capítulos 4 y 6.
Consideramos el estándar EPC-C1G2 un buen punto de partida para
la construcción de un estándar seguro para las etiquetas de bajo coste. De
hecho, esperamos que el nivel de seguridad sea incrementado en la pro-
xima generación (Gen-3). Algunos de los problemas de seguridad de este
estándar son debidos a su diseño. En concreto, el estándar está centrado
en el fabricante mientras que los usuarios no son considerados. En nuestra
opinión, la operatividad del estándar es importante, pero los usuarios de-
berían ser tenidos en cuenta. Por ejemplo, el EPC no puede ser transmitido
como texto en claro comprometiendo la privacidad del usuario.
Aparte del EPC-C1G2, existen otros estándares relacionados con esta
tecnología, debido a su heterogeneidad. Estos pueden ser clasificados en
cinco áreas principales (tarjetas de circuito integrado sin contacto, identifi-
cación de animales, gestión de items, campo cercano y EPC), como veremos
en el Capítulo 2. Además, regulaciones regionales (ECC y ETSI en Europa)
imponen restricciones adicionales a la implantación de estos sistemas. Es-
tas restricciones están principalmente relacionadas con la planificación y
uso del espectro radioeléctrico.
La tecnología RFID no es nueva, el primer artículo relacionado se pub-
licó en los años cincuenta. Sin embargo, la investigación sobre esta tec-
nología y seguridad ha recibido una atención considerable desde el año
2003. En los años 2003 y 2004, se publicaron 10 y 30 artículos respectiva-
mente, en esta área de investigación. Esta cifra aumentó a 75, 90, y 85,
respectivamente en los tres siguientes años (http://www.avoine.net/
rfid/download/bib/bibliography-rfid.pdf; consultada en Junio
del 2008). De hecho, la seguridad en RFID es un tema de interés en un
gran número de conferencias. Muchos de estos trabajos están centrados en
seguridad, y la variedad de estas propuestas es muy diferente. Algunos au-
tores han propuesto el uso de soluciones no criptográficas tales como jaulas
de Faraday, declaración de derechos, etc. Otros autores han propuesto solu-
ciones basadas en técnicas criptográficas. Estas soluciones son muy diver-
sas, estando basadas algunas de estas en cifradores de bloque, generador
de números pseudo-aleatorios, e incluso en criptografía asimétrica. Sin em-
bargo, la solución más ampliamente usada está basada en el uso de una
función resumen. Todos los protocolos anteriores comparten la particula-
ridad común de ser protocolos de una sola ronda. En una aproximación
completamente diferente tenemos la familia de human protocols que es-
tán basados en la ejecución iterada de una ronda muy simple. Además,
sólo tres entidades (base de datos, lector y etiqueta) están involucradas
en todos los protocolos mencionados. Sin embargo, existen nuevas áreas
de aplicación más allá de la autenticación mutua, y por ejemplo, algunos
protocolos se centran en el problema de proporcionar una evidencia de la
lectura simultánea de dos o más etiquetas.
0.4.3 Protocolos Ligeros
La mayoría de las propuestas que tratan de dotar de seguridad a las etique-
tas RFID cometen dos errores. Primero, proponen un protocolo para las eti-
quetas RFID sin especificar para qué clase de etiquetas está destinado. Esto
es un punto muy importante, ya que el número de recursos disponibles
(memoria, circuito y consumo de energía, etc.) dependerá enormemente
de esta decisión. Por tanto, no todas las etiquetas soportan el mismo tipo
de operaciones. Por ejemplo, la criptografía de clave pública es aplicable
para las etiquetas de alto coste pero excede las capacidades de las etiquetas
de bajo coste. Además, cada clase de etiqueta tendrá un nivel de seguridad
diferente. No es razonable que a las etiquetas de bajo coste (ej. paquete
de galletas) se les exija el mismo nivel de seguridad que a las etiquetas
de alto coste (ej. pasaporte electrónico). En segundo lugar, los protocolos
propuestos no son realistas respecto a los recursos de las etiquetas. Como
ya hemos mencionado anteriormente, la solución más ampliamente usada
se basa en la utilización de una función resumen. A pesar de ello mu-
chos autores afirman que sus protocolos son adecuados para las etiquetas
de bajo coste. Sin embargo, un máximo de 4K puertas lógicas se pueden
dedicar a funciones de seguridad en esta clase de etiquetas. Como veremos
en el Capítulo 6, un gran número de recursos (más de 9K puertas lógicas)
son necesarios para implementar funciones resumen criptográficas están-
dar. Por otra parte, no se proponen funciones resumen ligeras. Por tanto,
la criptografía ligera es necesaria.
Con el fin de evitar errores del pasado, los requisitos y restricciones del
sistema deben ser fijados inicialmente. En nuestro trabajo, hemos discri-
minado entre dos clases de etiquetas: etiquetas de bajo coste y etiquetas
de coste moderado. Para cada clase de etiqueta se han especificado las
siguientes características: fuente de alimentación, circuitería, distancia de
lectura, precio, etc. En el Capítulo 6 pueden verse los detalles. La princi-
pal diferencia entre estas dos clases de etiquetas es el número de puertas
lógicas que pueden ser dedicados a tareas relacionas con la seguridad. Las
etiquetas de bajo coste únicamente usan operaciones eficientes (250K-4K
puertas lógicas) y las etiquetas de costemoderado soportan primitivas crip-
tográficas ligeras (< 6K puertas lógicas). Otro punto interesante es el nivel
de seguridad. Los ataques han sido divididos en activos y pasivos. Las
etiquetas de bajo coste deben ser resistentes frente a ataques pasivos y las
etiquetas de coste moderado frente a ataques pasivos y activos. Por ultimo
mencionar que recientemente Chien propuso una clasificación alternativa
de las etiquetas basada en las operaciones soportadas en las mismas (véase
Capítulo 6).
0.4.4 Problemas Sociales
Incluso considerando que los problemas tecnológicos podrían eventual-
mente ser resueltos, la implantación de los sistemas RFID a gran escala
no sería una realidad si no se educa al ciudadano acerca de sus beneficios
y riesgos potenciales, y si no podemos garantizar un nivel de seguridad
adecuado.
Gunter et al. realizaron un interesante estudio empírico acerca de la
tecnología RFID y la percepción de control desde la perspectiva del con-
sumidor [87]. La percepción de control pude ser vista como la creencia que
el consumidor tiene en que el entorno electrónico actuará sólo en los ca-
sos explícitamente permitidos. Dos factores principales son considerados
responsables de la percepción de pérdida de privacidad. En primer lugar,
una cierta aprensión a “ser accedido”, de no controlar la entrada en el en-
torno. Un atacante puede determinar el comportamiento personal y trazar
los movimientos de los poseedores de las etiquetas sin ser detectado. En se-
gundo lugar, “difusión, uso y mantenimiento de la información”, esto es, el
uso espurio de la gran cantidad de datos que pueden ser adquiridos de las
personas. Dos tecnologías para aumentar la privacidad (PET) fueron pro-
puestas a los usuarios. En el modelo orientado a usuario, los consumidores
tienen un control total sobre el sistema (ej. mecanismo de autenticación).
Por el contrario, el control de acceso es delegado a un agente (sistema de
gestión de la identidad con protección de la identidad) en el modelo orien-
tado a agente. Se analizó empíricamente cuál de estos dos mecanismos
incrementaría la aceptación para el consumidor de la tecnología RFID. La
Figura 7.1 (véase Capítulo 7) muestra la percepción de control en cada apro-
ximación. El estudio reflejó que los usuarios preferían (73.4%) desactivar
las etiquetas después de comprar un producto. Un 18% confiaban en PET
(usuario o modelo de agente), y un 8.6% estaban indecisos.
En resumen, los avances tecnológicos deben reflejarse en la sociedad,
y este aspecto no debe ser descuidado. Después de todo, los ciudadanos
tienen la última palabra para decidir el futuro de una tecnología determi-
nada.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objectives
This thesis examines cryptography for RFID systems. RFID security is an
important research subject today, as evidenced by the great number of re-
search papers published in the past two years (over 200). RFID technology
has similarities with other technologies (wireless, bluetooth), but it also has
unique features that must be taken into account when designing protocols.
Some papers do refer to attacks on RFID systems, but so far there has not
been a rigorous study on the subject. Understanding attacks is the first
step towards creating mechanisms to secure the technology. More thor-
ough study is therefore necessary. The extent and impact of an attack can
vary considerably; some focus on a particular component of the system (eg.
the tag) whereas others target the whole system. As RFID technology is a
pervasive technology, privacy is one of main problems to be solved. Pri-
vacy concerns both information and location. Although these are the risks
most often referred to in the literature, there are other equally important
problems to address. To aid the reader in his comprehension of the matter,
the threats are grouped according to the unit involved. First we examine
threats related to tags and readers such as eavesdropping, cloning, replay
and relay attacks. Then we look at the threats to the back-end database (eg.
ONS attack, virus).
Due to the diversity of RFID technology, there are a great number of stan-
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dards in existence. The EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard (the EPC-C1G2
standard for short) is one of the most significant. The computational and
storing restrictions of Class-1 RFID tags are very severe, which rules out the
use of standard cryptographic solutions. Some experts consider this stan-
dard as the universal for low-cost RFID tags. Since its publication, various
researchers have pointed out its security risks, but a rigorous security anal-
ysis still awaits. This necessity has provided the motivation for our analy-
sis, which concludes that security is very deficient. We would hope that the
results of our analysis be taken into account in future versions (Generation-
3) of the specification, which we believe must be able to provide greater
security. In fact, it is incomprehensible that user information and location
privacy should not be guaranteed.
Several authors have proposed solutions intending to provide satisfactory
security within the framework of the EPC-C1G2 standard. In 2007, Chien
et al. proposed a mutual authentication protocol advancing on Duc et al.’s
schemewhich had proved vulnerable to attacks such as DoS attacks against
both tags and readers. Additionally, disguise tags are not detected and for-
ward secrecy is not guaranteed. These protocols assume that tags support
on-chip a cyclic redundancy code and a pseudo-random generation func-
tion. The same year, Konidola et al. presented a tag-reader mutual authen-
tication scheme at the prestigious RFID security conference (RFIDSec’07).
The scheme can be considered an improved version of an earlier proposal
which was insecure even under a passive attack. In the scheme, a PadGen
chain is introduced to protect access and kill passwords. We have crypt-
analyzed these two proposals and are able to point out important security
flaws which are difficult to solve. Consequently, all protocols proposed
within the framework of the EPC-C1G2 specification (that are known to
us) fall short of the security objectives.
Cryptography seems inevitable as a way to make RFID technology secure.
From a theoretical point of view, standard cryptography may be a correct
approach. However, it demands resources far in excess of those available
on many tags. Low-cost RFID tags are very constrained devices, having
severe storage, circuitry and power consumption limitations. Therefore,
lightweight cryptographic techniques appear to be the most appropriate
solution for non-high-cost RFID tags.
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Many research articles do not specify the class of tag for which the pro-
posed protocol is appropriate. Resources vary with the class of tag -in other
words, tag class determines the kind of operations that can be supported.
This thesis focuses on non-high-cost RFID tags with a distinction between
low-cost and moderate-cost tags. We examine both kinds and identify their
requirements and restrictions.
Having established the requirements, one protocol is proposed for each
class of tag. Prior to defining the protocol, an adversary model is identified.
The protocol is then defined, being broken down into its different stages.
A security and performance analysis follows. It should be noted that there
are greater security demands on moderate-cost tags than on low-cost RFID
tags. Indeed, moderate-cost tags must resist both passive and active attacks
whereas low-cost tags need only resist passive attacks.
The security of the proposed protocol, which corresponds to the require-
ments of moderate-cost tags, is based on a secure one-way hash function.
However, the resources demanded by standard cryptographic primitives
far exceed those of moderate-cost tags. To date, no lightweight hash func-
tion has been proposed that is suitable for RFID tags. So research must
concentrate efforts on designing lightweight primitives. With the aim of
advancing this research area, a new lightweight hash function, named Tav-
128, is therefore proposed. Its design is an attempt to avoid the errors oc-
curring in certain primitives proposed in the past (such as the use of a very
linear expansion algorithm). A security analysis, examining its output over
a low entropy input, is then performed. Finally, careful consideration is
given to the resources required for its implementation.
Additionally, the EPC-C1G2 standard ratified the use of PRNGs for low-
cost RFID tags. PRNGs conforming to this specification should meet three
conditions of randomness. These are clearly specified, but no algorithm
was proposed. Although there are some commercial products conform-
ing to the EPC-C1G2 specification, the algorithms of the supported PRNGs
have not been made public. So the design of public algorithms would be
desirable. As a step in the right direction, we propose a new lightweight
PRNG conforming to the standard. Indeed, two PRNGs have been de-
signed: LAMED (32-bits) and LAMED-EPC (16-bits). Genetic program-
ming was employed in their construction. Once presented, an in-depth
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security analysis is made, which also looks at LAMED-EPC’s compliance
with the specification. Finally, an architectural design is proposed, which
gives an overestimation of the number of logic gates necessary for imple-
mentation.
1.2 Motivation
RFID is one of the most promising technologies in the field of ubiquitous
computing. Indeed, it may well transform identification processes. The
technology offers many advantages over other identification systems. At
the moment, the dominant identification system is the barcode. The main
difference between the two technologies is that barcodes only allow type
identification whereas RFID tags allow unequivocal identification. This
means that two items of the same type can be distinguished if RFID tech-
nology is employed.
However, RFID technology has its disadvantages too. There are associated
security risks. Privacy and tracking are the principal issues, but there are
others that need to be considered too: physical attacks, counterfeiting, de-
nial of service, etc. Additionally, the cost of RFID tags is an obstacle to
technological advance. When a new technology appears (eg. bluetooth,
wireless technology), the main concerns are cost and efficiency rather than
security. We believe that past errors should be avoided. Cryptographic
solutions are therefore required to provide adequate levels of security. De-
pending on the RFID class, the security level will vary. It is important to
realise that not all tag classes need to guarantee the same security level.
Since 2003, there have been a great number of research publications fo-
cusing on security. The vast majority of these do not realistically address
the severe limitations of these devices (storage, circuitry, power consump-
tion, etc.). Although from a theoretical point of view the proposals make
sense, their application in a great number of low-cost tags is not possible.
They are based on cryptographic primitives, but lightweight cryptographic
primitives are not discussed and standard cryptographic primitives exceed
tag capabilities. Additionally, it is often not specified for which class of tag
the proposals are suitable.
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In 2003, Vajda et al. published the first article proposing the use of
lightweight cryptography. The following year, Juels introduced the con-
cept of minimalist cryptography. In 2005, there was no proposal in this
area, the majority of proposals being based on the use of hash function.
Nevertheless, this research has attracted some interest recently when cer-
tain lightweight protocols were proposed by the author of this thesis, in
2006. Of these protocols, one was presented in the RFIDSec conference,
considered the most important event in the field of RFID security. Since
the publication of these works, certain authors including the author of this
thesis have tried to advance the development of lightweight cryptography
for non-high-cost RFID tags.
1.3 Methods and Schedule
The development of the thesis is structured in two main blocks:
RFID Technology First, an understanding of RFID technology was neces-
sary. A good starting point was reading "RFID Handbook: funda-
mentals and applications in contactless smart-cards and identifica-
tion". Other books and many articles were also read in the same pe-
riod. Knowledge of the technology was further extended by studying
related standards. We considered it appropriate to focus our investi-
gation of RFID technology on the security aspects of these RFID de-
vices. During this same period, our first step was to consult the web-
site maintained by Gildas Avoine (http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/
~gavoine/rfid/) which gathers a great number of articles about
security and privacy in RFID systems. Reading these and many other
articles provided us with the very latest news in this research area.
Research activity in the three areas (RFID technology, standards and
security) could be said to have taken about a year and a half, although
in reality the phase is an ongoing one, because RFID technology cur-
rently attracts a great deal of attention and new advances happen by
the month.
Advances in Lightweight Cryptography Having understood and ana-
lyzed all the published proposals, we decided to focus investiga-
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tion on non-high-cost RFID tags. The studies mentioned previously
highlighted the need for advance in the development of lightweight
cryptographic solutions. First, a security analysis of the EPC Class-
1 Generation-2 standard was performed. We consider the analysis
important because this specification can be considered as the univer-
sal standard for low-cost RFID tags. The analysis revealed important
security risks. Several authors, being aware of these, proposed im-
proved schemes under the framework of the specification. We crypt-
analyzed the two most recent proposals in this field and identified
important vulnerabilities. Thirdly, we designed a new protocol resis-
tant to passive attacks and suitable for low-cost RFID tags. As the
design of a new protocol is not an easy task, different proposals were
made until we arrived at the proposed protocol in this thesis. We
then went on to consider the great challenge of designing a new pro-
tocol resistant to both passive and active attacks. This new protocol
is inspired in Shieh et al.’s protocol for smart cards, but adapted to
RFID systems. As this protocol is based on cryptographic primitives,
we considered the design of lightweight cryptographic primitives to
be an imperative. This is a research area where hardly any proposals
have considered non-high cost RFID tags. Specifically, we proposed
two new lightweight primitives (a hash function and a pseudoran-
dom number generator). After their design, a thorough security anal-
ysis was performed. Hardware complexity was also examined, to
check that the resources required did not exceed the capabilities of
moderate-cost RFID tags. This period of research lasted just over two
years and a half.
To conclude, Table 1.1 shows the duration of each activity.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, RFID systems are introduced. First, an overview of RFID com-
ponents (tags, readers, back-end database) is given. Secondly, communica-
tion methods and interfaces are described. Then standards related to RFID
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Table 1.1: Activity Duration
Intended Activity Duration
Part 1 A. RFID technology 4 months
B. Standards 3 months
C. RFID Security 10 months
Part 2 A. EPC 3 months
B. Cryptanalysis: EPC+ 6 months
C. Protocol: low-cost RFID tags 6 months
D. Protocol: moderate-cost RFID tags 6 months
E. Lightweight hash function 5 months
F. Lightweight PRNG 5 months
technology are outlined. To clarify the explanation, they have been classi-
fied in five main groups: contactless integrated circuit cards, animals, item
management, near field communication, and electronic product code.
Chapter 3 describes in detail the kind of attacks that RFID systems can suf-
fer. First, the main privacy issues (privacy and tracking) are examined.
Then attacks related to tags and readers are analyzed. Finally, attacks con-
nected with back-end databases are studied.
In Chapter 4, the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (IS0 18000-6C) standard is an-
alyzed in depth. First, the main differences between Generation-2 and
Generation-1 tags are described. Secondly, the main concepts of the stan-
dard are explained. Then a detailed description of the messages exchanged
in the different operations is given. With understanding of the procedures
now gained, a security analysis is carried out. Current proposals to im-
prove upon the security of the standard are also considered, and their se-
curity aspects examined.
Chapter 5 introduces the main proposals to date for solutions to the security
problems discussed in Chapter 3. These are divided into different groups
(classical cryptography, hash function based schemes etc.) to facilitate the
reader’s understanding. Note that a whole section with the main proposals
for lightweight cryptography appears at the end of the chapter. The basic
principles and a critical review of each proposal are included. Although
the full details are not given, readers may consult the bibliography entries
for a more in-depth consideration of the subject.
Chapter 6 looks at solutions based on lightweight cryptography. First, the
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necessity of lightweight cryptography for non-high-cost RFID tags is ex-
plained. Secondly, we cryptanalyze two novel authentication protocols un-
der the EPC-C1G2 specification. Then an ultralightweight protocol resis-
tant to passive attacks and conforming to low-cost RFID tags requirements
is proposed. The cryptanalysis of the recently proposed and innovative ul-
tralightweight protocol SASI is also incorporated in this section. Finally, a
new protocol resistant to both passive and active attacks, and conforming
to moderate-cost RFID tag restrictions, is presented. Since this last protocol
is based on the use of a hash function and a PRNG, two new lightweight
primitives suitable to moderate-cost RFID tags are also put forward.
Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions that have been drawn previously in
the corresponding chapters of the thesis. The concept of social problems is
then introduced. Finally, there is an extensive bibliography for the reader
to study the subject in depth.
1.5 Evaluation Methods
In the early part of the research period dealing with lightweight cryptogra-
phy (2.A and 2.B), the security of the EPCClass-1 Generation-2 specification
was examined. First, the specification was considered in detail: physical
layer, tag identification layer, tag memory, tag states and slot counter, etc.
Then the messages exchanged in the different operations (select, inventory,
access) were studied. Once the procedures were understood, their secu-
rity vulnerabilities were identified. Additionally, some researchers have
tried to enhance the security level of this standard. After studying these
protocols (EPC+ for short), their security was assessed, particularly their
resistance to standard attacks such as privacy, tracking etc.
In the subsequent part of the research period dealing with lightweight
cryptography (2.C and 2.D), two new lightweight protocols for non-high-
cost RFID tags were designed. These were specifically suited to low-cost
and moderate-cost RFID tags respectively. First, to define the protocol, the
requirements of each tag class were identified. These requirements were
then all evaluated after design of the protocol. Since designing a new pro-
tocol is not an easy task, different versions of the protocols were created
until a definitive version could be identified. The protocols were submit-
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ted for publication to recognized peer-reviewed conferences or journals, a
process that allows the exchange of new ideas and allows potential vul-
nerabilities to be detected by the research community. Most importantly, it
encourages advance in the creation of lightweight cryptography for RFID
systems.
As mentioned previously, protocol design is a complex and challenging
task. An in-depth security analysis must be carried out on completion of
the design. In our case, the proposed protocol was analyzed for its robust-
ness to the following attack types:
X User Privacy
X Location Privacy
X Data Integrity
XMutual Authentication
X Forward Security
X Replay Attack
X Forgery Resistance
X Data Recovery
X Active Attacks
X Etc
Once the security analysis was complete, the performance of the protocol
was studied. This was an important process because it included assessment
of compliance with tag class requirements. Computational, storage, and
communication overhead are some of the parameters included in the anal-
ysis. Finally, the protocol was compared with the main proposals found in
the research literature.
Finally, two new primitives (a hash function and a PRNG) were proposed
(2.E and 2.F). Designing these primitives without exceeding the capabili-
ties of constrained tags (moderate-cost) is a challenge. We endeavoured to
avoid errors encountered in previous primitive designs. Once the design
of the primitive was completed, a security analysis was carried out. The
statistical properties of the outputs generated by the primitive were ana-
lyzed using four well-known stringent randomness test suites: ENT [216],
DIEHARD [149], NIST [205], and David Sexton’s battery [6]. The confor-
mity of the PRNG primitive with the randomness requirements established
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in the EPC-C1G2 standard was also scrutinized. Finally, these new prim-
itives were submitted for publication to the recognized conferences and
journals for analysis by the research community.
The implementation of these functions was another important issue. Func-
tions should be as efficient as possible from a hardware perspective. An
architectural design was proposed for each lightweight primitive. An over-
estimation of the gate count and throughput was obtained. Finally, the
primitive was compared with other relevant proposals.
1.6 Main Contributions
The summary of the novel contributions of this thesis can be stated in three
main points as:
State of the Art We started out with a comprehensive survey of the state
of the art concerning with RFID technology: RFID systems, compo-
nents and communications methods in Chapter 1; the main standards
related to RFID technology in Chapter 2; and a comprehensive study
of the main attacks on RFID systems in Chapter 3. Finally, in Chapter
5 we listed and analyzed the main proposals (including an extensive
section on lightweight cryptography) formaking RFID technology se-
cure. This work led to the publication of a paper for the International
PersonalWireless Communications Conference [164] and of two book
chapters in Security in RFID and Sensor Networks [170, 171] published
by Auerbach Publications.
EPC-C1G2 Standard As the EPC-C1G2 (ISO 18000-6C) is regarded as the
universal standard for low-cost RFID tags, a comprehensive study
and analysis was completed (Chapter 4). Part of this is going to ap-
pear as a book chapter in The Internet of Things: From RFID to the
Next-Generation Pervasive Networked Systems [169] to be published by
Auerbach Publications.
Lightweight Cryptography for Low-cost RFID Tags We proposed rele-
vant contributions advancing research into lightweight cryptography
for RFID systems (see Chapter 6), as follows:
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Cryptanalysis of EPC+ Without significantly altering the frame-
work of the EPC-C1G2 standard, some authors have proposed
new schemes to correct the unsatisfactory level of security in the
specification. We cryptanalyzed the two most recent EPC+ pro-
posals and concluded that both show significant security flaws.
This investigation resulted in the publication of two articles: in
the Computer Standards & Interfaces Journal [168] and in the
International Conference on RFID Security [172].
An Ultralightweight Protocol An important part of our research ac-
tivity was centered on the design of an ultralightweight proto-
col resistant to passive attacks. Since designing a secure solution
is a great challenge, several schemes were proposed until the
protocol proposed in this thesis (Gossamer protocol) was cre-
ated. In 2006, we proposed a family of ultra-lightweight proto-
cols (the UMAP protocols for short). The UMAP protocols were
published in several international conferences including the In-
ternational Conference on RFID security [161, 162, 163]. Sev-
eral researchers published passive and active attacks against the
UMAP family of protocols. Finally, Chien et al. published the
protocol SASI which is a step towards designing a secure ultra-
lightweight protocol. However, we have shown in this thesis a
cryptanalysis of SASI under the weak assumption of a passive
attacker. This work was submitted to IEEE Transactions on De-
pendable and Secure Computing (May 2008). The fruit of all this
research is a new protocol called Gossamer, inspired in SASI and
in the UMAP family of protocols, and presented in this thesis.
A Protocol Resistant to Active Attacks We identify the necessity of
a secure protocol design for moderate-cost RFID tags. Both
passive and active attacks apply to this class of tag. Rather
than starting from scratch, we proposed a protocol inspired by
Shieh et al.’s protocol for smart cards but adapted for moderate-
cost RFID tags. This work led to a publication in the Interna-
tional Conference on Security in Ubiquitous Computing (SecU-
biq) [165].
Lightweight Primitives In Chapter 5, a thorough study of
lightweight cryptographic primitives was made. The anal-
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ysis reveals that whilst great strides have been made in
lightweight stream/block cipher design, much work remains to
be done in the case of lightweight hash functions. We proposed
two new lightweight primitives to advance research in this area.
First, since the protocol for moderate cost RFID tags mentioned
earlier is based on a hash function, a novel lightweight hash
function, Tav-128, was proposed. This lightweight primitive
was published together with the protocol at the SecUbiq con-
ference [165]. Secondly, we looked at lightweight PRNGs, as
their use for low-cost RFID tags is ratified by the EPC-C1G2
standard. In this specification three conditions are required for
the PRNG, yet no algorithms have been proposed. So far, no
public algorithm has been published despite the existence of
several commercial products. To this end, two novel lightweight
PRNGs (LAMED and LAMED-EPC) were proposed. This led
to the publication of an article in the Computer Standards &
Interfaces Journal [166].
Finally, we would like to highlight the impact that our work has
made on the research community in connection with this thesis.
Our articles have been cited 64 times (Consulted in June 2008:
http://scholar.google.es/scholar?hl=es&lr=&q=pedro+
peris-lopez&btnG=Buscar&lr=). Additionally, a Web site
(http://www.lightweightcryptography.com/) was created to
spread our research activity as widely as possible.
Chapter 2
RFID Systems
2.1 Introduction
At the moment, the most extended identification systems are barcodes (Fig-
ure 2.1). Initially, there were two standards: the Universal Product Code
(UPC, United States) and the European Article Number (EAN, Europe).
Although at first EANwas only taken on by twelve European countries, by
the end of 2004 more than one hundred countries all over the world had
already adopted this standard. Finally, when the United States decided to
adopt the European-born standard, UPC and EAN merged, giving rise to
what is nowadays known as GS1 [60].
Recently, there has been mass deployment of Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion systems (RFID) (Figure 2.2). These systems comprise Radio Frequency
(RF) tags or transponders, and RF readers or transceivers. Tag readers
broadcast an RF signal to access resistant data stored in tags. One of the
Figure 2.1: Barcode
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Figure 2.2: RFID Tag
main differences between tags and barcodes is that RFID tags provide an
unique identifier, or a pseudonym that allows access to this unique identi-
fier. The use of RFID tags offers several advantages over barcodes; data can
be read automatically, without line of sight and through a non-conducting
material such as cardboard or paper, at a rate of hundreds of times per sec-
ond, and at a distance of several meters.
RFID systems are becoming valuable tools in processes such as manufac-
turing, provision chain management and stock control. Around 5 billion
barcodes are read daily, so efficiency gains from using RFID tags could
lower the cost of tagged items substantially [195]. The penetration of RFID
systems is nowadays mainly limited by privacy concerns and by their cost,
which must be between 0.05 and 0.1 ¤ to be considered economically vi-
able. Additionally, in order to take full advantage of the potential offered
by RFID tags, the identification of an item must be maintained throughout
its life cycle: production, distribution, sale and recycling (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: Life Cycle of an Object
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The low cost demanded for RFID tags causes them to be very resource lim-
ited. Typically, they can only store hundreds of bits, have roughly between
5K and 10K logic gates, and a maximum communication range of a few
meters. Within this gate counting, only between 250 and 4K gates can be
devoted to security functions. It is interesting to recall that for a standard
implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) between 20K
and 30K gates are needed. Additionally, power restrictions should be taken
into account, since most RFID tags in use are passive. Nor can these sys-
tems be expected to store passwords securely, because tags are not at all
resistant to tampering attacks.
In spite of all these limitations, the penetration of RFID technology is in-
creasing steadily. Experts believe that both systems will coexist for some
time and that finally, RFID tags will completely replace classical barcodes.
Some developments and current uses of this technology are:
• The US Department of Defense and Wal-Mart require all their major
suppliers to use RFID technology in their supply chains [18].
• Delta Airlines is testing RFID for luggage control [20].
• Michelin is planning to build RFID tags into its tyres [17].
• The European Central Bank wants to attach a tag into 500 ¤ bank
notes [112].
• The Vatican’s library has installed RFID technology for tracking
books [19].
However, the implantation of RFID systems is not all smooth sailing, as
certain organizations like CASPIAN [41] and FOEBUD [75] are strongly
against their mass use.
2.2 Overview of RFID Systems
2.2.1 RFID System Components
RFID systems are made up of three main components, briefly described
bellow: the transponder or RFID tag, the transceiver or RFID reader, and
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the back-end database.
Transponder or RFID Tag In an RFID system, each object will be labeled
with a tag. Each tag contains a microchip with some computation
and storage capabilities, and a coupling element, such as an antenna
coil for communication. Tags can be classified according to two main
criteria:
1. The type of memory: The memory element serves as writable
and non-writable data storage. Tags can be programmed to be
read-only, write-once read-many, or fully rewritable. Depend-
ing on the kind of tag, tag programming can take place at the
manufacturing level or at the application level.
2. The source of power: A tag can obtain power from the signal
received from the reader, or it can have its own internal source
of power. The way the tag gets its power generally defines the
category of the tag.
Passive RFID tags Passive tags do not have an internal source
of power. They harvest their power from the reader that
sends out electromagnetic waves. They are restricted in
their read/write range as they rely on RF electromagnetic
energy from the reader for both power and communication.
Semi-passive RFID tags Semi-passive tags use a battery to run
the microchip’s circuitry but communicate by harvesting
power from the reader signal.
Active RFID tags Active tags possess a power source that is
used to run the microchip’s circuitry and to broadcast a sig-
nal to the reader.
Transceiver or RFID Reader RFID readers are generally composed of an
RF module, a control unit, and a coupling element to interrogate elec-
tronic tags via RF communication. Readers may have better internal
storage and processing capabilities, and frequently connect to back-
end databases. Complex computations, such as all kind of crypto-
graphic operations, may be carried out by RFID readers, as they do
not usually have more limitations than those found in modern hand-
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Table 2.1: Communication Methods
Passive Passive backscatter or inductive coupling
Semi-passive Passive backscatter or inductive coupling
Active Transmits and receives RF signal
held devices or PDAs. Under this assumption, complexity is trans-
ferred out of the restricted tags.
Back-end Database The information provided by tags is usually an index
to a back-end database (pointers, randomized IDs, etc.). This limits
the information stored in tags to only a few bits, which is a sensible
choice due to severe tag limitations in processing and storing. It is
generally assumed that the connection between readers and back-end
databases is secure, because processing and storing constraints are
not so tight in readers, and common solutions such as SSL/TLS can
be used.
2.2.2 Passive Communications Methods
The communication between a passive tag and a reader consists of energy
transfer as well as data transfer. Energy is transferred using coupling via
electromagnetic fields [82]. An electromagnetic field, as the name implies,
has an electrical component and a magnetic component. RFID tags uses
either the electric field or the magnetic field or both to receive energy from
the reader. There are various methods of transferring the data to a reader,
but passive tags usually use backscatter or inductive coupling. Table 2.1
summarizes the different communication methods for different tag types.
Passive Backscatter Passive tags communicate with a reader using passive
backscatter, also called modulated backscatter (see Figure 2.4). The
reader transmits a continuous wave RF signal into the reading envi-
ronment. When a tag appears in the area, it receives the reader signal
and demodulates it (or breaks it up) into patterns of ones and zeros.
This data is used as commands to inform the tag what operation to
perform. By detuning and tuning its antenna very rapidly, the tag
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Figure 2.4: Passive Backscatter [230]
modulates the signal and reflects it, in a pattern of ones and zeros,
back to the reader.
Inductive Coupling (Magnetic coupling) The electrical current flow
through a conductor generates a magnetic field around the conduc-
tor. However, there is a further point to this phenomenon. When a
conductor is exposed to a magnetic field, the magnetic field produces
a current flow in the conductor. This is known as inductive coupling,
because a current is generated by the influence of the magnetic field.
This communication process is used by Low Frequency (LF) and
High Frequency (HF) band RFID devices. The RFID reader’s antenna
uses current to generate the magnetic field. The antenna on the RFID
tag, when exposed to the magnetic field generated by the reader’s
antenna, generates a current in the tag that powers the tag circuitry.
Circuitry on the RFID tag switches the impedance load of the tag’s an-
tenna, according to the data stream, causing modulation of the mag-
netic field joining the reader and tag. Themodulation is demodulated
by circuitry in the RFID reader, and the data is transmitted to the user
(see Figure 2.5).
Electromagnetic Coupling Ultra High Frequency and Microwave tags
usually use electromagnetic coupling. They can utilize the electric
field as well as the magnetic field for energy. Because of the nature
of the magnetic field, it can be utilized only at short distances from
the source. That is why LF and HF tags, which mainly use mag-
netic fields, have short read ranges. Sometimes, where UHF and mi-
crowave tags are in near proximity to the radiating source, they can
also use the magnetic field if the antenna design allows it. For longer
read ranges, the magnetic fields get weaker and the electric field is
used to resonate the tag’s antenna in a specific frequency band.
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Figure 2.5: Inductive Coupling [230]
2.2.3 RFID System Interface
In this section, we focus exclusively on passive RFID tags, since we con-
sider that these will be the first to be massively deployed and form part of
our daily lives. Additionally, these low-cost RFID systems are very limited
on resources, which forces some interesting trade-offs in their designs.
Transceiver/Transponder Coupling Communication Passive RFID tags
obtain their operating power by harvesting energy from the RF signal
of the reader by means of passive backscatter or inductive coupling.
They have a reading distance of up to 3.3m.
The signal sent from readers to tags must be used simultaneously to
transmit both information and energy. However, readers normally
operate in Industrial Scientific-Medical (ISM) bands, so there are re-
strictions in the bandwidth and in the transmitted power. Tags, on
the other hand, are not subject to these limitations.
Data Coding The exchange of data between the reader and the tag, and
vice versa, must be produced efficiently; so both coding and modu-
lation are used. The coding/modulation is defined according to the
existing limitations in the backward and the forward channel. Read-
ers will be able to transmit greater power, but will have bandwidth
limitations. Tags, which are passive, will not have bandwidth limita-
tions.
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Table 2.2: Coding Techniques
Channel Usual Coding
Forward Channel Manchester or NRZ
Backward Channel PPM or PWM
As a coding mechanism, level codes (Non-Return-to-Zero, NRZ; and
Return to Zero, RZ) or transition codes (Pulse Pause Modulation,
PPM; Pulse Weight Modulation, PWM; and Manchester) are mostly
used. These coding techniques are shown in Table 2.2.
Modulation The modulation scheme determines how the bitstream is
transmitted between readers and tags, and vice versa. Three possi-
ble solutions exist: Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK), Frequency Shift
Keying (FSK) and Phase Shift Keying (PSK). The choice of modula-
tion type is based on power consumption, reliability and bandwidth
requirements.
Tag Anti-collision Collisions in RFID systems happen when multiple tags
simultaneously answer a reader signal. Methods used to solve this
kind of problem, allowing reliable communication between readers
and tags, are referred to as anti-collision methods. The anti-collision
algorithms used in RFID systems are quite similar to those applied
in networks, but they take into account that RFID tags are generally
more limited than the average network device. Two approaches are
used: probabilistic or deterministic. In practice, however, a combina-
tion of both is used to solve the problem.
Reader Anti-collision In this case, several readers interrogate the same tag
at the same time. This is known in the bibliography as the Reader Col-
lision Problem. One possible solution to this problem consists of allo-
cating frequencies over time to a set of readers by either a distributed
or a centralized approach.
Frequencies and Regulations Most RFID systems operate in ISM bands
[102]. ISM bands are designated by the International Union of
Telecommunications and are freely available for use by low-power,
short-range systems. The most commonly used ISM frequencies for
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Figure 2.6: RFID Standards
RFID systems are 13.56MHz and 865-868MHz (only in Europe). Each
band has its own radiation power and bandwidth regulations.
2.3 RFID Standards
RFID systems do not lack standards. Those standards typically describe the
physical and the link layers, covering aspects such as the air interface, anti-
collision mechanisms, communication protocols and security functions.
Nevertheless, not everything is well covered, and there is a certain absence
of standardization in testing methods and application data (notably in pro-
tocols and application programming interfaces). Figure 2.6 summarizes the
most important standards [164].
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Many organizations making standards around RFID base their standards
on existing ones developed by the ISO/IEC, and then augment or modify
them to meet the needs of their particular application or design.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the world’s
leading developer of international standards. ISO technical standards spec-
ify the requirements for products, services, processes, materials, and sys-
tems. ISO has also developed standards for good(s) conformity assessment,
managerial, and organizational practices.
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a leading global or-
ganization that prepares and publishes international standards for all elec-
trical, electric, and related technologies. The IEC promotes international
cooperation on electrotechnical standardization, such as the assessment of
conformity to standards in the fields of electricity, electronics, and related
technologies such as RFID.
The EPCglobal has also contributed to RFID standardization. EPC is a joint
venture between the EAN International and the Uniform Code Council
(UCC). It was chartered to establish and support the Electronic Product
Code (EPC) Network as the global specification and leading to the global
worldwide standard (ISO) for immediate, automatic and accurate identifi-
cation of any item in the supply chain, and has become the major organiza-
tion for the development of RFID specifications.
2.3.1 Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards
ISO 7810 defines a special type of identification card without contact. Ac-
cording to the communication range, three types of cards can be distin-
guished:
Close-coupled Cards (ISO 10536) These are cards that operate at a very
short distance from the reader (< 1 centimeter).
Proximity Cards (ISO 14443) These are cards that operate at an approxi-
mate distance of 10 centimeters from the reader. They can be consid-
ered as a high-end RFID transponder since they have a microproces-
sor.
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Vicinity Cards (ISO 15693) These are cards that operate at distances
greater than one meter. Unlike previous cards (ISO 14443), they usu-
ally only incorporate inexpensive state machines, instead of micro-
processors.
2.3.2 RFID in Animals
ISO 11784, ISO 11785, and ISO 14223 standardize tags for animal identifi-
cation in the frequency band below 135 KHz. Initially, standards define an
identifier of 64 bits. In ISO 14223, greater blocks for reading and writing,
as well as blocks of protected writing, are allowed. There are hardly any
differences between the communication protocols defined in ISO 14223 and
ISO 18000-2.
2.3.3 Item Management
ISO 18000 defines the air interface, collision detection mechanisms, and the
communication protocol for item tags in different frequency bands. The
reference architecture is described in part 1, and parts 2-6 specify the char-
acteristics for the different frequency bands. Specifically, part 2 defines tags
for low frequency (< 135 KHz). Part 3-1 for HF systems (13.56MHz) is com-
patible with ISO 15693 (but with more flexibility in tag design), and part 3-2
specifies a next generation RFID system in the same frequency band with
higher bandwidth and faster scanning of multiple tags. Part 4 specifies 2.4
GHz systems: in mode 1, a passive backscatter system and in mode 2, ac-
tive tags with long range and high-data rates. Part 5 for the 5.8 GHz band
is currently withdrawn. Part 6 defines a passive backscatter system around
900 MHz. Part 7 specifies a RFID system with active tags and long range
in the 433 MHz band. Finally, ISO/IEC 18000 is employed in conjunction
with a great number of application oriented standards:
• ISO/IEC 6346 Freight containers - Coding and marking.
• ISO/IEC 7816 (1-12) Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards
with contacts.
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• ISO/IEC 1736X and ISO 10374.2 Pertain to large shipping container
applications of RFID.
• ISO/IEC 14816 Road traffic and transport telematics. Automatic ve-
hicle and equipment identification.
• ISO/IEC 15691/15692 Deal with the data protocol/application inter-
face as well as encoding rules and memory functions for item man-
agement.
• 10374 Define uses of RFID for freight container identification.
• ISO/IEC 17358 Applications requirements include hierarchical data
mapping.
• ISO/IEC 17363 Freight containers.
• ISO/IEC 17364 Returnable transport items.
• ISO/IEC 17365 Transport units.
• ISO/IEC 17366 Product packaging.
• ISO/IEC 17367 Product tagging.
• ISO/IEC 10374.2 RFID freight container identification.
2.3.4 Near-Field Communication (NFC)
NFCIP-1 NFC is designed for interactions between tags and electronic de-
vices in close proximity (< 10 cm). The standards ETSI TS 102.190,
ISO 18092, and ECMA 340 identically define the Near Field Commu-
nications Interface and Protocol-1 (NFCIP-1).
These protocols describe the air interface, initialization, collision
avoidance, a frame format, and a block-oriented data-exchange pro-
tocol with error handling. Additionally, they describe two different
communication modes: active and passive.
NFCIP-2 TheNear Field Communication Interface and Protocol-2 (NFCIP-
2) specifies the communication mode selection mechanism (ECMA
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352). NFCIP-2 compliant devices can enter in three different commu-
nication modes: NFCIP-1, ISO 14443, and ISO 15693. All these modes
operate at 13.56 MHz and are designed not to disturb other RF fields
at the same frequency.
2.3.5 Electronic Product Code (EPC)
The Auto-ID (Automatic Identification) Center was created in October 1999
at the MIT Department of Mechanical Engineering, by a number of leading
figures. At the beginning, EPC was developed by the Auto-ID Center. The
Auto-ID Center officially closed 26th October, 2003. The center had com-
pleted its work and transferred its technology to EPCglobal [64]. EPCglobal
is a joint venture between EAN International and the Uniform Code Coun-
cil (UCC).
2.3.5.1 Tag Data Standard
The EPC Tag Data Standard version 1.3 defines standardized EPC tag data,
including how it is encoded on the tag and how it is encoded for use in
the information systems layer of the EPC Network System [67]. Standard-
ized EPC data consists of an EPC identifier, which uniquely identifies an
individual object, as well as a filter value, which enables effective and effi-
cient reading of the EPC tag. Additionally, some types of EPC tags (Class-1
Generation-2) allow user defined data. Specifically, an EPC number con-
tains:
Header: identifies the length, type, structure, version and generation.
Manager Number: identifies the company or company entity.
Object Class: is similar to a Stock Keeping Unit (SKU).
Serial Number: is the specific instance of the object class being tagged.
The EPC Tag Data Standard version 1.3 does not provide specific guidance
for EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Tags. Specifically, the standard defines the
following encoding schemes:
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GTIN Global Trade Item Number is the globally unique number used to
identify trade items, products or services. This term also refers to the
entire family of UCC.EAN. A GTIN is a numeric structure containing
8 digits (EAN-8), 12 digits (EAN-12), 13 digits (EAN-13) or 14 digits
(EAN-14).
SSCC Serial Shipping Container Code is a fixed length, 20-digit number
that contains no classifying elements. It has a trailing check digit
and a leading extension digit, which a company can use for inter-
nal needs. The central 18 digits represent the company prefix and the
serial reference. The SSCC is different for each carton and shipping
container, regardless of its content. The SSCC is specially used for
tracking cartons containing custom quantities of mixed products.
GLN Global Location Number is a globally unique 13-digit number that
provides a standard means of identifying any legal, functional or
physical location within a business or organizational entity such as
a company (legal entities), a specific department within a legal entity
(functional entities), a loading dock (physical entities), etc.
GRAI Global Returnable Asset Identifier provides the unique identifica-
tion of a returnable asset. A returnable asset is a reusable package or
transport equipment of a certain value. The identifier is composed
of a company prefix, and a individual asset type. Optionally a serial
number, allowing its unique identification, can be included.
GIAI Global Individual Asset Identifier is used to uniquely identify an en-
tity that is part of the fixed inventory of a company. This GIAI can
be used to identify any fixed asset of an organization. A fixed asset
is defined as: any property used in carrying out the operation of a
business, which will not be consumed through use or converted into
a cash during the current fiscal period. The identifier is composed
of a company prefix and an individual asset reference. The holder of
the company prefix determines the numbering of the individual asset
reference.
GID General Identifier is defined for a 96-bit EPC, and is independent of
any existing identity specification or convention. In addition to the
header which guarantees uniqueness in the EPC namespace, the GID
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is composed of three fields: the general manager number, object class
and serial number.
2.3.6 Tag Protocol
The EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specification defines the physical and logical
requirements for a passive backscatter, Interrogator-Talk-First (ITF), radio
frequency identification system operating in the 860-960 MHz frequency
range [61]. The system comprises interrogators (also known as readers),
and tags (also known as labels).
This standard has been ratified by both EPCglobal and ISO. In fact, it can
be considered as the universal standard for low-cost RFID tags. Due to its
importance, a security analysis of this specification is tackled in Chapter 4.
2.3.7 EPCglobal Architecture
The EPC Network (EPCglobal Architecture Framework) is a technological
application that will allow organizations to increase their efficiency as a
greater visibility of their product information is obtained. This new global
and open standard mixes low-cost RFID technology, existing communica-
tions networks, and the electronic product code to create precise, effective
and real time information. The EPCglobal network is made up of six fun-
damental components [65]:
EPC (EPC Tag Data Standards Version 1.3 [67]). The Electronic Product
Code (EPC) is the next generation in the product identification. The
EPC code is composed of a collection of numbers that unequivocally
identify an item in the supply chain.
Tag or Labels EPC (EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Version 1.09 [61]). In this
system, barcodes are replaced by tags (radio frequency chip joined to
an antenna). Each tag stores an electronic product code.
Readers (EPC Reader Protocol Standard, Version 1.1 [66]). The barcodes
readers are replaced by RFID readers which are composed of one or
several antennas. When a group of items are near a reader, each one
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is activated and its stored information collected. EPC readers are lo-
cated in strategic localizations to facilitate the tracking of item move-
ments.
Middleware (The Application Level Events (ALE) Specification Version
1.0 [62]). Software technology designs to manage and transfer infor-
mation to avoid the overload of public and corporative networks. The
EPC middleware uses a distributed architecture that works in differ-
ent computers throughout an organization.
EPC-IS (EPC Information Services Specification Version 1.0 [68]). The EPC
Information Service allows users to interchange information included
in the EPCs between commercial partners by means of the EPC net-
work.
EPC Discovery Service A group of services that allow users to find and
obtain access to the associated information of an specific EPC.
ONS - Object Naming Service (EPC Object Naming Service (ONS) Spec-
ification Version 1.0 [63]). The ONS service is similar to the Domain
Name Service (DNS). Using this service, the information associated
with the EPC can be acquired. Specifically, the location of the EPC-IS
that stores this information is provided.
2.3.8 Region Regulations
Some standardization and regulatory organizations work within a region.
These organizations are either governmental bodies or independent organi-
zations that base their specifications and regulations on international stan-
dards. The most significant organizations are outlined bellow:
FCC The Federal Communications Commission is the regulatory author-
ity for the US government for regulating the use of RFID technology.
The FCC issues standards that apply to RFID technologies, including
RS-232 and RS-485 communications protocols of FCC Part 15 for RF
transmissions. FCC Part 15, section 15.247 define the conditions un-
der which RFID devices operating at UHF frequencies in the Indus-
trial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands can operate. This section
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also defines operation within the bands 902-928 MHz, 2400-2483.5
MHz, and 5725-5850 MHz. The 902-928MHz band, or UHF, offers op-
timum range of operation and is usually preferred for supply chain
applications. Additionally, new regulations for the use of improved
RF identification systems in conjunction with commercial shipping
containers (433.5-434.5 MHz) have been adopted.
GASB 34 Government Accounting Standards Boards (GASB) Statement
No. 34, which is typically known as GASB 34. This standard requires
states and local governments to report the value of their infrastruc-
ture assets (including bridges, roads, water, etc). Additionally, the
standard demands an asset management system in which RFID tech-
nology plays an important role.
ANSI American National Standards Institute. This organization promotes
interpretability and compatibility of electronic devices. RFID devices
have to be compliant with ANSI NCITS 256, a standard for itemman-
agement that describes three 2.4 GHz interfaces, 2 UHF interfaces,
and the 13.56 MHz interface.
ERO and ECC The European Radiocommunications Offices (ERO) sup-
ports the Electronics Communications Committee (ECC), formerly
called the European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC). The
main task of the ECC is to develop radiocommunications policies and
coordinate frequency, regulatory, and technical matters for the alloca-
tion and utilization of the 9 KHz to 275 GHz frequency range.
ETSI The European Telecommunications Standards Institute is another
regulatory Agency in Europe that regulates the use of RFID technol-
ogy. The ETSI standards relevant to RFID operation in the UHF bands
are defined in EN 300 220.
palabra
Chapter 3
Attacking RFID Systems
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background
Press stories about RFID often give inaccurate descriptions of the possibili-
ties that exist for abuse of this technology. They sometimes predict a world
where all our possessions will have a unique identification tag: clothes,
books, electronic items, medicines, etc. For example, an attacker outside
your house equipped with a commercial reader would be able to draw up
an inventory of all your possessions, and particular information such as
your health and lifestyle could also be revealed. Also, it is said that this
technology allows “Big Brother” to know when you are in public places
(office, cinemas, stores, pubs, etc.), tracking all your movements and com-
promising your privacy in terms of your whereabouts (location).
RFID technology is a pervasive technology, perhaps one of the most perva-
sive in history. While security concerns about the possibility of abuse are
legitimate, misinformation and hysteria should be avoided. One should
be aware that ways of collecting, storing and analyzing vast amounts of
information about consumers and citizens existed before the appearance
of RFID technology. For example, we usually pay with credit cards, give
our names and address for merchandizing, use cookies while surfing the
Internet, etc.
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In this chapter we give an overview of the risks and threats related to
RFID technology, helping the reader to become better acquainted with this
technology. Although the privacy issues are the main focus in literature
[36, 50, 95, 97, 112, 122, 126, 180, 185, 186, 193, 199], there are other risks
that should be considered when designing a RFID system.
3.1.2 Attack Objectives
The objectives of each attack can be very different. It is important to iden-
tify the potential targets in order to understand all the possible attacks. The
target can be the complete system (i.e. disrupt the whole of a business sys-
tem) or only a section of the entire system (i.e. a particular item).
A great number of information systems focus solely on protecting the trans-
mitted data. However, when designing RFID systems, additional objec-
tives, such as tracking or data manipulation should be considered. Imag-
ine the following example in a store: an attacker modifies the tag content
of an item reducing its price from 100 to 9.90 ¤. This leads to a huge loss
for the store. In this scenario, the data may be transmitted in a secure form
and the database has not been manipulated. However, fraud is carried out
because part of the system has been modified. Therefore, in order to make
a system secure, all of its components should be considered. Neglecting
one component, whatever the security level of the remaining components,
could compromise the security of the whole system.
As shown in the above example, the attack may be perpetrated to steal or
reduce the price of a single item, while other attacks could aim to prevent
all sales at a store. An attacker may introduce corrupt information in the
database to render it inoperative. Some attacks, such as the Faraday cage or
active jamming, are inherent in the wireless technology employed. Other
attacks focus on eliminating physical access control, and ignore the data.
Some involve fraudulent border crossing, identity stealing from legitimate
e-passports, etc.
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AvailabilityIntegrity
Confidentiality
Figure 3.1: Three Pillars of Security: The CIA Triad
3.1.3 Security Needs
As any other mission-critical system, it is important to minimize the threats
to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of data and comput-
ing resources. These three factors are often referred to as “The Big Three”.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the balance between these three factors.
However, not all systems need the same security level. For example, not
all systems need 99.999% availability or requiere that its users be authenti-
cated via retinal scans. Because of this, it is necessary to analyze and eval-
uate each system (sensitivity of the data, potential loss from incidents, crit-
icality of the mission, etc.) to determine the exact confidentiality, integrity,
and availability requirements. To give another example, the security re-
quirements of tags used in e-passports should not equal those employed in
the supply chain (i.e. tag compliant to EPC Class-1 Generation-2).
Confidentiality: The information should be accessible only to those au-
thorized for access. Privacy information, such as the static identi-
fiers transmitted by tags, fits into the confidentiality dimension. Both
users and companies consider this issue of utmost importance. Fur-
thermore, RFID technology allows the tracking of items. From a user
perspective tracking should be avoided. However, companies may
take advantage of it in controlling the movements of materials in the
supply chains, increasing the productivity of their processes.
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Integrity The assurance that the messages transmitted between two par-
ties are not modified in transit. Additionally, some systems provide
the authenticity of messages. The recipient is sometimes even able to
prove that a message was originated by the purported sender and is
not a forgery (non-repudiation). An example of this kind of attack is
the spoofing attack.
Availability System availability is whether (or how often) a system is
available for use by its intended users. This factor will determine
the performance and the scalability level of the system. DoS attacks
are usual threats against availability (i.e. active jamming of the radio
channel or preventing the normal operation of vicinity tags by using
some kind of blocker tag).
Each time a new technology is implanted, contingency plans for various
points of failure should be designed. We recommend periodical security
audits in order to review the security polices, procedures and IT infrastruc-
tures. As has been frequently mentioned, RFID technology may be a re-
placement for barcode technology. Nevertheless, new risk scenarios should
be considered with its implantation. For example, consider the repercus-
sions of a barcode reader failing or an RFID reading going down. When a
barcode reader fails, an operator can manually enter the codes into the ter-
minal and the system works, albeit with relatively slowness. On the other
hand, if the RFID reader is processing high volumes of items and these
items are moving at high speed, the consequences will be much worse. Se-
curity needs should therefore be considered a priority.
3.2 Main Security Concerns
3.2.1 Privacy
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks [1].
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Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas
they must, whatever the nationality or residence of individuals, re-
spect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to pri-
vacy, and contribute to economic and social progress, trade expansion
and the well-being of individuals [2].
Privacy has no definite boundaries and its meaning is not the same for dif-
ferent people. In general terms, it is the ability of an individual or group
to keep their lives and personal affairs out of public view, or to control the
flow of information about themselves.
The invasion on privacy by governments, corporations or individuals is
controlled by a country’s laws, constitutions or privacy laws. For exam-
ple, taxation processes normally require detailed private information about
earnings. The EU Directive 95/46/EC [2] on the protection of individu-
als with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement
of this, limits and regulates the collection of personal information. Addi-
tionally, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights identifies
the right to have private and family life respected. Within this framework,
monitoring the use of e-mails, internet or phones in the workplace, without
notifying employees or obtaining their consent can result in legal action.
RFID technology is a pervasive technology, and seems destined to become
more and more so. As Weiser already predicted in 1991, one of the main
problems that ubiquitous computing has to solve is privacy [225]. Leakage
of information is a problem that occurs when data sent by tags reveals sen-
sitive information about the labeled items. Products labeled with insecure
tags reveal their memory contents when queried by readers. Usually, read-
ers are not authenticated and tags answer in a completely transparent and
indiscriminate way.
As an example of the threat this could pose, consider the pharmaceuti-
cal sector where tagged medication is planned for the immediate future.
Imagine that when you leave the chemist’s with a given drug -say an anti-
depressive or AIDS treatment, an attacker standing by the door equipped
with a reader could find out what kind of medication you have just bought.
In a similar scenario, thieves equipped with tag readers could search peo-
ple, selecting those with multiple tagged bank bills to rob, and they would
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know how much they would earn with each robbery.
Advanced applications, where personal information is stored in the tags,
have appeared recently. E-passports are a good example of this sort of ap-
plication. As part of its US-VISIT program, the United States government
mandated the adoption of e-passports by the twenty-seven nations in its
Visa-Waiver Program. A combination of RFID technology and biometric
technology are employed [98, 111, 126]. The RFID tags store the same in-
formation that is printed on its first page (name, data of birth, passport
number, etc) as well as biometric information (facial image). In phase-2 of
the European e-passport project [10], the biometric data from two finger-
prints, which is very sensitive information, will also be stored.
Several organizations like CASPIAN [41], and FOEBUD [7] are strongly
against the massive deployment of RFID technology. They believe that
RFID technology will lead to a significant loss of citizens’ privacy. Some
of CASPIAN’s activities include successful boycott campaigns against im-
portant companies like Benetton [32, 106], Tesco [212], and Gillette [85], to
name but a few. Additionally, a book titled “SPYCHIPS: How Major Cor-
porations and Government Plan to Track your EveryMove with RFID” and
published in 2005 [21], has contributed to promoting suspicion about RFID
technology.
Another example of objection to RFID technology is the case of California
State Senator Joe Simitian (Senate Bill 682), who planned to restrict the use
of identification systems based on RFID technology: “The act would pro-
hibit identity documents created, mandated, or issued by various public
entities from containing a contactless integrated circuit or other device that
can broadcast personal information or enable personal information to be
scanned remotely” [69]. Due to significant industry opposition, Bill 682
was stalled in the Assembly Appropriations Committee and an important
missed deadline resulted in the expiry of the Bill. Legislative manoeuvring
allowed the resurrection of the case by means of Bill 768 [189]. This bill
was finally vetoed by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. In
particular, Bill 768 proposed to:
1. Criminalize the “skimming” of personal data from RFID-enable iden-
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tification documents.
2. Implement specific provisions to ensure the security of data con-
tained in such identification documents.
3. Impose a three-year moratorium on the use of RFID technology in
certain types of government issued identification documents.
In 2002, Garfinkel proposed a set of rights that should be upheld by any
system that uses RFID technology [78]. Consumers should have:
1. The right to know whether products contain RFID tags.
2. The right to have RFID tags removed o deactivated when they pur-
chase products.
3. The right to use RFID-enabled services without RFID tags.
4. The right to access an RFID tag’s stored data.
5. The right to know when, where and why the tags are being read.
These rights are not necessarily considered as the basis for a new law, but
as a framework for voluntary guidelines that companies wishing to deploy
this technology may adopt publicly.
3.2.2 Tracking
Location information is a set of data describing an individual’s location
over a period of time [56]. The resolution of the system (time and localiza-
tion) depends on the technology used to collect data.
Indeed, location privacy can be viewed as a particular type of privacy infor-
mation [33]. A secondary effect of wireless communication is that informa-
tion can be made public and collected. In a mobile phone context, regions
are divided up into cells. Each time a phone enters a new cell, the mobile
is registered. Mobile phone operators record handset location information
and supply it to third parties (i.e. police, the company that subscribed the
localization service, etc). Other techniques such as triangulation can be
used to increase the precision of the system. The new localization services
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(i.e. third-generation mobile phones) allow an accuracy of a few meters by
means of the incorporation of a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver.
In data network context, Wireless 802.11 Ethernet cards obtain connectivity
by registering with access points which could be used to locate a network
device.
RFID technology is not a high-tech bugging device. It does not possess
GPS functionality or the ability to communicate with satellites. RFID tags
do not have the storage and transmission capability for large quantities of
information. An RFID system is normally composed of only three com-
ponents: tags, readers and a back-end database. Readers are connected,
using a secure channel, to the database. When a database is present in the
system, tags might only transmit an identifier. This identifier is used as a
index-search in the database to obtain all the information associated with
the tag. Therefore only people with access to the database can obtain the
information about the labeled item.
Most of the time, tags provide the same identifier. Although an attacker
cannot obtain the information about the tagged item, an association be-
tween the tag and its holder can easily be established. Even where indi-
vidual tags only contain product codes rather than a unique serial number,
tracking is still possible using an assembly of tags (constellations) [223]. To
clarify the potential risks of tracking, some examples are given:
Wall-Mart Wall-Mart is an American public corporation, currently one of
the world’s largest. It has concentrated on streamlining the supply
chain, which is why it encourages all its suppliers to incorporate
RFID technology. The substitution of barcodes by RFID tags allows
an increase in the reading-rate of the pallets as they move along the
conveyor belt. RFID readers can automatically scan these as they
enter or leave the warehouse, saving time and improving product
flow. Right now, RFID technology is used at pallet level. Individual
packaging is the next logical step.
Individual Product Packaging Imagine that your Tag Heuer bifocals pos-
sess a tag, and this tag stores a 96-bit static identifier, allowing an at-
tacker to establish a link between the identifier and you. On associa-
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tion, an attacker could knowwhen you passed through a given place,
for example when you enter or leave your home, when you arrive at
or leave your office etc. Even worse, the attacker could place several
readers in your favorite mall. He could collect data over a long time
(data, time, shop, etc.) acquiring a consumer profile of you. Finally,
he could send you unsolicited personalized advertising information
depending on your shopping habits.
E-passports Since October 2006, USA required the adoption of e-passports
by all the countries in its Visa-Waiver Program. The ICAO standard
specifies one mandatory cryptographic feature (passive authentica-
tion) and two optional cryptographic features (basic access control
and active authentication). Passive authentication only demonstrates
that tag content is authentic but it does not prove that the data con-
tainer is secure. Basic authentication ensures that tag content can only
be read by an authorized reader. Additionally, a session key is es-
tablished, encrypting all the information exchanged between the tag
and the reader. Active authentication is an anti-cloning feature, but
it does not prevent unauthorized readings. Independently of the se-
curity mechanism used, tracking is possible. The electronic chip re-
quired by the ICAO must conform to ISO/IEC 14443 A/B already
adopted in other applications [4, 11]. The collision avoidance in ISO
14443 uses unique identifiers that allow readers to distinguish one tag
from another [111]. However, this identifier will allow an attacker to
unequivocally identify an e-passports’s holder. One simple counter-
measure is to generate a new random identifier each time the tag is
read.
As has been shown, RFID technology is not the first one that permits the
tracking of people (i.e. video surveillance, mobile phone, Wireless 802.11
Ethernet cards , GPS, etc.). Nevertheless, the equipment used to track peo-
ple holding RFID tags is not very expensive. If we return to the example of
tracking in a mall, we will understand one of the principal differences be-
tween RFID and other localization technologies. The vast majority of malls
have a video surveillance system. You can be filmed in all the supermar-
ket sections in which you buy an item. Then, the information obtained by
the system (images) has to be processed to obtain your consumer profile.
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Table 3.1: Tag Frequencies and Reading Distances
Frequency band Frequency Distance Energy Transfer
Low 125 KHz 1 - 90 cm, typically Inductive
(LF) around 45 cm coupling
High 13.56 MHz 1 - 75 cm, typically Inductive
(HF) under 40 cm coupling
Ultra High 865 - 868 MHz Up to 9 m Electromagnetic
(UHF) 902 - 928 MHz coupling
433 MHz
Microwave 2.45 Ghz Typically 0.3 - 0.9 m Electromagnetic
(µW ) 5.8 GHz coupling
However, if RFID technology were employed, data could be automatically
collected without the need for subsequent data processing as in video sys-
tems.
3.3 Tags and Readers
3.3.1 Operating Frequencies and Reading Distances
RFID tags operate in four primary frequency bands [230]:
1. Low Frequency or LF (120-140 KHz).
2. High Frequency or HF (13.56 MHz).
3. Ultra High Frequency or UHF (860-960 MHz).
4. Super High Frequency/Microwave (2.45 GHz and above).
The characteristics of different frequencies are summarized in Table 3.1.
Low Frequency (LF) Tags These tags operate at 120-140 KHz. They are
generally passive and use near field inductive coupling. So they are
suited for applications reading small amounts of data at relatively
slow speeds and at short distances. Their read range varies from 1
to 90 cm, typically below 45 cm. LF tags do not support simulta-
neous tag reads. LF tags are relatively costly because they require
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a longer, more expensive copper antenna. They penetrate materials
such as water, tissue, wood and aluminium. Their most common ap-
plications are in animal identification, automobile security, electronic
article surveillance, commerce and other areas.
High Frequency (HF) Tags These tags operate at 13.56MHz. They are typ-
ically passive and frequently use inductive coupling. HF tags pen-
etrate materials well, such as water, tissue, wood, aluminium, etc.
Their data rates are higher than LF tags and their cost is lower due
to the simple antenna design. Their read ranges varies from 1 cm to
75 cm, typically under 40 cm. HF tags are used in smart shelf, smart
cards, libraries, baggage handling, and similar applications.
Ultra High Frequency (HF) Tags UHF active and passive tags can operate
at different frequencies. UHF active tags operate at 433 MHz, and
UHF passive tags usually operate at 860-960 MHz. Generally, passive
UHF tags are not very effective around metals and water. They per-
form well at distances greater than 90 cm. UHF passive tags usually
reach about 9 m. UHF tags have good non-line-of-sight communica-
tion, have a high data rate, and can store relatively large amounts of
data.
Super High Frequency/Microwaves Tags These tags operate at frequen-
cies of 2.45 GHz and above (also 5.8GHz) and can be either active or
passive. Their characteristics are similar to those of UHF tags. How-
ever, they have faster read rates and are less effective around metals
and liquids than tags of lower frequencies. These tags can be smaller
in size compared to LF, HF and UHF tags and are used for electronic
toll collection as well as for the tracking of shipping containers, trains,
commercial vehicles, parking, etc. The read range varies from 0.3 m
to 0.9 m for passive tags, and is very dependent on design. Active
systems also use microwave frequency.
3.3.2 Eavesdropping
RFID technology operates through radio, so communication can be surrep-
titiously overheard. In [182], the possible distances at which an attacker
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Figure 3.2: Eavesdropping Range Classification [182]
can listen to the messages exchanged between a tag and a reader are cate-
gorized (see Figure 3.2).
Forward Channel Eavesdropping Range In the reader-to-tag channel
(forward channel) the reader broadcasts a strong signal, allowing its
monitoring from a long distance.
Backward Channel Eavesdropping Range The signal transmitted in the
tag-to-reader (backward channel) is relatively weak, and may only
be monitored in close proximity to the tag.
Operating Range The read ranges shown in the above section are the op-
erating read range using sales-standard readers.
Malicious Scanning Range An adversary may build his own reader
archiving longer read ranges, especially if regulations about radio de-
vices are not respected. A conversation between a reader and a tag
can be eavesdropped over a greater distance than is possible with di-
rect communication. For example, tags compliant to ISO 14443 have a
reading distance of around 10 cm (using standard equipment). How-
ever, Kfir et al. showed that this distance can be increased to 55 cm
employing a loop antenna and signal processing [120].
Eavesdropping is particular problematic for two reasons:
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1. Feasibility: it can be accomplished from long distances.
2. Hard Detection: it is purely passive and does not imply any kind of
power signal emission.
Eavesdropping attacks are a serious threat mainly when sensitive infor-
mation is transmitted on the channel. To give an example, we consider
the use of RFID technology in payments cards (RFID credit cards) [24]. In
an eavesdropping attack, information exchanged between the credit card
reader and the RFID credit card is captured. Heydt-Banjamin et al. showed
how this attack can be carried out [96]. An antenna was located next to
an off-the-shelf RFID credit card reader. The radio signal picked up by the
antenna was processed to translate it into human readable form. In particu-
lar, the following pieces of data were captured: cardholder name, complete
credit card number, credit card expiry date, credit card type, and finally
information about software version and supported communications proto-
cols. As the above example shows, eavesdropping attacks should therefore
be considered and treated seriously.
3.3.3 Authentication
Entity authentication allows the verification of the identity of one entity
by another. The authenticity of the claimed entity can only be ascertained
for the instant of the authentication exchange. A secure means of com-
munication should be used to provide authenticity of the subsequent data
exchanged. To prevent replay attacks, a time variant parameter, such as
a time stamp, a sequence number, or a challenge may be used. Messages
exchanged between entities are called tokens. At least one token has to be
exchanged for unilateral authentication and at least two tokens for mutual
authentication. An additional token may be needed if a challenge has to be
sent to initiate the protocol.
In RFID context, the first proposals found in the literature are based on
unilateral authentication [71, 160, 215]. However, the necessity of mutual
authentication has been confirmed in many publications [47, 107, 155, 163].
In ISO/IEC 9784, different mechanisms for entity authentication are de-
scribed [3]:
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• Part 1: General model.
• Part 2: Entity authentication using symmetric techniques.
• Part 3: Entity authentication using a public key algorithm.
• Part 4: Entity authentication using a cryptographic check function.
The use of a cryptographic check function seems to be the most adequate
solution for RFID. Due to the fact that standard cryptographic primitives
exceed the capabilities of a great number of tags, the design of lightweight
primitives is imperative, at least for low-cost RFID tags.
The two entities (claimant/verifier) share a secret authentication key. An
entity corroborates its identity by demonstrating knowledge of the shared
key. This is accomplished by using a secret key with a cryptographic check
function applied to specific data to obtain a cryptographic check value.
This value can be recalculated by the verifier and compared with the re-
ceived value. The following mechanisms, as shown in Figure 3.3, are possi-
ble.
3.3.4 Skimming
Takashimaya, one of the largest retailers in Japan, now sells anti-
skimming cards called “Sherry” at their department stores. Con-
sumers can just put the cards in their wallets in order to prevent their
RFID-chipped train passes, etc. from skimming attacks.
The anti-skimming card functions by creating a reverse electromag-
netic field like Taiyo’s technology [5].
Eavesdropping is the opportunistic interception of information exchanged
between a legitimate tag and legitimate reader. However, skimming occurs
when the data stored on the RFID tag is read without the owner’s knowl-
edge or consent. An unauthorized reader interacts with the tag to obtain
the data. This attack can be carried out because most of the tags broadcast
their memory content without requiring any kind of authentication.
One interesting project is Adam Laurie’s RFIDIOt [131]. Specifically, RFID-
IOt is an open source library for exploring RFID devices. Several experi-
ments with readers operating at 13.56 MHz and 125/134.2 KHz are shown.
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Figure 3.3: Entity Authentication Mechanisms
The number of standards supported by the library is around 50. Some ex-
amples of the attacks carried out are the following:
Non-authentication In 2004, Verychip received approval to develop a
human-implant RFID microchip [16]. About twice the length of a
grain of rice, the device is typically implanted above the triceps of
an individual’s right arm. Once scanned at the proper frequency, the
Verichip answers with an unique 16-digit number which can corre-
late the user to the information stored on a database. The type of tag
used by Verichip appears to be an EM4x05. This kind of tag can be
read simply with the program “readlfx.py”, obtaining the following
information: card ID, tag type, application identifier, country code,
national ID.
Password Authentication Since 2003, the Oyster card has been used on
Transport for London and National Rail services. The Oyster card is a
contactless smart card, with a claimed proximity range of about 8cm,
and based on Philips’s MIFAREr standard [13]. A code for attack-
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ing this kind of card is included in the project. The sample program
“bruteforce.py” can be run against it, and it will try to log in the sector
0 by choosing random numbers as the key.
Nowadays, the security of e-passports have aroused a great interest [40, 88,
98, 111]. Skimming is problematic because e-passports possess very sensi-
tive data. The mandatory passive authentication mechanism demands the
use of digital signatures. A reader will be able to verify that the data came
from the correct passport-issuing authority. However, digital signatures do
not link data to a specific passport. Additionally, if only passive authentica-
tion is supported, an attacker equippedwith a reader could obtain sensitive
information such as your name, birthday or even your facial photograph.
This is possible because readers are not authenticated -in other words, the
tag answers indiscriminately. Certain projects exist which openly give the
code needed to read e-passports: RFIDIOt (Adam Laurie) [131], OpenM-
RTD (Harald Welte) [226], JMRTD (SoS group, ICIS, Radbound University)
[198].
3.3.5 Cloning and Physical Attacks
Symmetric-key cryptography can be used to avoid tag cloning attacks.
Specifically, a challenge-response mechanism like the following can be em-
ployed. First, the tag is singulated from many by means of a collision-
avoidance protocol like the binary treewalking protocol. The tag (Ti) shares
the key (Ki) with the reader. Afterwards, the following messages are ex-
changed:
1. The reader generates a fresh random number (R) and transmits it to
the tag.
2. The tag computes H = g(Ki, R) and sends it back to the reader.
3. The reader computes H ′ = g(K ′i, R) and checks its equality with H .
The g function can be implemented by a hash function or, alternatively, by
an encryption function. Note that if the g function is well constructed and
appropriately deployed, it is infeasible for an attacker to impersonate the
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tag. Because standard cryptographic primitives (hash functions, message
authentication codes, block/stream ciphers, etc.) are extravagant solutions
for low-cost RFID tags on account of their demand for circuit size, power
consumption and memory size [108], the design of new lightweight primi-
tives is pressing.
For some kinds of tags, resources are not so restricted. However, their cost
is much higher than low-cost RFID tags (i.e. tags used in supply chain).
An example of these sort of tags are e-passports. The active authentication
method is an anti-cloning feature. The mechanism relies on public cryp-
tography. It works by forcing e-passports to prove possession of a private
key:
1. The tag generates an 8-byte nonce and sends it to the tag.
2. The tag digitally signs this value using its private key, and transmits
it to the reader.
3. The reader can verify the correctness of the response with the public
key supposedly associated with the passport.
Tamper-resistant microprocessors are used to store and process private and
sensitive information, such as private keys or electronic money. The at-
tacker should not be able to retrieve or modify this information. To achieve
this objective, chips are designed so that the information is not accessible
using external means and can only be accessed by the embedded software,
which should contain the appropriate security measures.
Making simple electronic devices secure against tampering is very difficult,
as a great number of attacks are possible, including [221]:
XMechanical Machining XWater Machining
XLaser Machining XShaped Charge Technology
XEnergy Attacks XRadiation Imprinting
XTemperature Imprinting XHigh Voltage Imprinting
XProbe Attacks XPassive Probes
XActive or Injector Probes XPico Probes
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XEnergy Probes XMatching Methods
XManual Material Removal XHigh or Low Voltage
XClock Glitching XCircuit Disruption
XElectronic Beam Read/Write XIR Laser Read/Write
XImaging Technology
As sensitive information such as cryptographic keys are stored on the
chips, tamper resistant devices may be designed to erase this information
when penetration of their security encapsulation or out-of specification en-
vironmental parameters is detected. Some devices are even able to erase all
their information after their power supply has been interrupted.
In the RFID context we have to distinguish between low-cost RFID tags and
tags used in applications without severe price restrictions. Low-cost RFID
tags are very constrained resources (storing, computing and energy con-
sumption). These kinds of tags are usually non-resistant to physical attacks.
An example are tags compliant with the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specifi-
cation [61]. High-cost tags, sometimes called contact-less chips or smart
cards, are not so restrictive regarding resources. However, price increases
from 0.05 ¤to several euros. For example, the chips used in e-passports
have an EAL 5+ security level, the highest security level for chips [133].
Therefore, an attacker will not be able to acquire the private key used in pri-
vate authentication in order to avoid cloning attacks. The plusID tag, man-
ufactured by Bradcom, is another example of tamper resistant tags [206].
Initially, its security level was 2 (tamper evidence) according to Federal In-
formation Processing Standards (FIPS), but it was finally increased to level
3 (tamper-resistant).
3.3.6 Replay and Relay Attacks
A replay attack copies a stream of messages between two parties and re-
plays it to one or more parties. A generalized definition of a replay attack
could be the following: an attack on a security protocol using replay ofmes-
sages from a different context into the intended (or original and expected)
context, thereby fooling the honest participant(s) into thinking they have
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successfully completed the protocol run [147]. An exhaustive classification
of replay attacks can be found in [209].
Common techniques to avoid replay attacks are incremental sequence
number, clock synchronization, or a nonce. In [25], a set of design prin-
ciples for avoiding replay attacks in cryptographic protocols is presented.
In a RFID context, clock synchronization is not feasible since passive RFID
tags cannot make use of clocks, as these kind of tags do not have an on-
board power source. Incremental sequence such as session tokens may be
a straightforward solution if tracking is not considered a threat. Therefore,
the use of a nonce seems to be the most suitable option for RFID tags.
A number of factors combine to make relay attacks on RFID technology
possible. Tags are read over a distance and activated automatically when
close to a reader. Therefore, an attacker could communicate with a tag
without the knowledge of its owner.
Two devices, as shown in Figure 3.4, are involved in the relay attack: the
ghost and the leech [120]. The ghost is a device which fakes a card to the
reader, and the leech is a device which fakes a reader to the card. A fast
communication channel between the legitimate reader and the victim card
is created by the ghost and the leech:
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1. The legitimate reader sends a message (A) to the ghost.
2. The ghost receives it and forwards this message (A) to the leech
through the fast communication channel (minimum delay).
3. The leech fakes the real reader, and sends the message (A) to the le-
gitimate tag.
4. The legitimate tag computes a new message (B) and transmits it to
the leech.
5. The leech receives it and forwards this message (B) to the ghost
through the fast communication channel.
6. The ghost forwards this message (B) to the real reader.
This sort of attack dispels the assumption that readers and tags should be
very close to communicate. Additionally, even if communications were en-
crypted, the attack is feasible because messages are only relayed through
a fast communication channel, without requiring knowledge of their con-
tents. In [89], a practical relay attack against ISO 14443 compliant tags is
described.
3.3.7 Hiding
RFID technology uses electromagnetic radio waves. Labeled items can be
therefore protected by insulating them from any kind of electromagnetic
radiation:
Faraday Cage A Faraday cage or shield is a container made of conducting
material, or a mesh of such material. This blocks out radio signals of
certain frequencies. There are currently a number of companies that
sell this type of solution [15, 152].
Passive Jamming Each time a reader wants to interact with a single tag,
the tag will have to be singulated from a population of tags. A
collision-avoidance protocol such as Aloha or Binary tree walking
may be employed. To conceal the presence of a particular tag, this
could simulate the full spectrum of possible tags in the singulation
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phase, hiding its presence. This concept was first introduced by Juels
et al. as the “Blocker tag” [113]. In 2004, a variant of the blocker
concept, named “soft blocking”, was introduced [110]. This involves
software (or firmware) modules that offer a different balance of char-
acteristics from ordinary blockers.
Active Jamming Another way of achieving isolation from electromagnetic
waves is disturbing the radio channel -known as active jamming of
RF signals. This disturbance may be implemented with a device that
actively broadcasts radio signals, so as to completely disrupt the ra-
dio channel, thus preventing the normal operation of RFID readers.
However, in most cases government regulations on radio emissions
(power and bandwidth) should be violated [130].
3.3.8 Deactivation
Some methods exist for deactivating tags and rendering them unreadable.
The most common method consists on generating a high-power RF field
that induces sufficient current to burn out a weak section of the antenna.
The connection between the chip and the antenna is cut off, rendering it
useless. This method is usually chosen to address privacy concerns and to
deactivate tags that are used to label individual items or prevent thefts in
stores.
The benefits of using RFID technology in a store are clear. However, the de-
activation of tags may be malicious. The necessary technology can be avail-
able to anyone. The usual range of a “kill” signal is only a few centimeters.
However, designing and building a high-gain antenna with a high power
transmitter is easy. Using batteries, it could probably fit into a back pack.
Then an attacker entering a store could kill all the tags, causing widespread
retail chaos. A practical implementation of this sort of attack is the RFID-
Zapper project [51, 153].
Karjoth et al. proposed the use of physical RFID structures that permit a
consumer to disable a tag by mechanically altering it [116]. In “clipped
tags”, the consumer can physically separate the body (chip) from the head
(antenna) in an intuitive way. Such separation provides visual confirmation
that the tag has been deactivated. Then, the tag can be reactivated bymeans
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of physical contact. The reactivation requires deliberate actions on the part
of its owner. Indeed, reactivation cannot be carried out without the owner’s
knowledge unless the item is stolen.
To avoid wanton deactivation of tags, the use of kill passwords has been
proposed. Tags compliant to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 implement this
feature [61]. When an EPC tag receives the “kill” command, it renders it-
self permanently inoperative. However, to protect tags from malicious de-
activation, the kill command is PIN protected. One of the main problems
linked to this kind of solutions is password management. Employing the
same password for all tags is a very naive solution: if a single tag is com-
promised, all the tags would be at risk. Another straightforward solution
is that each tag has a different password, with the associated management
and scalability problems.
The potential benefits of RFID technology usage are reduced if tags are
permanently deactivated. Instead of killing tags, they could be put to sleep,
rendering them only temporarily inoperative. As with the killing process,
sleeping/waking up tags will not offer real protection if anyone is able to
accomplish these operations. So some form of access control, such a PINs,
will be needed to sleep/wake up a tag.
3.3.9 Cryptographic Vulnerabilities
In the 19th century, Kerckhoffs sets out the principles to the security
of cryptography systems [119]:
1. The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indeci-
pherable.
2. It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall
into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience.
3. Its key must be communicable and retainable without the help of
written notes, and changeable or able to be modified at the will of
the correspondents.
4. It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence.
5. It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require
the concourse of several people.
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6. Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command
its application, that the system be easy to use, requiring neither
mental strain nor the knowledge of a long series of rules to ob-
serve.
RFID tags are very constrained devices, with restrictions in power con-
sumption, storage and circuitry. Due to these severe limitations, some
commercial RFID tags support weak cryptographic primitives, and thus
vulnerable authentication protocols. Additionally, some of these crypto-
graphic primitives are proprietary. The use of proprietary solutions is not
really inadequate if algorithms are published to be analyzed by the research
community. However, as time has shown, the security of an algorithm can-
not reside in its “obscurity”. A system relying on security through obscu-
rity may have theoretical or actual security vulnerabilities, but its owners
or designers incorrectly believe that the flaws are unknown, and that at-
tackers are unlikely to find them [119].
Texas Instruments manufactures a low-frequency tag, named Digital Sig-
nature Transponder (DST). The DST executes a challenge-response proto-
col. The reader and the DST share a secret key Ki. The reader sends a
challenge R to the DST. The DST computes an encryption function of the
challenge C = eKi(R) and sends this value to the reader. The reader com-
putes C ′ = eK′i(R) and compares this value with the received value. The
challenge is 40 bits in length, and the output of the encryption function is 24
bits length. The length of theKi is only 40 bits. It is a very short length. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [8] and the ECRYPT
EU Network of Excellence on cryptography [12] recommended in 2005 a
key length of 80 bits for a minimal level of general purpose protection, and
112 bits for the following ten years.
The most common uses of DST are the following:
1. The DST is employed as a theft-deterrent (immobilizer keys) in auto-
mobiles, such a Ford and Toyota vehicles.
2. The DST serves as a wireless payment device (speedpass), which can
be used by more than seven million individuals in around 10,000
Exxon and Mobile gas stations.
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Texas Instruments has not published details of the encryption algorithm,
basing itself on security through algorithm obscurity. A team of researchers
at Johns Hopkins University and RSA Laboratories discovered, however,
serious security vulnerabilities in the DST [37]. In particular, a successful
reverse engineering of the DST encryption algorithm was accomplished.
First, a rough schematic of the cipher was obtained from a published Texas
Instruments presentation. With the reverse-engineering of the cipher, they
showed that a 40-bit key lengthwas inadequate, and that the cipherwas not
only vulnerable to brute-force attacks. The proposed attack can be divided
into three phases:
Reverse Engineering They were equipped with a DST reader and some
blank DST tags. With the reader and the blank tags, the output of the
encryption function, with any key and challenge, could be obtained.
Using specific key/challenge pairs and centering on the schematic of
the encryption, operational details of the algorithm were derived.
Key Cracking After determining the encryption algorithm, a programmed
hardware “key cracker” was implemented to recover the unique
cryptographic key of the DST. The cracker operated by brute force
(full space of 240). Given two input-output pairs, it took around 30
minutes to recover the secret key.
Simulation They programmed a hardware device with the recovered key
from the DST. This device could impersonate the original DST.
The research on the DST exemplifies the importance of Kerckhoffs’s princi-
ples. Another significant and similar example is the proprietary CRYPTO1
encryption algorithm used in Philips Mifare cards, which has been recently
reverse-engineered [117, 159]. We recommend the publication of any used
algorithms. Open algorithms can be analyzed and refined by the scientific
community, bolstering confidence in their security.
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3.4 Back-end database
3.4.1 Tag Counterfeiting and Duplication
Since the incorporation of RFID technology in sensitive applications such
as passports [178] or pharmaceutical pedigrees [220], the possibility of cre-
ating counterfeiting tags has unleashed some concerns.
Here are some arguments that may dissuade users from being too alarmist
[86]:
1. Usually, each tag has an unique identifier (ID) that allows its unequiv-
ocal identification. To counterfeit a tag, one would have to modify the
identity of an item, which generally implies tag manipulation. The
tag (ID) implementation may vary in each manufacturer as well as in
each product. The major manufacturers first programme the tag and
then lock it. So resistance to these attacks lies in the lock. In most
cases, it is not possible to unlock the tag without using invasive tech-
niques. These techniques are not commonly available to the general
public.
2. RFID tags are generally sold pre-programmed with their identifiers,
this being one of the phases of the normal production process. The ID
format usually accords with a standard. The non-availability of blank
tags will therefore reduce the possibility of counterfeiting.
3. An alternative is the design of blank tags. However, even with the
equipment necessary for IC fabrication, designing these kind of chips
is not an easy task.
Despite the difficulty of counterfeiting tags, on some occasions tags have
been duplicated. It is a similar problem to that of credit card fraud where a
card is duplicated and possibly used inmultiple places at the same time. As
duplicate tags cannot be operatively distinguished, the back-end database
should detect rare conditions. An example of a rare condition is the fol-
lowing: a tag cannot be in the toll gate on the Madrid-Barcelona motorway
and fifteen minutes later in the toll gate of Almería-Sevilla motorway. The
design of back-end database should be considered case by case [213].
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Figure 3.5: EPCglobal Network
3.4.2 EPC Network: ONS Attacks
The EPCglobal network is made up of three key elements, as displayed in
Figure 3.5:
1. EPC Information Services.
2. EPC Discovery Services.
3. Object Name Service.
When an RFID tag is manufactured with an EPC, the EPC is registered
within the ONS. The RFID tag is attached to a product, and the EPC be-
comes a part of that product as it moves through the supply chain. The
particular product information is added to the manufacturer’s EPC-IS, and
the knowledge that this data exists within the manufacturer’s EPC-IS is
passed to the EPC Discovery Service.
The ONS is a distributed but authoritative directory service that routes re-
quest for information about EPCs. Existing or new network resources can
be employed to route the requests. The ONS is similar to DNS in both tech-
nology and functionality. When a query is sent to the ONS including the
EPC code, one or more localizations (Uniform Resource Locator or URL)
3.4. BACK-END DATABASE 57
where information about items reside, are returned. The ONS service is
divided in two layers. First, the Root ONS, which is the authoritative direc-
tory of manufacturers whose products may have information on the EPC
Network. Second, the Local ONS, which is the directory of products for
that particular manufacturer.
As the ONS can be considered a subset of the DNS, the same security risks
are applicable. In 2004, a threat analysis of the Domain Name System was
published as RFC 3833 [23]. Some of the principal threats identified were
the following:
1. Packet interception: manipulating IP packets carrying DNS informa-
tion.
2. Query prediction: manipulating the query/answer schemes of the
DNS protocol.
3. Cache Poisoning: injecting manipulated information into DNS
caches.
4. Betrayal by trusted server: attacker controlling DNS servers in use.
5. Denial of service (DoS): DNS is vulnerable to DoS as happens in any
other network service. Additionally, the DNS itself might be used to
attack third parties.
However, there are some risks that are particular to the ONS service [70]:
1. Privacy: There are many situations where the EPC of an RFID tag can
be considered highly sensitive information. Sensitive information can
be obtained even knowing just part of the EPC. For example, knowing
only the class of the identifier, you can find out the kind of object. To
obtain the information associated with a tag, the EPC-IS has to be
located. Even if the connections to the EPC-IS are secured (i.e. with
SSL/TLS), the initial ONS look-up process is not authenticated nor
encrypted in the first place. Therefore, sensitive information passes
in clear on the channel (middleware - networks - DNS server ).
2. Integrity: The correctness and the completeness of the information
should be guaranteed. An attacker controlling intermediate DNS
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servers or launching a successful man-in-the-middle attack could
forge the list of URLs (i.e. a fraudulent server). To prevent this at-
tack, an authentication mechanism should be used for the EPC-IS.
3. Availability: If the adoption of the EPC network is widespread, there
will be a great number of companies dependent on network services.
ONS will become a service highly exposed to attacks. These could
include Distribute Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, that reduce the
functioning of the server or its network connection by issuing count-
less and intense queries, or targeted exploits that shut down the
server software or its operating system.
3.4.3 Virus Attacks
The RFID tag memory generally contains an unique identifier, but addi-
tional data may be stored. This data size varies from a few bytes to sev-
eral kilobytes. The memory where this additional information is stored is
rewritable. The information sent by the tags is usually implicity trusted by
the database, which implies some security threats [184, 213]:
1. Buffer Overflow: Buffer overflow is one of the most frequent sources
of security vulnerabilities in software. Programming languages, such
as C or C++, are not memory safe. In other words, the length of the
inputs are not checked. An attacker could introduce an input that is
deliberately longer, writing out of the buffer. As program control data
is often located in memory areas adjacent to data buffers, the buffer
overflow may lead the program to execute an arbitrary code. As a
great number of tags have severe storage limitations, resource rich
tag simulating devices could be utilized [105].
2. Code Insertion: An attacker might inject malicious code into an ap-
plication, using any script language (i.e. CGI, Java, Perl, etc.). RFID
tags with data written in a script language could perform an attack
of this kind. Imagine that the tags used for tracking baggage in the
airport contain the airport destination in its data field. Each time a
tag is read, the back-end system fires the query, “select * form loca-
tion_table where airport =< tag data>”. Imagine that an attacker
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stores in one piece of baggage “MAD;shutdown”. When this data
is read, the database will be shutdown and the baggage system will
crash.
3. SQL Injection. SQL injection is a type of code insertion attack, exe-
cuting SQL code in the database that were not intended. The main
objectives of these attacks are the following: enumerate the database
structure, retrieve authorized data, make unauthorizedmodifications
or deletions, etc. RFID tags could contain data for a SQL injection at-
tack. Storage limitation is not a problem, as it is possible to do a lot of
harm with a very small amount of SQL commands. For example, the
SQL “drop table <tablename>” will delete a specified database table.
Summarizing, an RFID tag is an unsecured and untrusted data source. So
the information obtained from such devices should be analyzed until there
is sufficient evidence that the data is accurate. However, this is not a new
concept, as in all information systems the input data should be examined
to ensure that it will not cause problems.
palabra
Chapter 4
EPC Class-1 Generation-2
4.1 Introduction
There are multiple standards related to RFID technology. In this chapter,
the EPCClass-1 Generation-2 is examined. This standard can be considered
as the “universal” standard for Class-1 RFID tags. Class-1 RFID tags are
very limited both in their computational and storage capabilities. Because
of these severe restrictions, the usage of standard cryptographic primitives
is not possible. However, RFID tags are susceptible to attacks also found
in other technologies such as wireless, bluetooth, smart-cards, etc. There-
fore, once the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specification is explained, a secu-
rity analysis will reveal its weak points. Furthermore, current proposals to
enhance its security level are presented and analyzed. Finally, the chap-
ter is finished by identifying some open research issues to increment the
security of low-cost RFID tags.
The benefits of standards are clear, and assumed by almost everyone. The
growth of any new technology is in many cases due in part to the estab-
lishment of open standards. Back in 2003, there was a clear lack of har-
monization and major RFID vendors offered mainly proprietary systems.
Fortunately, things are quickly changing. Nowadays, EPCglobal [64] and
ISO [103] have joined forces to publicize and harmonize the use of RFID
technology.
EPCglobal is a joint venture between EAN International and the Uniform
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Code Council (UCC). EPCglobal fulfills the industry’s need for an effective
RFID-network standard with its EPC (Electronic Product Code) Network.
Within EPCglobal, the Hardware Action Group (HAG) develops specifica-
tions for hardware components of the EPC Network, including tags and
readers. The EPC system defines four RFID tag classes:
• Class-1: Identity Tags. Passive-backscatter tags with the following
minimum features:
– An Electronic Product Code (EPC) identifier.
– A Tag identifier (TID).
– A kill function that permanently disables the tag.
– Optional password-protected access control, and optional user
memory.
• Class-2: Higher functionality tags. Passive tags with all the afore-
mentioned features, also including the following:
– An extended TID.
– Extended memory.
– Authenticated access control.
– Additional features (TBD) as will be defined in the Class-2 spec-
ification.
• Class-3. Semi-passive tags with all the aforementioned features, also
including the following:
– An integral power source.
– An integrated sensing circuitry.
• Class-4. Active tags with all the aforementioned features and also
including the following:
– Tag-to-Tag communications.
– Active communications.
– Ad-hoc and networking capabilities.
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4.2 Generation-2 vs Generation-1
One of the most important standards proposed by EPCglobal is the EPC-
global Class-1 Gen-2 RFID specification [61]. This standard was adopted
by EPCglobal in 2004 and was sent to ISO. Eighteen months later (March-
April’2006), it was ratified by ISO and published as an amendment to its
18000-6 standard.
These specifications provide a great advance to consolidate the adoption of
RFID technology [211]. Where previously there were several specifications
such as EPC Class-1 and EPC Class-0, a single UHF specification is now
established. In order to ease a worldwide deployment, emerging UHF reg-
ulations in different regions have been taken into account. Additionally,
the best features of the preceding specifications have been improved, and
a range of future applications including higher-function sensor tags have
been foreseen.
4.2.1 Read and Write Speed
Generation-1 provides a single communication speed, providing satisfac-
tory speed and adequate robustness for most applications. On the other
hand, four different communication speeds are available in Generation-2
to provide more flexibility for different operational environments. Gen-2
tags have a maximum theoretical reading speed of around 1000 tags per
second (when insulated from RF noise), but in very noisy environments
that speed is reduced to around 100 tags/sec. The read speed of Gen-2 is
then about twice as fast as in Gen-1 in real conditions, with average read
rates of around 500 tags per second.
Furthermore, Gen-2 specifies the speed at which tags can be programmed.
The specification dictates that tags should be writable at a minimum rate
of about 5 per second, setting 30 tag/sec as the objective value in optimum
conditions.
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4.2.2 Robust Tag Counting
Tags compliant with Gen-1 specification are singulated by means of binary
tree walking protocols with persistent sleep/wake states. The Gen-2 spec-
ification is based on the principle that tags experiencing brief moments of
power can be read. In particular, the Q protocol, which is based on simple
query/acknowledgment exchanges between reader and tags, is employed.
Q is a parameter that a reader uses to regulate the probability of tag re-
sponse. Briefly, a reader sends a Query to a tag and the tag loads a Q-bit
random number (or pseudo-random number) into its slot counter. The tag
responds with a random number when the value in its slot counter is fixed
to zero. The reader then sends an acknowledge that includes the tag’s ran-
dom number, which sends back its ID (i.e. EPC). The process continues
until all tags in the reader’s field have been counted.
In Gen-1, tags are switched to sleep mode after they have been read, facil-
itating the reading of tags that have not yet been counted. To begin a new
count, a wake-up message is sent to tags in order to wake them to be ready
for reading. Multiple wake-up, count and sleep cycles are necessary to en-
sure that all tags in a reader field have been read. Gen-2 refines this process
by introducing a dual state, avoiding the necessity of a wake-up command.
Under this approximation, tags change their state each time they are read.
As the reader counts tags in “A” state, those change automatically to “B”
state, and viceversa. Gen-2 repeats counts of “A” and “B” until all tags have
been identified. Therefore, these two mechanisms both allow an increase
in reading speed and make sure all tags have been counted.
4.2.3 Dense Reader Operation
If there are many readers operating and querying in close proximity at the
same time, this can drown out the weak responses of tags. In US, frequency
hopping is used, as there are not severe bandwidth requirements in the
UHF band. In Europe, the band available to RFID is relatively narrow, so
this approach is not possible. Readers are required to “listen before talk”;
first they determine that the channel is not already in use, only then they
may start communication.
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Gen-2 tries to improve its features under dense reader operation in several
ways. First, the available RF bandwidth is used as efficiently as possible;
only minimal data is exchanged between readers and tags. Second, Gen-2
provides new radio signaling techniques which easily allow the isolation of
tag’s response, even in noisy conditions. In particular, “Miller sub-carrier”
or “FM0” are employed. Third, three modes of operation are available:
single reader, multi-reader and dense-reader. Finally, Gen-2 verifies data as
in Gen-1 specification to ensure accurate reads in noisy environments, and
adds a feature that confirms when tags have been correctly written.
4.2.4 Parallel Counting
It is possible that several readers communicate simultaneously with the
same tag. In this situation, a tag might change its state in the middle of
another reader’s query, causing the loss of the tag by the second reader. To
solve this problem, tags support “sessions” allowing a single tag to com-
municate with two or more readers. Up to four logical sessions can be
assigned to be assigned to different readers.
4.3 EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Specification
The EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specification [61], in the following named as
EPC-C1G2, defines the physical and logical requirements for RFID systems
operating in the 860-960 MHz frequency range. These systems are made
up of two main components: interrogators, also known as readers, and
tags also known as labels.
Modulating a RF signal (860-960 MHz), a reader transmits information to
a tag. As tags are passive, all of their operating energy is received from
reader’s RF waveform. Indeed, both information and operating energy are
extracted from the signal sent by the reader.
Furthermore, as tags do not have a power source, tags can only answer
after a message is sent by the reader. These kind of systems are known as
Interrogator-Talk-First (ITF). A reader receives information from a tag by
transmitting a continuous-wave RF signal to the tag. The tag backscatters a
4.3. EPC CLASS-1 GENERATION-2 SPECIFICATION 66
signal to the reader by means of the modulation of the reflection coefficient
of its antenna. Communications are half-duplex, so the reader talks and the
tag listens, or viceversa.
4.3.1 Physical Layer
A reader sends information to one or more tags by modulating an RF car-
rier using Double-SidebandAmplitude Shift Keying (DSB−ASK), Single-
Sideband Amplitude Shift Keying (SSB − ASK) or Phase-Reversal Am-
plitude Shift Keying (PS − ASK) using Pulse-Interval Encoding (PIE)
format. Tags receive their operating power from this RF signal.
In order to receive information from a tag, readers transmit an unmodu-
lated RF carrier and listen for a backscattered replay. Tags send informa-
tion by backscatter-modulating the amplitude/phase of the RF carrier. The
encoding format is either FM0 or Miller-modulated subcarrier.
4.3.2 Tag-Identification layer
A reader interacts with tags using three basic operations:
• Select. The operation of choosing a subset of the tag population for
inventory and access. Working with databases, this operation is sim-
ilar to selecting records.
• Inventory. The operation of identifying tags. Specifically, after the
exchange of several messages (an inventory round), the tag sends to
the reader the PC, EPC and a CRC-16 values. An inventory round
operates in one and only one session at a time.
• Access. The operation of communicating (reading from and/or writ-
ing to) with a tag is comprised of multiple commands. Tags have to
be unequivocally identified before access.
4.3.3 Tag Memory
Tag memory is logically separated into four banks, as illustrated in Figure
4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Logical Memory Map
• Reserved memory (Bank 00). This area of memory shall contain the
kill and access passwords. Unless this memory locations have non-
zero values, the kill and access commands will not be accepted. Fur-
thermore, these locations cannot be locked or protected without in-
voking the access command.
The kill and access passwords are 32-bits values. Once the tag re-
ceives the kill password, it is rendered silent thereafter. Tags with a
nonzero access password have to receive this before transitioning to
a secure state.
• EPC memory (Bank 01). This area of memory shall contain a CRC-
16 checksum. Specifically, the complement-one of the precursor de-
fined in ISO/IEC 13239 is computed. A basic integrity check is im-
plemented by using a CRC-16 checksum of the PC and EPC values
that a tag backscatters during an inventory operation.
In the same block we can find the Protocol Control (PC) bits and
a code (such as an EPC) that unequivocally identifies the object to
4.3. EPC CLASS-1 GENERATION-2 SPECIFICATION 68
Figure 4.2: Tags State Diagram
which the tag is attached. The PC is subdivided into the EPC length
field, RFU , and a Number System Identifier (NSI).
• TID memory (Bank 10). This area of memory shall contain an 8-bit
ISO/IEC 15693 class identifier. Additionally, sufficient information to
unequivocally identify the custom commands and/or optional fea-
tures supported by the tag is also stored.
• User (Bank 11). This area of memory allows user-specific data stor-
age. The memory organization is user-defined.
4.3.4 Tag States and Slot Counter
As defined in EPC-C1G2, tags shall implement different states, as displayed
in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
• Ready state. After being energized, a tag that is not killed shall enter a
ready state. The tag shall remain in this ready state until it receives an
accurate Query command. Tag loads a Q-bit number from its RNG,
and transitions to the arbitrate state if the number is non-zero, or to
the replay state if the number is zero.
• Arbitrate state. A tag in an arbitrate state shall decrement its slot
counter every time it receives aQueryRep, transitioning to the replay
state and backscattering a RN16when its slot counter reaches 0000h.
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Figure 4.3: Interrogator/Tag Operations and Tag State [61]
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• Replay state. A tag shall backscatter a RN16, once entering in replay
state. If the tag receives a valid acknowledge (ACK), it shall transi-
tion to acknowledge state, backscattering its PC, EPC, and CRC-16.
Otherwise, the tag remains in arbitrate state.
• Acknowledge state. A tag in acknowledge state may transition to
any state except killed.
• Open state. After receiving a Req_RN command, a tag in acknowl-
edge state whose access password is nonzero shall transition to open
state. The tag backscatters a new RN16 that both reader and tag shall
use in subsequence messages. Tags in an open state can execute all
access commands except Lock and may transition to any state except
acknowledge.
• Secured state. A tag in acknowledge state whose access password is
zero shall transition to secured state, upon receiving a Req_RN com-
mand. The tag backscatters a new RN16 that both reader and tag
shall use in future messages. A tag in the open state whose access
password is nonzero shall transition to a secured state, after receiving
a valid access command, which include the same handle that was pre-
viously backscattered when it transitioned from acknowledge state to
the open state. Tags in secured state can execute all access commands
and may transition to any state except open or acknowledge.
• Killed state. Once a kill password is received by a tag in either open
state or secured state, it shall enter the killed state. Kill permanently
disables a tag. A tag shall notify the reader that the killed operation
was successful, and shall not respond to any reader thereafter.
Tags shall implement a 15-bit slot counter. Once a Query or QueryAdjust
command is received, a tag shall load into its slot counter a value between
0 and 2Q−1 obtained from tag’s PRNG.Q is a integer in the range (0, 15). A
Query specifiesQ, and aQueryAdjustmaymodifyQ from the priorQuery.
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4.3.5 Managing Tag Populations
As shown in Figure 4.2, tag populations are managed using three basic op-
erations. Each of these operations comprise one or more commands. The
operations are defined as follows:
• Select. The process that allows a reader to select a subset of the tag
population for inventory and access. The select command is Select.
A reader may use one or more Select commands to select a particular
tag previous to inventory.
• Inventory. The process that allows a reader to identify a tag. The
inventory operation is started by transmitting a Query command in
one of the four sessions that the tag can handle. One or more tags
may replay. The reader isolates a single tag response, and requests
the PC, EPC, CRC-16 from the tag. An inventory round can only
operate one session at a time.
The inventory command set is comprised of the following com-
mands: Query, QueryAdjust, QueryRep, ACK, NACK. All of these
commands are mandatory.
• Access. The process that allows a reader to interact (read from or
write to) with individual tags. Tags have to be unequivocally iden-
tified prior to access. There are multiple access commands, some of
which employ a one-time-pad-based cover coding in the R⇒ T link.
The set of access commands is composed of the following manda-
tory commands: Req_RN , Read,Write and Lock. Additionally, there
are other optional commands described in the specification: Access,
Blockwrite and BlockErase.
4.4 Pseudo-Random Number Generators
According to EPC-C1G2, tags shall be able to generate 16-bit random or
pseudo-random numbers (RN16), and shall have the ability to extract Q-
bit subsets from a RN16 to preload into its slot counter. Additionally, tags
should be able to temporally store at least two RN16s while powered, for
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example a handle and a 16-bit cover-code during password transactions.
The generator (RN16) should meet the following randomness criteria:
• Probability of a single RN16: The probability that any RN16 drawn
from the RNG has value RN16 = j for any j, shall be bounded by
0.8/216 < P(RN16 = j) < 1.25/216.
• Probability of simultaneously identical sequences: For a tag pop-
ulation of up to 10,000 tags, the probability that any of two or more
tags simultaneously generate the same sequence of RN16s shall be
less than 0.1%, regardless of when the tags are energized.
• Probability of predicting an RN16: An RN16 drawn from a tag’s
RNG 10ms after the end of Tr, shall not be predictable with a proba-
bility greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from RNG,
performed under identical conditions, are known.
4.5 Security Analysis and Open Issues
In this section we see in detail the messages exchanged in the different op-
erations between tags and readers. Once the procedures have been under-
stood, the security faults can easily be identified.
4.5.1 Inventory Procedure
A Query initiates an inventory round and decides which tags participate
in the round. After receiving the Query tags shall pick up a random value
in the range (0, 2Q − 1), and load this value into its slot counter. Tags that
pick up a nonzero value shall transition to the arbitrate state and await a
QueryAdjust orQueryResp command. Assuming that a single tag answers
(slot_counter = 0), the query-response algorithm proceeds as follows:
• T ⇒ R: The tag backscatters an RN16 and enters in replay state.
• R ⇒ T : The reader acknowledges the tag with an ACK containing
the same RN16.
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• T ⇒ R: The acknowledged tag transitions to the acknowledged state,
and backscatters its PC, EPC, and CRC-16
• R ⇒ T : The reader sends a QueryAdjust or QueryRep, so the iden-
tified tag inverts its inventory flag (i.e A → B or B → A) and transi-
tions to the ready state.
The security of this procedure is almost non-existent. Imagine the follow-
ing scenario, where a passive eavesdropper is listening in the channel. Un-
der these simple and realistic conditions the following security drawbacks
are presented:
• Tags do not transmit the EPC in a secure way. Instead, the EPC
is transmitted in plain-text. So one of the most important concerns
about the use of RFID technology is not accomplished. In other
words, the privacy information of the tag is easily jeopardized.
• Every time a tag is interrogated, it always transmits the same EPC.
Due to the fact that the EPC transmitted by a tag is fixed, a tag may
be associated with its holder, allowing its tracking. Suppose that your
watch has a tag compliant with the EPC-C1G2. An attacker may place
readers in your favorite entertainment places: cinemas, pubs, shops,
etc. During twomonths the attacker’s readers store the day and hours
when you stay at these places. Then, the attacker collects all this in-
formation, obtaining a consumer profile of you, which is very valu-
able information for a great number of companies. This is only one
example of how privacy location may be compromised. Therefore,
another of the main citizen concerns about the implantation of RFID
technology is not guaranteed, either.
The above scenario shows how privacy and location privacy are not guar-
anteed even under a very weak attack scenario, where there is only a pas-
sive eavesdropper. To avoid these two connected problems, researchers
proposed the use of pseudonyms. In general terms, a pseudonym is a ficti-
tious name. In RFID context, a pseudonym is interpreted as an anonymized
static identifier. However, under these conditions only privacy is guaran-
teed, as no private information is passed on the channel. An additional
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requirement is needed to prevent an attacker from being able to track a
holder’s tag. Specifically, every time the tag is interrogated, the tag has to
transmit a fresh new pseudonym.
The most commonly-found solution in the literature consists on repeat-
edly applying a hash function to the static identifier (i.e pseudonymn =
hashn(EPC)). Since the work of Sarma [193] in 2002, there has been a huge
number of solutions based on this idea [49, 93, 136, 160, 228]. Other authors
have even proposed using both hash functions and pseudo-random num-
ber generators [59, 183].
The usage of pseudonyms may be a good and interesting solution. How-
ever, hash functions have not been ratified by the EPC-C1G2 specification.
As we have mentioned earlier, standard hash functions greatly exceed the
capabilities of low-cost RFID tags. Therefore, an interesting issue may be
to design efficient and lightweight hash functions for RFID environments.
4.5.2 Access Procedures
After acknowledging a tag, a reader may want to access the tag. The ac-
cess command set comprises Req_RN , Read, Write, Kill, Lock, Access,
Blockwrite and Blockerase. The above commands can be computed un-
der the following conditions:
Command State
Req_RN Acknowledged, Open or Secured
Read Secured
Write Secured
BlockWrite Secured
BlockErase Secured
Acess Open or Secured
Kill Open or Secured
Lock Secured
Note that Read, Write, Blockwrite and BlockErase commands may also
be executed from the open state when allowed by the lock status of the
memory location.
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A reader starts an access to a tag in the acknowledged state as set out bel-
low:
• R⇒ T : The reader sends a Req_RN to the acknowledged tag.
• T ⇒ R: The tag generates and stores a new RN16 (denoted handle).
Then, the tag backscatters the handle, and transitions to open state
if its access password is nonzero, or to the secured state if its access
password is zero.
• R: Now or at some later point, the reader may start further access
commands.
All access commands sent to a tag (in open or secured state) include the
handle as a parameter. The tag shall verify the handle every time an ac-
cess command is received. Access commands with an incorrect handle are
ignored. The tag’s answers should also include the handle. This value is
fixed for the entire duration of an access sequence.
Tags and readers can communicate indefinitely in the open and secured
states. If the reader wants to terminate communication, one of the follow-
ings messages would have to be sent: Query, QueryAdjust, QueryRep, or
NAK.
4.5.2.1 Write, Kill and Access Commands
Everytime aWrite, Kill or Access command is sent to a tag, a 16-bit word
(either data or half-password) is transmitted over the channel. As confiden-
tial information is sent, the reader “obscures” it by means of a cover-code.
In general terms, to cover-code data or a password, the reader first requests
a random number from the tag. The reader computes a bit-wise xor of the
wordwith this pseudorandom number, and transmits the cover-code string
to the tag. Finally, the tag uncovers the received word by performing a bit-
wise XOR with the original random number. Specifically, as described in
the specification, the following sequence of messages are exchanged:
• R⇒ T : The reader sends a Req_RN to the acknowledged tag.
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• T ⇒ R: The tag generates a new RN16 and backscatters it to the
reader.
• R⇒ T : The reader computes a 16-bit cipher-text, which is composed
of the bitwise XOR of the 16-bit word to be transmitted with the new
RN16. The reader sends a command to the reader which includes as
a parameter the cipher-text and the handle.
• T ⇒ R: The tag decrypts the received cipher-text performing a bit-
wise XOR of it with the original RN16.
Kill and access passwords are 32-bits length. Therefore, to kill or access a
tag, a reader shall follow a multi-step procedure: the first containing the
16MSB of the kill or access password xored with a RN16, and the second
containing the 16 LSB of the kill or access password xored with a different
RN16.
The security margin of a protocol using a 16-bit PRNG is usually bounded
by 1
216
. Furthermore, the access and kill password are 32-bit values. The use
of 32-bits random numbers would avoid themulti-step procedure for using
the access, kill and write command. We recommend the usage of 32-bits
PRNG, which increases the security level and provides greater flexibility.
Therefore, the design of lightweight 32-bits PRNG can be considered as
an interesting open issue in RFID security. This PRNG has to obey the
randomness criteria specified in the EPC-G1G2 standard [61] and fits in the
severe computational and storing requirements for low-cost RFID tags.
The RFID channel asymmetry does not prevent the listening of the back-
ward channel (tag-to-reader channel) by an attacker. Indeed, the secu-
rity of the above mechanisms can be easily jeopardized even by a passive
eavesdropper. In this scenario, the attacker can obtain the random number
(RN16) sent by the tag (answer to Req_RN message). Once obtained, the
attacker can decrypt the message sent by the reader using a simple XOR.
Therefore the access password, kill password or sent data, can be easily ac-
quired by means of listening to the channel and performing a bitwise XOR.
Summarizing, cover-coding does not provide any kind of security protec-
tion for data or passwords.
4.5. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND OPEN ISSUES 77
A naive solution to protect data and passwords would be the use of con-
ventional encryption. However, standard cryptographic ciphers lie beyond
the capabilities of low-cost RFID tags. So, an open issue is the design
of new secure ciphers conforming to the severe restrictions of these en-
vironments. Another possible solution may consist of more sophisticated
challenge-response protocols such as the Gossamer protocol proposed in
this thesis (see Chapter 6).
4.5.2.2 Read Command
Read allows a reader to read part or all of tag’s Reserved, EPC, TID or User
memory. A read command has the following fields:
MemoryBank Specifies whether the reader accesses Reserved, EPC,
TID or User access memory.
WordPtr Specifies the starting word address for the memory
read, where words are 16-bit in length.
WordCount Specifies the number of 16-bit words to be read.
The read command also includes tag’s handle and a CRC-16. Before re-
ceiving a Read command, the tag first verifies that all memory words exist
and none are read-locked. Second, the tag backscatters a header (a 0-bit),
the requested memory words, and its handle.
The information exchanged between readers and tags is transmitted in
plain-text. So, if the tag requests access to private information, it could be
obtained by an attacker listening to the channel. In the case that the access
password was equal to zero, theReading command could be accomplished
from open state. This will imply that an adversary may gain access to the
tag’s data without prior authentication. Once the tag is in open state, an
attacker may send messages to the tag trying to obtain all its stored infor-
mation. To avoid this kind of attack, we recommend locking the memory
when the access password is fixed to zero, in order to discard Read com-
mands.
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Figure 4.4: Lock-Command Payload and Masks
4.5.2.3 Lock Command
Only tags in the secured state shall execute a Lock command. Using the
Lock command the reader is able to:
• Lock individual passwords, thereby preventing or allowing subse-
quent reads and/or writes of that password.
• Lock individual memory banks, therefore preventing or allowing
subsequent writes to that bank.
• Permalock (make permanently unchangeable) the lock status for a
password or memory bank. Permalock bits, once asserted, cannot
be deasserted. If a tag receives a Lock whose payload attempts to
deassert a previously asserted permalock bit, a tag will ignore the
command and backscatter an error code.
As displayed in Figure 4.4, Locks contains a 20-bit payload defined as fol-
lows:
• The first 10 payload bits areMask bits, which are interpreted by tags
as follows:
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– Mask = 0: Ignore the associated action field and retain the cur-
rent lock setting.
– Mask = 1: Implement the associated action field and overwrite
the current lock setting.
• The last 10 payload bits are Actions bits, which are interpreted by
tags as follows:
– Action = 0: Deassert lock for the associated memory location.
– Action = 1: Assert lock or permalock for the associated memory
location.
Specifically, the functionality of various actions fields is described below:
pwd-write permalock Description
0 0 Associated memory bank is writeable
from either the open or secured states.
0 1 Associated memory back is permanently
writeable from either the open or secured
states and may never be locked.
1 0 Associated memory back is writeable
from the secured state but not from the
open state.
1 1 Associated memory back is not writeable
from any state.
pwd-read/ permalock Description
write
0 0 Associated password location is readable
and writeable from either the open or se-
cured states.
0 1 Associated password location is perma-
nently readable and writeable from either
the open or secured states and may never
be locked.
1 0 Associated password location is readable
and writeable from the secured state but
not from the open state.
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pwd- 1 read perm1 aloc Associated password location is not read-
able or writeable from any state.
The security of the Lock command lies in the security of the access pass-
word, due to the fact that Lock command can be only executed when the
tag is in the secured state. For example, a DoS attack can be accomplished
once the access password is obtained. Once the tag is in secure state, the
attacker can send a Lock command, whose payload is FFFFFh. This com-
mand will entail the permanent lock of the memory, preventing the tag’s
functionality. Note that the permanent lock is an irreversible action.
4.5.2.4 BlockWrite and BlockErase Commands
As optional commands, readers and tags may implement BlockWrite and
BlockErase. These commands allow a reader/tag to write/read multiple
words in tag’s Reserved, EPC, TID, or User memory using a single com-
mand. These commands have the following fields:
MemoryBank Specifies whether the BlockWrite/BlockErase ac-
cesses Reserved, EPC, TID or User access memory.
Both commands shall apply to a single memory
bank. Successive BlockWrite/BlockErase may ap-
ply to different banks.
WordPtr Specifies the starting word address for the memory
write/read, where words are 16-bit length.
WordCount Specifies the number of 16-bit words to be writ-
ten/read.
Data Only employed in the BlockWrite command. It
contains the 16-bit words to be written, and shall be
16 ×WordCount bits in length.
The security of the BlockWrite command is also non-existent. Tags send
information (16-bit words) over the channel in plain text. Therefore if pri-
vate information passes on the channel, it may be captured by a passive
attacker listening to the channel. Similarly, an active attacker can easily
modify messages.
4.6. EPC CLASS-1 GENERATION-2+ 81
The BlockErase command is not encrypted upon transmission over the
channel. As the information is transmitted in clear text, an attacker may be
able to easily modify the messages. For example, an attacker may send the
following message: 0xC8 - 01 - EPC - 0x00 - 0x8 - handle. Once the tag
receives the previous message, the EPC memory will be erased, leaving a
non-operative tag.
In the case that the access password was equal to zero, the Blockwrite and
BlockErase command can be accomplished from open state. So, in this sit-
uation, an adversary may acquire or erase the tag’s data without previous
authentication. We recommend deactivating these two commands when
access password is fixed to zero. In fact, a more secure option will be to
limit the usage of these two commands, independently of whether a tag is
in secured or open state, onlywhen non-sensitive information is concerned.
4.6 EPC Class-1 Generation-2+
The vast majority of studies on the design of security protocols for RFID
either do not conform to the EPC-C1G2 specification or suffer from seri-
ous security flaws. In this section, we present some recent proposals that
try to raise the security level of low-cost RFID tags and were developed
“conforming” to EPC-C1G2.
4.6.1 Strengthening EPC Tags
In [109], Juels claims that EPC tags which do not have any explicit authen-
tication functionality are vulnerable to cloning attacks. Tags emit its EPC
in a promiscuous mode and readers accept the validity of the EPC at face
value. The result is that tags compliant with EPC-C1G2 are vulnerable to
elementary cloning attacks. Juels introduces the concept of skimming, the
process of scanning a tag and obtaining its EPC for the purpose of cloning.
Several algorithms were proposed, distinguishing between two types of
tags. A basic tag is one that carries only the mandatory features of the
EPC-C1G2 specification. An enhanced EPC tag additionally includes the
optional access-control function.
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We now describe the BasicTagAuth protocol and the EnhancedTagAuth
protocol. In a system with N tags, the integer i (with 1 6 i 6 N ) denotes
the unique index of an EPC tag. Ti and Ki denotes the EPC identifier
and the valid kill PIN of tag i respectively. PIN-test(K) denotes an EPC-tag
command that causes a tag to output a bit-response b: 0 if the kill PIN is
correct, and 1 otherwise.
4.6.1.1 Basic TagAuth Protocol
T : T ← Ti
T ⇒ R: T
R: if T = Tx for some 1 ≤ x ≤ N the i← x
else output “unknown tag” and halt
R: (j,{P (1)i , P (2)i ,...,P (q)i })← GeneratePINSet(i)[q]
M ← valid
for n = 1 to q do
R⇒ T : PIN -test(P (n)i )
T ⇒ R: b
if b == 1 and n 6= j thenM ← invalid
if b == 0 and n = j thenM ← invalid
R: output M;
The key idea of this protocol is the presentation of spurious PINs as ameans
of testing their authenticity. The q value is a security parameter that speci-
fies the number of spurious PINs to be generated.
An attacker that performs skimming attacks can only create a cloned device
that attempts to guess the correct PIN-trial j uniformly at random. The
probability of successful attack (the cloned tag appearing to be valid) is
clearly just 1/q. However, the protocol is very inefficient (time-consuming)
as large number of messages (q) are exchanged between tags and readers
to provide an adequate security level.
4.6.1.2 Enhaced TagAuth Protocol
Enhanced EPC tags have both access and kill PIN. Juels proposes a mutual
authentication protocol, in which the access PIN (Ai) serves to authenticate
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the reader and the kill PIN (Ki) in turn serves to authenticate the tag.
T : T ← Ti
T ⇒ R: T
R: if T = Tx for some 1 ≤ x ≤ N the i← x, A← Ai
else output “unknown tag” and halt
R⇒ T : A
T : if A = Ai thenK ← Ki
elseK ← φ
T ⇒ R: K
T : ifK = Ki then output “valid”
else output “invalid”
Both of Juels’s proposals prevent a cloned tag from impersonating legiti-
mate EPC-C1G2 tags. Although this problem constitutes a very interesting
issue, we believe that focusing only on cloning, and forgetting other impor-
tant problems such as privacy, tracking, denial of service, etc. should not
be the correct approach.
4.6.2 Shoehorning Security into the EPC Standard
Juels et al. examine various ways by means of which RFID tags might per-
form cryptographic functionality while remain compliant with EPC-C1G2
standard [27]. Its key idea resides in taking an expansive view of EPC tag
memory. Instead of considering this memory merely as a form of storage,
they use it as an input/output medium for interfacingwith a cryptographic
module within the tag. Therefore, read/write commands may carry out
cryptographic values associated, such as messages in a challenge-response
protocol.
Juels et al. claim that EPC-C1G2 is a very limited protocol for entity authen-
tication. Specifically, tags are not authenticated in the specification, which
facilitates counterfeiting. As an example, this simple challenge-response
protocol is presented:
• R⇒ T : CR
• T ⇒ R: EPC, RT
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RT = H(KTS , CR), and H() is a cryptographic primitive like a block-
cipher, KTS is some secret key known only to the tag and the reader, and
CR is a unique challenge.
To implement the previous protocol, commands designed for other pur-
poses will have to be reused or one should define custom or new com-
mands. The task of defining the use of one protocol to carry the data units
of another is often designed as protocol convergence. Concisely, the ISO
7816 command set to accomplish entity authentication of the tag is pro-
posed.
Juels et al.’s work signals the need for mutual authentication between tags
and readers. However, the proposal is based on the assumption that EPC-
C1G2 tags might support on-board cryptographic modules. We consider
that this is not realistic, at least at the present time. Moreover, this pro-
posal is focused on tag authentication (counterfeiting). However, there are
a great number of other security concerns that should be considered before
proposing a protocol converge. Otherwise, Juels et al.’s proposal can be a
good starting point.
4.6.3 Enhancing Security of EPC-C1G2
Duc et al. proposed a tag-to-backend server authentication protocol [158].
During manufacturing time, EPC, and tag’s access PIN are assigned by the
manufacturer. Then, it chooses a random seed and stores K1 = f(seed) in
the tag’s memory and the corresponding back-end server’s database entry.
The authentication protocols is described as follows, where f() denotes a
PRNG function.
R⇒ T : Query request
T : ComputeM1 = CRC(EPC||r)⊕Ki and C = CRC(M1 ⊕
r)where r is a nonce.
T ⇒ R⇔ S: M1, C and r
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S: From each tuple (EPC,Ki) in its database, the server ver-
ifies whether the equationM1 ⊕Ki = CRC(EPC||r) and
C = CRC(M1⊕ r) hold. If a match is found, then the tag
is successfully identified and authenticated, and the server
will forward tag’s information to the reader and proceed
to the next step; otherwise the process is stopped.
S ⇔ R→ T M2
IfR desires to perform read/write operation to tag’s mem-
ory, it requests an authentication token to M2 from S
where M2 = CRC(EPC||PIN ||r) ⊕ Ki. Then, R sends
M2 to T . The tag receivesM2 and computes itsM2, using
its local values (PIN , r, EPC, Ki), and verifies whether
the received M2 equals the local one. If so, the tag will
accept the end session command in the next step.
S ← R→ T: EndSession command
Upon receiving this command, both server and tag update
their shared keys asKi+1 = f(Ki).
The security of Duc et al.’s protocol greatly depends on key synchroniza-
tion between tags and back-end server. The last message of the protocol
is comprised of an EndSession command, which is sent to both tags and
readers. An interception of one of these messages will cause a synchroniza-
tion loss between the tag and the server. Therefore, the tag and the server
cannot authenticate each other any more. Additionally, this fault may be
exploited as follows: theEndSessionmessage to server may be intercepted
avoiding its key updating and then a counterfeiting tag can replay old data
(M1, r, C) leading to its correct authentication.
Furthermore, the forward secrecy is not guaranteed. Forward secrecy is the
property that guarantees that the security of the messages sent today will
still be valid tomorrow. If the tag is compromised, obtaining (EPC, PIN ,
Ki), an attacker can verify whether past communications came from the
same tag. This attack is based in the symmetry of messages M1 and M2.
Imagine that an attacker has stored old (M1, M2, r) messages. Now, he
computesM1⊕M2 = CRC(EPC⊕r)⊕CRC(EPC||PIN ||r), and using the
compromised values (EPC, PIN , Ki) and the eavesdropped r, he could
verify that these messages came from the same tag.
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Chapter 5
Proposed Solutions for
Securing RFID Technology
In this chapter we present the best solutions proposed so far for solving
the security problems and threats associated with the use of RFID systems.
Our objective is not to give a detailed explanation of each solution, but to
provide the reader with the fundamental principles and a critical review of
every proposal, as well as the bibliography to be checked in case the reader
should wish to pursue particular aspects of this subject further.
5.1 Kill Command
This solution was proposed by the Auto-ID Center [43] and EPCglobal.
In this scheme, each tag has an unique password, for example of 24 bits,
which is programmed at the time of manufacture. On receiving the correct
password, the tag will deactivate forever.
5.2 The Faraday Cage Approach
Another way of protecting the privacy of objects labeled with RFID tags
is by isolating them from any kind of electromagnetic wave. This can be
done using what is known as a Faraday Cage (FC), a container made of
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metal mesh or foil that cannot be penetrated by radio signals (of certain
frequencies).
5.3 The Active Jamming Approach
Another way of obtaining isolation from electromagnetic waves, and an al-
ternative to the FC approach, is by disturbing the radio channel, a method
known as active jamming of RF signals. This disturbance may be accom-
plished with a device that actively broadcasts radio signals, so disrupt-
ing the radio channel completely, thus preventing the normal operation of
RFID readers.
5.4 Blocker Tag
If more than one tag answers a query sent by a reader, it detects a collision.
The most important singulation protocols are Aloha (13.56 MHz) and the
tree-walking protocol (915 MHz). Juels [113] used this feature to propose a
passive jamming approach based on the tree-walking singulation protocol,
called blocker tag. A blocker tag simulates the full spectrum of possible
serial numbers for tags. In [110], Juels and Brainard proposed a weaker
privacy-protection mechanism, called soft blocking. Soft blockers simply
show the privacy preferences of their owners to RFID readers.
5.5 Bill of Rights
In [78], Garfinkel proposed a so-called RFID Bill of Rights that should be
upheld when using RFID systems. He did not try to convert these rights
into Laws, but proposed them as a framework that companies voluntarily
and publicly should adopt.
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Figure 5.1: Interleaved Challenge-Response Protocol [72]
5.6 Classic Cryptography
Rewritable Memory In 2003, Kinoshita [121] proposed an anonymous-ID
scheme. The fundamental idea of his proposal is to store an anony-
mous ID, E(ID), for each tag, so that an adversary cannot find out
the real ID of the tag. E may represent a public or a symmetric key
encryption algorithm, or a random value linked to the tag ID. In or-
der to solve the tracking problem, the anonymous ID stored in the
tag must be renewed by re-encryption as frequently as possible.
Symmetric Key Encryption Feldhofer [72] proposed an authentication
mechanism based on a simple two-way challenge-response algorithm
(as illustrated in Figure 5.1). The main problem with this approach is
that it requires AES to be implemented in an RFID tag. In the next
section the main block and stream ciphers suitable for low-cost RFID
systems are presented.
Public Key Encryption There are solutions that use public-key encryp-
tion, based on the cryptographic principle of re-encryption. Read-
ers interested in the precise details can read Juels’s paper [112]. Two
other interesting papers that tackle the subject of re-encryption are
[83] and [192]. Nowadays, other authors have proposed the use of
public cryptographic based on elliptic curve cryptography (see Sec-
tion 5.8)
5.7. SYMMETRIC CIPHERS 90
5.7 Symmetric Ciphers
Block and stream ciphers are two categories of ciphers used in classic cryp-
tography.
Block cipher A block cipher is a type of symmetric-key encryption algo-
rithm that transforms a fixed-length block of plaintext data into a
block of ciphertext data of the same length. The transformation is
controlled using a second input -the secret key. The fixed-length is
usually the same as the block size, 64-bits being a value normally
found in many ciphers of the past. However, block size has nowa-
days been increased to 128-bits as processors are more powerful and
attacks of complexity 264 become feasible.
Techniques known as modes of operation have to be used when we
encrypt messages longer than the block size. To be useful, a mode
must be at least as secure and efficient as the underlying cipher.
Stream cipher A stream cipher is a type of symmetric encryption, typically
much faster than block ciphers. In contrast to block ciphers that op-
erate on a block of data, stream ciphers operate on smaller units of
plaintext, usually bits or bytes. If we encrypt several times any par-
ticular plain text with a block cipher using the same key and an ECB
as the mode of operation, the same ciphertext is obtained. However,
with a stream cipher, the transformation of these smaller plaintext
units will vary, depending on when they are encountered during the
encryption process.
A stream cipher generates a keystream, in other words a sequence
of bits used as a key. Encryption is generally performed by combin-
ing the keystream with the plain text, and usually the bitwise XOR
operation is employed. When the keystream is independent of the
plaintext and ciphertext, the stream cipher is said to be synchronous.
Alternatively, it can depend on the data and its encryption, in which
case the stream cipher is said to be self-synchronizing.
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5.7.1 AES
In 2005, Feldhofer et al. proposed a hardware implementation of the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) which is optimized for low-resource re-
quirements [74]. The authors claim that the proposed implementation will
serve for considerable time as a reference for AES-128 implementations that
support encryption and decryption including key setup. The two main ob-
jectives of this implementation are optimization of the silicon area (small-
est possible footprint) and power consumption. High data throughput, on
other hand, is of minor importance.
Most AES operations are byte oriented, executing efficiently on 8-bit pro-
cessors. As 8-bit operations can be combined to form 32-bit operations,
AES can be efficiently implemented on 32-bit processors too. However, the
most common implementation found is a 128-bit architecture. With this
architecture, a higher degree of parallelism is obtained, permitting higher
throughput. Feldhofer et al. decided to implement AES with encryption
and decryption using a fixed key size of 128 bits. The low-power require-
ments do not permit use of 128-bits operations and even a 32-bit architec-
ture still exceeds the restrictions. An 8-bit architecture, as seen in Figure
5.2, was finally proposed. For more details, the reader is referred to the
original paper. We summarize now the most relevant aspects from their
implementation:
Die Size The core occupies a silicon area of 0.25 mm2 on a 0.35µm CMOS.
This compares roughly to 3.4K gate equivalents, or to the size of a
grain of sand.
Performance The functionality of cheap devices, even at very low supply
voltages, has been tested. The chip works correctly with a supply
voltage higher than 0.65V. The encryption of one 128-bit block re-
quires 1032 clock cycles including loading data and data reading. The
maximum throughput for encryption is 9.9 Mbps. Similar values are
obtained for decryption.
Power Consumption A charge transfer method has been employed to
measure the power consumption on the AES chip. The mean cur-
rent consumption of the chip measured is 3.0 µA at the target clock
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of the 8-bit AES module [74]
Table 5.1: AES-128: Performance Comparison
AES-128 Technology Area Throughput Max. Power
version (µm) (GEs) (Mbps) Frequency (µW)
(MHz)
Feldhofer [74] 0.35 3400 9.9 80 4.5
Satoh [194] 0.11 5400 311 130 —
Mangard [177] 0.6 7000 70 50 —
frequency of 100 KHz and a supply voltage of 1.5V.
Finally, we can compare the Feldhofer et al. proposal with other efficient
AES implementations. Table 5.1 summarizes the specifications of these pro-
posals. The Feldhofer proposal requires the lower chip area for its imple-
mentation, with a reduction of at least 40%. From a throughput perspec-
tive, Satoh [194] and Mangard [177] are superior. However, 10Mbps may
be enough for most of the intended applications. Finally, the Satoh and
Mangard proposals do not include power consumption results since they
did not manufacture their design in silicon.
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5.7.2 DES and its Variants
In [176] Poschmann et al. proposed a serialized version of DES which pro-
cesses 4-bit and 6-bit data words instead of 32 bit or 48 bits (see the original
paper for details). This implementation requires only 2,310 gate equiva-
lents, and 144 clock cycles are consumed to encrypt a plain-text. The se-
curity of this cipher is limited by the use of a 56-bit key. A brute-force at-
tack using software takes a few months and hundreds of PCs, but only few
days with a special purpose machine such as COPACOBANA [129]. So
the above implementation is intended for applications demanding short-
term security or when the protected contents have a relatively low value.
A key-whitening technique can be employed when a higher security level
is required, yielding DESX:
DESXk.k1.k2(x) = k2⊕DESk(k1⊕ x)
The key space increases from 56 bits to 184 bits. However, the security level
of DESX is bounded by 118 bits due to the time-memory trade-offs [132].
This scheme demands around 14% additional extra gates because of the use
of the bank of XOR gates and the additional registers.
The same authors proposed a compact version called DESL (DES
Lightweight extension). DESL is based on the DES design, but the eight
original S-boxes are replaced by a single new one (7 S-boxes and a multi-
plexer are eliminated). The S-box has been optimized allowing the cipher
to be resistant against common attacks (i.e. linear and differential crypt-
analysis, Davies-Murphy attack). This DES variant demands 1,850 gate
equivalents, consuming 144 clock cycles to encrypt a block. Finally, authors
proposed the use of key whitening when a higher security level is required.
This version, called DESXL, requires 2170 equivalent gates, consuming the
same number of clock cycles. Table 5.2 summarizes the specifications of the
different DES variants.
5.7.3 PRESENT
Recently, Bogdanov et al. proposed an ultra-lightweight block-cipher
named PRESENT [35] and inspired by the AES finalist candidate SERPENT.
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Table 5.2: DES Variants: Performance Comparison
DES Technology Area Clock cycles Current consumption
version (µm) (GEs) (µA)
DESL 0.18 1,848 144 0.89
DES 0.18 2,309 144 1.19
DESX 0.18 2,629 144 —
DESXL 0.18 2,168 144 —
Figure 5.3: PRESENT Cipher [35]
This cipher is an example of a substitution-permutation network (SPN) and
consists of 32 rounds. The block length is 64 bits and two key lengths of
80 and 128 bits are supported. Figure 5.3 depicts the data path of an area-
optimized version of PRESENT-80. As any other SPN, the cipher comprises
three stages: a key mixing step, a substitution layer, and a permutation
layer. For the key mixing, authors choose a simple XOR operation. The key
schedule consists basically of a 61-bit rotation together with an S-box and
a round counter (PRESENT-80 uses a single S-box, whereas PRESENT-128
demands two S-boxes). The substitution layer comprises 16 S-boxes with
4-bit inputs and outputs (4 x 4). The authors recommend the version with
the 80-bit key for constrained devices (i.e. low-cost RFID tags or sensor net-
works). The implementation of PRESENT-80 requires around 1.6K equiva-
lent logic gates, and 32 clock cycles are needed to encrypt a 64-bit plain text
(200 Kbps). PRESENT-80 is therefore more efficient than AES-128 [74] from
a hardware perspective. However, from a security perspective, AES has
been studied for many years and a deeper security analysis of PRESENT is
required [217].
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5.7.4 Other Block Ciphers
Recently, many block ciphers (i.e. HIGHT, Clefia, SEA, TEA, etc.) have been
proposed for they use in RFID systems. HIGHT is block cipher with 64-bit
block length and 128-bit key length [99]. This cipher requires 3048 gates
on 0.25µm technology and consumes 34 clock cycles for encryption. Clefia
is a new 128-bit block cipher supporting key lengths of 128, 192, and 256
bits [197]. The authors claim this cipher achieves enough resistance against
known attacks and performs well both in hardware and software. The cir-
cuit of CLEFIA with 128-bit key by area optimization requires around 6,000
gates. The Scalable Encryption algorithm (SEAn,b) is a block cipher tar-
geted for small embedded applications [145, 201]. This cipher can be pa-
rameterized according to the plaintext size n, key size n, and the processor
(or word) size b. Although it was initially designed for software imple-
mentations, its implementation in a FPGA device has been also examined
[146]. Finally, the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) and its variants (XTEA
and XXTEA) are optimized for software architectures [53, 54, 55]. The TEA
family uses only addition, XOR and shift, so that those can be implemented
efficiently on 8-bit platforms.
5.7.5 Grain
Grain [91, 92] is a stream cipher designed for restricted hardware environ-
ments and submitted to eSTREAM in 2004 by Martin Hell, Thomas Johans-
son and Willi Meier. It has been selected as Phase 3 Focus Candidate for
Profile 2 by the eSTREAM project and finally in the eSTREAM Profile 2
(Hardware) Portafolio. This cipher is suitable for devices in which gate
count, power consumption and memory are very limited.
We shall give a brief description of the Grain cipher (the reader is referred
to the original paper for more details). Grain cipher is a bit oriented syn-
chronous stream cipher. So the key stream is generated independently from
the plain text. Two shift registers are employed, one with linear feedback
(LFSR) and one with nonlinear feedback (NFSR). The NFSR is used in com-
bination with a nonlinear output function to introduce nonlinearity in the
cipher. In order to balance the state of the NSFR, the input to the NFSR is
masked with the output of the LFSR. Both shift registers are 80 bit in size.
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Figure 5.4: Grain Cipher [91]
Table 5.3: Gate Count and Throughput of Grain
t Gate count Throughput (Mbit/s)
MAX 3000A MAX II Cyclone
1 1450 49 200 282
2 1637 98.4 422 576
4 2010 196 632 872
8 2756 — 1184 1736
16 4248 — 2128 3136
The key size is 80 bits and the IV size is specified to be 64 bits. Figure 5.4
shows the architecture of the cipher.
In the initial proposal, both shift registers are regularly clocked so the ci-
pher will output 1 bit/clock. Johansson and Meier looked at how to in-
crease the speed of the cipher at the expense of more hardware. Specifi-
cally, this can be done by just implementing the feedback function and the
output function several times. To achieve the objective, in registers each
bit is shifted t steps instead of one when the speed is increased by a factor
t. An example of the architecture proposed when the speed is doubled is
shown in Figure 5.5.
The authors studied the hardware complexity for its implementation. They
elaborated a design based on standard FPGA architectures. The design has
been implemented in three different FPGA families. Table 5.3 summarizes
the results obtained.
Finally, the authors claim that the Grain design provides much better secu-
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Figure 5.5: Grain cipher when at double speed [91]
rity than both E0 and A5/1 while maintaining a low gate count.
5.7.6 Trivium
Trivium is a synchronous stream cipher designed to provide a flexible
trade-off between speed and gate count in hardware, and a reasonably effi-
cient software implementation [58]. It has one of the simplest architectures
of the eSTREAM candidates and is consequently particularly easy to im-
plement. Trivium generates up to 264 bits of output from an 80-bit key and
an 80-bit IV. As for most stream ciphers, this process consists of two phases:
first the internal state of the cipher is initialized using the key and the IV,
then the state is repeatedly updated and used to generate keystream bits.
Trivium’s 288-bit internal state consists of three shift registers of different
lengths. The key stream generation consists of an iterative process which
extracts the values of 15 specific state bits and uses them both to update
3 bits of the state and to compute 1 bit of keystream. The state bits are
then rotated and the process is repeated until the requested N < 264 bits
of keystream have been generated. Figure 5.6 shows a graphical represen-
tation of the keystream generation. To initialize the cipher, the key and IV
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Figure 5.6: Trivium Cipher [58]
Table 5.4: Performance of Trivium
Version Gates Bits/cycle
Trivium 3488 (288 Flip-Flops + 3 AND + 11 XOR) 1
Trivium-8 3712 (288 Flip-Flops + 24 AND + 88 XOR) 8
Trivium-16 3968 (288 Flip-Flops + 48 AND + 176 XOR) 16
Trivium-32 4480 (288 Flip-Flops + 96 AND + 352 XOR) 32
Trivium-64 5504 (288 Flip-Flops + 192 AND + 704 XOR) 64
are written into two of the shift registers and the remaining bits are set to
a fixed pattern of zeros and ones. The cipher state is then updated 4 x 288
= 1152 times in the same way as explained above, so that every bit of the
internal state depends on every bit of the key and of the IV in a complex
nonlinear way.
Authors suggest a bit-oriented architecture for compact implementation.
Additionally, the parallelization of operations allows power-efficient and
fast implementations. As any state bit is not used for at least 64 iterations
after its modification, up to 64 iterations can be computed at once. So the
3 AND gates and 11 XOR gates in the original scheme are duplicated a
corresponding number of times. Table 5.4 summarizes the results obtained.
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5.7.7 Other Stream Ciphers
The ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project is a multi-year effort to identify new
stream ciphers thatmight become suitable for widespread adoption. Profile
2 is oriented to hardware applications with restricted resources. Besides
Grain and Trivium, other candidates for Profile-2 are the following:
Cipher Authors
DECIM Côme Berbain, Olivier Billet, Anne Canteaut, Nicolas Courtois,
Blandine Debraize, Henri Gilbert, Louis Goubin, Aline Gouget,
Louis Granboulan, Cédric Lauradoux, Marine Minier, Thomas
Pornin and Hervé Sibert
Edon80 Danilo Gligoroski, Smile Markovski, Ljupco Kocarev and
Marjan Gusev
F-FCSR Thierry Berger, François Arnault and Cédric Lauradoux
MICKEY Steve Babbage and Matthew Dodd
Moustique Joan Daemen and Paris Kitsos
Pomaranch Cees Jansen, Tor Helleseth and Alexander Kolosha
Trivium Christophe De Cannière and Bart Preneel
The eSTREAM portfolio finalized on May 2008 and the follow-
ing ciphers have been chosen for the Profile-2: F-FCSR-H v2,
Grain v1, MICKEY v2, and Trivium. The reader is referred to
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/ for more details. Additionally,
hardware implementation and performance metrics of these algorithms
have been assessed in detail [39, 84, 188].
5.8 Asymmetric Ciphers
The major problem related to the use of symmetric key systems is the need
to share a secret key, this being required for both encryption and decryp-
tion. In asymmetric, (or public key), cryptography this is not an issue in
the same way. Two keys, mathematically related, are used and work to-
gether. For example, a plain text encrypted with one of the keys can only
be correctly decrypted with the other associated key. Of these two keys one
will be typically be kept private by its owner and the other will be made
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Table 5.5: ECC Performance Comparison
Total Area Technology Frequency
Source Field (GEs) (µm) (MHz)
Kumar et al. [128] GF (2113) 10,113 0.35 13.560
GF (2131) 11,970 0.35 13.560
GF (2163) 15,064 0.35 13.560
GF (2193) 17,723 0.35 13.560
Batina et al. [30, 31] GF (267)2 12,944 0.25 0.175
GF (2131) 14,735 0.25 0.175
Gaubatz et al. [79] GF (p100) 18,720 0.13 0.5
Wolkerstorfer [80] GF (p191) 23,000 0.35 68.500
O¨tztu¨rk et al. [57] GF (p166) 30,333 0.13 20.000
as widely-known as possible. So there is almost no need to share keys,
avoiding the risk of compromising security.
Whether a public-key cryptosystem can be implemented on an RFID tag
or not remains an open problem. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is
emerging as an attractive public-key cryptosystem for this kind of device.
Compared to traditional cryptosystems like RSA or discrete logarithms,
ECC offers equivalent security with smaller operand length, which results
not only in lower computational requirements, but also power consump-
tion and storage. ECC has been commercially accepted and recently en-
dorsed by the US government.
In [30], the most recent works in this research area are described. Batina
et al. investigated several options considering ECC over F2p , p a prime,
operands ranging between 130 a 140 bits of length, and composite fields.
Instead, Kumar et al. proposed ECC over binary fields (F2131 for short-term
security – F2163 for medium-term security). The authors claim that the use
of binary fields rather than prime fields offers two main advantages: carry
free arithmetic and simplified squaring arithmetic. A performance com-
parison of the main contributions of ECC implementations for constrained
devices is summarized in Table 5.5.
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5.9 Schemes Based on Hash Functions
One of the more widely used proposals to solve the security problems that
arise from RFID technology (privacy, tracking, etc) is the use of hash func-
tions.
Hash Lock Scheme Weis [224] proposed a simple security scheme based
on one-way hash functions. Each tag has a portion of memory re-
served for storing a temporarymetaID, and operates in either a locked
or an unlocked state. The reader hashes a key K for each tag, and each
tag holds a metaID (metaID = hash(K)). While locked, a tag answers all
queries with his metaID and offers no other functionality. To unlock
a tag, the owner queries the back-end database with the metaID from
the tag, looks up the appropriate key and sends the key to the tag.
The tag hashes the key and compares it to the stored metaID.
Randomized Hash Lock Scheme One of the problems of the aforemen-
tioned solution is that it allows the tracking of individuals. To avoid
this, the metaID should be changed repeatedly in an unpredictable
way. In order to solve this problem, Weis [224] proposed an extension
of the hash lock scheme. It requires that tags have a hash function and
a pseudo-random number generator.
Hash-Chain Scheme Ohkubo in [160] suggested a list of five points that
must be satisfied in all security designs of RFID schemes: keep com-
plete user privacy, eliminate the need for extraneous rewrites of the
tag information, minimize the tag cost, eliminate the need for high
power of computing units, and provide forward security. In [160], a
hash-chain schemewas proposed in which two hash functions (G and
H) are embedded in the tag.
The secret key s is stored in the tag’s memory, which is linked to the
object’s ID server, which manages the link between the secret key s
and the object’s ID. Tag responds to reader queries by generating
a hash value a=G(s) of secret s, computing new secret s’=H(s), and
overwriting the memory with new secret s’. The reader sends the
output from the tag to the server and makes a request for revealing
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Hash Lock Scheme
Randomized Hash Lock Scheme
Hash-Chain Scheme
Figure 5.7: Schemes Based on Hash Functions [160, 224]
the ID. The server identifies the ID of the tag from a=G(s), received
from the reader, and sends the ID back to the reader.
The above three schemes are illustrated in Figure 5.7. Some other recent
published works on the use of hash functions are [49, 93, 136, 228].
5.10 Schemes Based on Pseudo-Random Functions
Molnar [155] proposed a scheme for mutual authentication between tags
and readers, with privacy for the tag. This protocol uses a shared secret s
and a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) to protect the messages exchanged
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Figure 5.8: PRF-based Private Authentication Protocol [155]
between the tag and the reader. The protocol consists in a three message
exchange (see Figure 5.8). The reader sends a hello message along with a
random number r1. The tag responds to the reader queries by sending an-
other random number r2 and σ (σ = ID⊕fs(0, r1, r2)). The reader identifies
the ID of the tag, and then sends τ (τ = ID ⊕ fs(1, r1, r2)) in order the tag
to be able to authenticate the reader.
Finally, other proposals are based on the use of both hash functions and
PRNGs [59, 183].
5.11 Optimization of Server Search
One of the main drawbacks of the hash schemes already proposed is that
the load of the server (for identifying tags) is proportional to the number
of tags. Molnar [155] proposed a new scheme to reduce this load, which is
named Tree-Based Private Authentication. In this solution each tag is identi-
fied with a leaf of the tree. A tag stores the secrets (log n) from the root to
the leaf of the tree. The reader, when it wants to authenticate itself with a
tag, starts at the root (left or right) and if the reader and the tag successfully
authenticate using one of the secrets (left or right), the reader continues to
the next level of the tree. If the reader fails to convince the tag at any level,
the tag rejects the reader. If the reader passes all secrets in the path, the tag
accepts the reader.
In the tree-based private authentication, the reader acts as a relay, passing
the pseudonym from the tag to the Trusted Center (TC). It requires a costly
interaction between the reader and the TC every time the tag is read. In
order to reduce the burden on the TC, an off-line delegation scheme has
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Figure 5.9: Trusted Center Delegates Access to Two Different Readers [154]
been proposed [154]. In this scheme, the TC can compute a time limit secret
that only allows the ability to disambiguate pseudonyms for a particular
tag a limited number of times. In particular, the TC computes a secret that
allows recognizing the next q pseudonyms from this tag. We illustrate in
Figure 5.9 how off-line delegation works with two different readers and a
TC.
Another interesting proposal is thework of Gildas andOechslin [26], where
a time-space trade-off is proposed.
5.12 Lightweight cryptography
5.12.1 Naïve Proposals
In 2003, Vajda and Buttyán proposed a set of lightweight challenge and
response authentication protocols [215]. They started analyzing the follow-
ing simple protocol:
R→ T : x⊕ k = a (5.1)
T → R : f(x)⊕ k = b
whereR and T symbolize the reader and the tag, respectively; k is the secret
key shared between both entities; x is a n-bit random challenge; and f is a
n-bit to n-bit mapping function.
The mutual information (I(h, k) = H(x ⊕ f(x))) between the key and the
exchanged messages (h = (a, b)) is the entropy of x ⊕ f(x). Bearing this in
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mind, there are several ways to strengthen the security of the above proto-
col:
1. Non-linearity. The set of preimages will be more hard to compute by
an attacker if a nonlinear function f is used.
2. Mixed operations. XOR operation (which is linear over binary vec-
tors) could be replaced by modular addition or modular integer pow-
ering. In this case, the analysis and combination of messages would
not be so easy.
3. Compression. Authentication does not need to be based on invertible
transformations.
4. Keys. Different keys may be used in the two directions.
Protocol 1: XOR
A protocol based on the XOR operation and with different keys used in
both directions is proposed below:
R→ T : x⊕ k1 (5.2)
T → R : x⊕ k2
The above protocol is probably secure if the keys are randomly selected in
each run of the protocol. As low-cost RFID tags are very restricted devices,
a probably secure key update algorithm is necessary. The authors then
proposed a new protocol, where a lightweight block stream generator with
secret seed value k0 is employed:
R→ T : x⊕ ki (5.3)
T → R : x⊕ k0
where ki =
∏
(k(i−1)), and
∏
: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a permutation, a special
stream generator that expands seed k0.
Protocol 2: Subset
The following protocol was proposed, where a tag sends back a m-bit por-
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tion of the challenge as a replay:
R→ T : x⊕ k (5.4)
T → R : f(x) = (xL,xR[0..7] , xL,xR[8..15] , ..., xL,xR[8m..8m+7])
The challenge is divided into two parts: x = (xL, xR). The j-th byte of
xR, denoted by xR,[8j..8j+7], addresses a bit of xL, denoted by xL,xR,[8j..8j+7] ,
which is considered to be the j-th bit of the output vector. The following
parameters are assumed: n = 384 ( = 256 + 128 ), |xL| = 256, |xR| = 128
bits, and m=16. Under these conditions, the probability that an attacker
will successfully impersonate a tag using a random response is bounded
by 2−m = 2−16. This value is unacceptable for standard cryptographic
applications but it may suffice for some RFID applications.
Protocol 3: Squaring
A protocol based on the squaring of a 2n bit portion of the key shared be-
tween the tag and reader was proposed:
R→ T : x (5.5)
T → R : kL ⊕ ((kR + x)2 mod 2n)
where kL and kR are two halves of a 2n bit secret key k = (kL, kR), and the
symbol “+” represents integer addition.
Protocol 4: Knapsack
R→ T : d⊕ k, κ(x, d) (5.6)
T → R : x⊕ k′
where k is an m-bit secret key and k’ is an n-bit secret key, x is an n-bit chal-
lenge, and d is an m-bit trapdoor. κ is a punctured multiplicative knapsack;
in order words, a public set of n s-bit prime numbers, stored both by the
reader and the tag.
R selects randomly n/2 elements from this set (knapsack) and multiplies
together the selected primes. The n-bit challenge x contains 1 at those bit
positions which correspond to the primes selected (an order is assumed
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among the primes) and 0 at the remaining positions. R chooses t integers
randomly from the range of 1, 2, ... , s · n/2, and marks bits of binary
representation of the product at bit positions corresponding to the selected
integers. The marked bits are deleted and the binary string is shrunk in
size accordingly. The resultant punctured string is the output of mapping
κ. Trapdoor d consists of the integers used in puncturing, by appending
these integers in order. It follows that the output of κ has length s · n/2− t
bits, furthermore the trapdoor ism = t · log(s ·n/2) bits long. When the tag
receives the reader’s message, it knows the punctured position according
to the trapdoor, and the punctured bits will be found by exhaustive search.
All of these protocols assume that each tag shares a secret with the reader,
so it is quite difficult for the reader to find which secret corresponds to
which tag. To limit the impact of a potential discovery by an adversary,
they should be changed regularly and kept secure during distribution and
in service. The process of selecting, distributing and storing keys is known
as key management; this is difficult to achieve reliably and securely.
The aim of the above schemes is tag authentication, but the security level
is very low and can be breached by a powerful adversary. Additionally,
they do not solve important problems such as reader-to-tag authentication
or tracking, to name just a few issues.
5.12.2 List of Identifiers
In [107], Juels proposed a solution based on the use of pseudonyms, with-
out using hash functions at all. The RFID tag stores a short list of random
identifiers or pseudonyms (α1, α2, α3, ..., αk ). When the tag is queried, it
emits the next pseudonym in the list. An adversary can, however, gather
all the names on the list by querying a tag multiple times. Then the fraudu-
lent tag could impersonate a honest tag. This is the sort of cloning attack to
which standard RFID tags with static identifiers are vulnerable (i.e. EPC-
C1G2 specification).
To prevent such an attack, some solutions were proposed later: tags could
release their name only at a certain prescribed rate, or pseudonyms could
be refreshed only by authorized readers. If the second solution is em-
ployed, a mutual authentication between the reader and the tag is required.
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Juels proposed a lightweight mutual authentication protocol based on the
release of keys shared between both parties. The verifier authenticates to a
tag by releasing a key βi, which is unique to a pseudonym αi. Once the ver-
ifier has authenticated to the tag, the tag authenticates itself to the reader
by releasing an authentication key γi. Like βi, this authentication key γi
is unique to a pseudonym αi. After mutual authentication, key (βi,γi) and
pseudonym (αi) updating is accomplished. The reader transmits one-time
padding data that the tag uses in the updating stage. Although encryp-
tion is not explicitly involved by means of one-time pads, it is equivalent to
encryption. Pads can be considered keys used to “encrypt” and thereby up-
date the αi, βi and γi values. Indeed, each tag stores a series of pads. The
stored pads are updated with new material on each authentication. This
new pad material is sent in clear on the channel, but the updating proce-
dure ensures that it will be used only after a certain number (m) of updates.
This number should be chosen such that an adversary cannot observe m
consecutive authentications.
As it has been shown, Juels’s protocol does not require the use of any cryp-
tographic primitive. However, it involves the exchange of four messages
and needs key updating, which may be costly and difficult to perform se-
curely. Moreover, the assumption that an attacker can not observe m con-
secutive authentications does not hold in many real scenarios.
5.12.3 Abstractions of Integers Arithmetics
Lemieux and Tang proposed amutual authentication scheme based on infi-
nite, non-associative, and usually non-abelian structures that authors have
termed Abstractions of Integer Arithmetic (AIA) and Partial Abstractions
of Integer Arithmetic (PAIA) [138]. To give an easily understandable ex-
planation of the proposed protocol, the scheme is introduced to the reader
using integer arithmetic. However, infinite non-abelian groupoids or quasi-
groups should be used to achieve a secure solution (see the original paper
for more details).
The proposed authentication protocol is based on the multiplication of two
integers, as displayed in Figure 5.10. We assume that Alice and Bob share a
secret numberK = kn...k2k1 and a common secret digit d. In each round, a
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Figure 5.10: Multiplication of Two Integers
randomly digit is concatenated on the left hand side of the numberM . M
is initialized with the digitm1 = d, which is only shared between Alice and
Bob. In each round:
1. Alice randomly generates a new digit mi, concatenates this value to
M = mimi−1...m1 and computes E = K ×M . Then the pair (ei, mi)
is transmitted to Bob, where ei is the iith digit of E.
2. Bob computes the same product and checks the received ei. If it is
correct, he randomly generatesmi+1 and repeats the process.
After r rounds of consecutive success, both parties are convinced that they
share the same secret numberK and secret digit d. Encryption and decryp-
tion of a message can be computed in a similar manner as authentication.
In this case,mi represents the next digit in the message that Alice wishes to
send Bob. She encrypts it and the ciphertext ei is sent to Bob. Bob decrypts
ei to recovermi and the process continues with the next digitmi+1.
The authentication and encryption/decryption schemes, based on integer
arithmetic, are completely non secure. Two main assumptions are neces-
sary to guarantee an appropriate security level. First, given numbers E
andM , one cannot divide E andM even if it is know thatM is a factor of
E. Secondly, multiplication is not commutative. Therefore, AIAs or PIAs
are required to securely implement the protocol.
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5.12.4 Human Protocols
In [222], Weis introduced the concept of human-computer authentication
protocols due to Hopper and Blum, adapted to low-cost RFIDs (HB proto-
col). The security of the proposed protocol is rooted in the Learning Parity
with Noise Problem, whose hardness over random instances still remains an
open question.
Figure 5.11 (A) illustrates a single round of the HB authentication protocol
[114]. Suppose that the reader and the tag share a k-bit secret x, and the
tag would like to authenticate itself to the reader. The reader selects a ran-
dom challenge a  (0, 1)k and sends it to the tag. The tag responds to the
reader challenge by computing the binary inner-product a · x and injecting
noise into the result. The tag intentionally sends the wrong response with
probability η  (0, 12). This interaction must be repeated q rounds and the
reader will authenticate the tag’s identity if fewer than qη of its responses
are incorrect.
The above protocol is resistant to passive attacks, but not to active attacks.
Weis et al. proposed a new version of its protocol (HB+) to offer protec-
tion against active attacks [114]. The main differences with respect to the
HB protocol are the following: they introduce another k-bit secret key (y)
shared between the reader and the tag. The tag and not the reader initiates
the protocol, transmitting a k-bit blinding vector. Finally, z is computed as
the scalar product of the newly introduced secret key (y) and the blinding
vector transmitted by the tag, xored with the z in HB. A round of HB+ is
illustrated in Figure 5.11 (B). Although Juels et. al claimed that HB+ is resis-
tant to active attacks, Gilbert et al. showed how aman-in-the-middle attack
can be accomplished [81].
In order to avoid Gilbert et al.’s attack on HB+, Bringer et al. [38] proposed
two protocols (HB++[first attempt] and HB++ (Figures 5.11 (C) and 5.12
(A)) that protect against such man-in-the-middle attacks. However, these
protocols are vulnerable to attacks from an adversary that pretends to be a
genuine reader [175]. Piramuthu proposed a new protocol (see Figure 5.12
(B)) inspired by the HB++ protocol. The main changes introduced are as
follows:
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Tag (secret x)
ν ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν = 1) = η}
Compute:  z = rA· x ⊕ ν
Reader (secret x)
Check:  rA · x ≈ z
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
z
A round of HB protocol
(a) Fig. 5.11 (A)
Tag (secret x, y)
ν ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν = 1) = η}
Compute:  z = rA· x ⊕ rB· y ⊕ ν
Reader (secret x, y)
Check:  rA · x ⊕ rB · y ≈ z
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
z
A round of HB+ protocol
Generate blinding vector rB єR {0,1}k rB
(b) Fig. 5.11 (B)
Tag (secret x, y, x’, y’)
ν, ν’ ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν = 1),  Prob (ν’ = 1) = η}
Compute: 
z = rA· x ⊕ rB· y ⊕ ν
z’ = f (rA)· x’ ⊕ f (rB) · y’ ⊕ ν’
Reader (secret x, y, x’, y’)
Check:  
rA · x ⊕ rB · y ≈ z
f (rA) · x’ ⊕ f (rB) · y’ ≈ z’
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
(z, z’)
[First Attempt] A round of HB++ protocol
Generate blinding vector rB єR {0,1}k rB
(c) Fig. 5.11 (C)
Figure 5.11: Human Protocols (I)
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Tag (secret x, y, x’, y’)
ν, ν’ ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν = 1),  Prob (ν’ = 1) = η}
Compute: 
z = rA· x ⊕ rB· y ⊕ ν
z’ = rot (f (rA), ρ) · x’ ⊕
rot( f (rB),ρ) · y’ ⊕ ν’
Reader (secret x, y, x’, y’)
Check:  
rA · x ⊕ rB · y ≈ z
rot(f (rA), ρ) · x’ ⊕
rot(f (rB), ρ) · y’ ≈ z’
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
(z, z’)
A round of HB++ protocol
Generate blinding vector rB єR {0,1}k rB
(a) Fig. 5.12 (A)
Tag (secret  x’, y’)
ν’ ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν’ = 1) = η}
Initialize ρ = 0
ρ ← ρ + 1 
Compute: 
z’ = rot (f (rA), ρ) · x’ ⊕
rot( f (rB),ρ) · y’ ⊕ ν’
Reader (secret x’, y’)
Check:  
rot(f (rA), ρ) · x’ ⊕
rot(f (rB), ρ) · y’ ≈ z’
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
(z’)
A round of modified HB++ protocol (Piramuthu)
Generate blinding vector rB єR {0,1}k rB
(b) Fig. 5.12 (B)
Figure 5.12: Human Protocols (II)
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1. To thwart the attacker when an adversary pretends to be a valid
reader, z and the related vectors (x, y) and ν were omitted. Addi-
tionally, the protocol is kept more lightweight.
2. In order to prevent the use of the same ρ until protocol completion,
updating of ρ is accomplished every time z is computed.
Recently, Munilla and Peinado proposed another protocol [156]. First a
protocol inspired by HB and named HB-MP’ was proposed (see Figure 5.13
(A)). The authors acknowledge that the above protocol was vulnerable to
a simple man-in-the-middle attack, just like the initial HB+ protocol. To
avoid this weakness, a new protocol named HB-MP was worked out (see
Figure 5.13 (B)). We briefly describe a round of the HB-MP ′ protocol: sup-
pose that the reader and the tag share a k-bit secret x, and the tag would
like to authenticate itself to the reader. The reader selects a random k-bit
binary vector a and sends it to the tag. The tag computes the binary inner-
product a ·x and injects noise into this result. Then, the tag looks for a k-bit
binary vector b such that b · x = z. The tag sends back b to the reader. The
reader checks the equality of b · x and a · x. If it is correct, the tag is au-
thenticated. This protocol differs slightly from the protocols based on the
LPN problem. However, the authors maintain that the problem of finding
x, knowing the vectors a and b, is at least at difficult as solving the LPN
problem. In 2008, Leng et al. exposed a man-in-the-middle attack against
HB-MP and proposed an enhanced version of the aforemention protocol,
called the HB-MP+ protocol [139].
5.13 Simultaneous Reading
In 2004, Juels introduced the problem of providing a proof for the simulta-
neous reading of two RFID tags [115]. In other words, a proof that a pair
of RFID tags has been scanned simultaneously, but not necessarily by the
same reading device. Concretely, Juels denominated his proof as “yoking
proof” (applying “yoke” with its meaning “to join together”). Figures 5.14
and 5.15, summarize the proposed solutions related to the simultaneous
reading problem.
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Tag (secret x)
ν ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν = 1) = η}
Compute:  z = rA· x ⊕ ν
Choose:  z’ / z’· x = z
Reader (secret x)
Check: z’ · x  = rA · x 
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
z’
A round of HB-MP’ protocol
(a) Fig. 5.13 (A)
Tag (secret x, y)
ν ∊ {0, 1 | Prob (ν = 1) = η}
Compute:  
x = rotote(x, yi)  
z = rA· xm ⊕ ν
Choose: z’ / z’·xm = z
Reader (secret x, y)
x = rotate(x, yi)
Check: z’ · xm = rA · xm
Generate challenge rAєR {0,1}krA
z’
A round of HB-MP protocol
(b) Fig. 5.13 (B)
Figure 5.13: Human Protocols (III)
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Tag TATag TA Tag TBReader
“left proof”
A, rA
“right proof”, rA
B, mB, rB
mA = MACxA[rB]
PAB = (A, B, mA, mB)
mB = MACxB[rA]
Juels et al.: Yoking Proof
rB
mA
(a) Fig. 5.14 (A)
Tag TATag TA Tag TBReader
TS
A, mA
TS
B, mB
mA = MACxA[TS]
PAB = (A, B, TS, mB)
mA
mB = MACxB[TS,mA]
Saito and Sakurai: Grouping Proof
(b) Fig. 5.14 (B)
Figure 5.14: Simultaneous Reading (I)
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Tag TA A Tag TBReader
Verifier
r
request, r
a = (A, rA)
request, rA, r
mB = MACxB[rA,r]
B, mB, rB
mB
mA = MACxA[mB, rA ]
mA
PAB = (A, B, rA, 
rB, mA, mB)
Piramuthu: Variation of Yoking Proof
(a) Fig. 5.15 (A)
Tag TA A Tag TBReader
Verifier
t = gxv[TS]
a1 = Nun[IDA, counterA]
a2 = MACxA[ tMSB ⊕ a1 ]
Y = (a1, a2, counterA)
request, tMSB
Y
counterA= counterA+1
request, tLSB, a2
b1 = Nun[IDB, counterB]
b2 = MACxB[a2, b1 ⊕ tLSB]
Z = (b1, b2, counterB)
counterB= counterB+1
Z
b2
mAB = MACxA[a2, b2 ]
mAB
PAB = (Y, Z, mAB, t)
Mutual Authentication
Peris-Lopez: Clumping Proof
(b) Fig. 5.15. (B)
Figure 5.15: Simultaneous Reading (II)
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In 2005, Saito et al. presented a replay attack against the yoking proof [191].
Additionally, Peris et al. showed that the possession of a yoking proof only
implies that the involved tags have been read within a specific interval, but
it does not imply that the two tags have been simultaneously read [167].
Yoking proofs are based on message authentication codes and random
numbers. Saito and Sakurai proposed a yoking proof, which they called
“grouping proofs”, using timestamps [191] to be immune to replay attacks.
However, Piramuthu demonstrated [174] that grouping proofs are vulner-
able to replays attacks too.
In 2006, a new proof inspired by Juels’s yoking proofs was proposed by Pi-
ramuthu [174]. Although Piramuthu’s proposed scheme seemed to be re-
sistant to replay attacks, Peris et al. showed its vulnerability to multi-proof
session attacks. Furthermore, Piramuthu claims that privacy and location
privacy is guaranteed in his scheme, which is not the case as tags transmit
their static identifiers in clear [167].
Finally, in 2007, Peris et al. proposed a new anonymous proof, named
“clumping proof”, that solves the multi-proofs session attack and provides
privacy while also protecting against tracking [167].
palabra
Chapter 6
Lightweight Cryptography for
Low-cost RFID Tags
6.1 Introduction
The major challenge in trying to provide security for low-cost RFID tags is
their very limited computational capabilities (storage, circuitry and power
consumption), which makes them unable to perform the most basic cryp-
tographic operations.
Before designing a new protocol, the requirements and restrictions of a sys-
tem should be analyzed. The security level of an RFID tag used in an
e-passport should not be the same as that of a low-cost tag employed in
the supply chain (i.e. tags conforming to the EPC-C1G2 specification). To
clarify the kind of systems we refer to as low-cost/high-cost RFID tags,
Table 6.1 summarizes their specifications, these being relevant to current-
commercial RFID tags.
In [46], Chien proposed a tag classification mainly based on which were
the operations supported on-chip. High-cost tags are divided into two
classes: “full-fledged” and “simple”. Full-fledged tags support on-board
conventional cryptography like symmetric encryption, cryptographic one-
way functions and even public key cryptography. Simple tags can support
random number generators and one-way hash functions. Likewise, there
are two classes for low-cost RFID tags.“Lightweight” tags are those whose
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chip supports a random number generation and simple functions like a
Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) checksum, but not a cryptographic hash
function. “Ultralightweight” tags can only compute simple bitwise oper-
ations like XOR, AND, OR, etc. These ultralightweight tags represent the
greatest challenge in terms of security, because of the widespread use that
is anticipated for them and their very limited capabilities.
Table 6.1: Specifications for Low-cost and High-cost RFID Tags
Low-cost High-cost
RFID Tag RFID Tag
Standards EPC Class-1 Generation-2 ISO/IEC 14443 A/B
ISO/IEC 18006-C
Power Source Passively powered Passively powered
Storage 32 - 1K bits 32 KB - 70 KB
Circuitry 250 - 4K gates Microprocessor
(security processing) Standard cryptographic primitives Implement 3DES, SHA-1,
cannot be supported RSA
Reading Distance Up to 3 m About 10 cm
(commercial devices)
Price 0.05 - 0.1 ¤ Several euros
Physical Attacks Not resistant Tamper resistance
EAL 5+ security level
Resistance to Passive Attacks Yes Yes
Resistance to Active Attacks No Yes
[52, 111, 118, 158]
In spite of the severe restrictions of low-cost RFID tags, most of the pro-
posed solutions are based on the use of hash functions [49, 93, 136, 160, 193,
228]. Although this apparently constitutes a good and secure approach, en-
gineers face the non-trivial problem of implementing cryptographic hash
functions with only 250-4K gates [179]. In most of the aforementioned pro-
posals, no explicit algorithms were suggested and finding one is not an
easy issue, since traditional hash functions cannot be used (SHA-256, SHA-
1, MD5, etc.). The best implementation of SHA-256 requires around 11K
gates and 1120 clock cycles to perform a hash calculation on a 512-bit data
block [73]. As the number of resources needed is much greater than those
of a low-cost RFID tag, it may seem natural to propose the use of smaller
hash functions. However, neither functions such as SHA-1 (8.1K gates, 1228
clock cycles) or MD5 (8.4K gates, 612 clock cycles) fit in a tag [73]. Recently,
some authors have suggested the use of a “universal hash function” [229].
Although this solution only needs around 1.7K gates, a more thorough se-
curity analysis is necessary and this has not yet been done. Additionally,
this function only has a 64-bit output, which does not guarantee adequate
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security because finding collisions is a relatively easy task because of the
birthday paradox (around 232 operations).
Finally, none of the proposals comply with the EPC-C1G2 specification, be-
cause hash functions are not supported on Gen-2 RFID tags.
6.2 Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is the science that evaluates the promises of cryptography.
For example when you buy an air flight over the internet and pay with
your credit card, you would like that transaction to be secure. Transaction
security depends on the security mechanisms used. Cryptanalysis focuses
on evaluating the strength of cryptographic primitives and protocols [173,
200, 207].
Security issues do not seem to be properly addressed in the EPC-C1G2 stan-
dard. A number of papers, such as [27, 109, 124, 158] , have proposed new
protocols to enhance the security of this standard. Unfortunately, due to
weaknesses that have been exposed in them (see Chapter 4), these proto-
cols fall short of meeting the desired security objectives. In this section,
we show the security vulnerabilities of two recent authentication protocols
within the framework of the EPC-C1G2 specification [168, 172].
6.2.1 Chien et al. Protocol
In [47], Chien et al. proposed a mutual authentication protocol for improv-
ing the security of EPC-C1G2. Their scheme consists of two phases: an
initialization phase and an authentication phase.
Initialization Phase
For each tag denoted as Ti, the server randomly selects an initial authenti-
cation key Ki0 and a initial access key Pi0 . These two values are stored in
the tag together with the EPC (EPCi). The authentication and access key
are updated after each successful authentication. For each tag, the server S
(back-end database) maintains a record of six values: (1) EPCi; (2) the old
authentication key for this tag (Kold), which is initially set to Ki0 ; (3) Pold
denotes the old access key for this tag, which is initially set to Pi0 ; (4)Knew
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denotes the new authentication key, which is initially set to Ki0 ; (5) Pnew
denotes the new authentication key, which is initially set to Pi0 ; (6) Data
denotes all the information about the tagged object.
The (n+1) Authentication Phase
R→ Ti: N1
The reader sends a random nonce N1 as a challenge to
the tag.
Ti → R→ S: M1, N1, N2
The tag generates a random numberN2, computesM1 =
CRC(EPCi||N1||N2)⊕Kin , and sends the value back to
the reader, which will forward these values to the server.
The reader interactively selects an entry
(EPCi,Kold,Knew, Pold, Pnew, Data) from its database,
computes Iold = M1 ⊕Kold and Inew = M1 ⊕Knew, and
checks whether any of these two equations hold Iold =
CRC(EPCi||N1||N2) Inew = CRC(EPCi||N1||N2). This
is designed to be a way of avoiding desynchronization
attacks. The process is repeated until a match is found in
the database, thus implying a successful authentication
of the tag. If no match is found, a failure message is sent
to the reader, and the authentication process is stopped.
S → R: M2, Data
After a successful authentication, the server com-
putes M2 = CRC(EPCi||N2) ⊕ Pold or M2 =
CRC(EPCi||N2) ⊕ Pnew, depending on which value
(Kold, Knew) satisfies the equation in the previous step.
It also updates Kold = Knew, Pold = Pnew, Knew =
PRNG(Knew) and Pnew = PRNG(Pnew). The server
sendsM2, Data to the reader.
R→ Ti: M2
Upon receiving M2, the tag verifies whether the equa-
tionM2⊕Pin = CRC(EPCi||N2) holds. If so, it updates
its keysKin+1 = PRNG(Kin) and Pin+1 = PRNG(Pin).
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6.2.1.1 Cyclic Redundancy Codes - CRC’s
A Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) is a checksum algorithm that can be
used to detect transmission errors (typically one or two bit flips, or bursts)
in a very efficient way. CRCs operate by interpreting input binary se-
quences as polynomial coefficients that they divide over a prefixed poly-
nomial in order to obtain a remainder, which, in its binary expression, con-
stitutes the crc value.
CRCs are completely linear, so they shouldn’t be used in cryptographic
applications as they cannot detect malicious changes by a knowledgeable
attacker [22, 181, 203, 227]. To illustrate this property, the Hamming Dis-
tance (HD) can be used. The HD of a CRC polynomial is the minimum
possible number of bit errors that is undetected by computing the CRC.
For example, if a CRC has a HD of 3, any combinations of 1 or 2 bit errors
will be detected, but there is at least one combination of 3 bit errors that
will pass undetected. Cryptographic hash functions should therefore be
used for this purpose.
Computing a crc value for a given binary stream is essentially dividing the
polynomial associated with this stream by another fixed polynomial (that
depends on the particular CRC implementation) and computing a remain-
der. The stream should be multiplied by xN (being N the degree of the
crc polynomial) prior to division. That is to say, computing the crc of a
polynomial i(x) is basically finding a remainder r(x) so that,
i(x) · xN = d(x) · p(x) + r(x) with |r(x)| < |p(x)| (6.1)
The reader is referred to [210] where a detailed explanation about the elec-
tion of the p(x) polynomial is included. Some popular polynomials are the
following:
CRC-8 8AAA = x8 + x5 + x4 + 1
CRC-12 AAA = x12 + x11 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
CRC-16 AAA = x16 + x15 + x2 + 1
CRC-CCITT = x16 + x12 + x5 + 1
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CRC-32 AAA = x32 + x26 + x23 + x22 + x16 + x12 + x11 + x10 +
+x8 + x7 + x5 + x4 + x2 + x+ 1
CRC-64 AAA = x64 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
The EPC-C1G2 specification proposes the use of CRC-CCITT which detects
all single and double errors, all errors with an odd number of bits, all burst
errors of length 16 or less, 99.997 percent of 17-bit error bursts, and 99.998
percent of 18-bit and longer bursts.
The hardware requirements of a CRC generator are not very demanding.
Specifically, an n bit CRC consists of an n-bit shift register with some XOR
gates, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. To compute the CRC:
1. Load the register with the Preset value.
2. Augment the message by appending N zeros to the end of it (
i(x) · xN ).
3. While (more message bits)
3.1 Shift the register left by one bit, reading the next bit of
the augmented message into register bit position 0.
3.2 If (a 1 bit popped out of the register during the above
step)
Register = Register XOR p(x)
End While
4. The register contains the remainder.
CRC Properties
Due to their linearity, CRCs have some properties that, from the security
point of view, one can label as bad. In fact, we will show that one of these
“bad” properties (derived from their linear structure) will be enough to
successfully attack Chien et al.’s mutual authentication protocol in various
ways.
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1      0    0     0        1   0 0 0 0 0 0        1     0    0  0    0        1     Polynomial
Augmented messagePop!
16      15                    ...                               1      0     Bits   
…⊕ ⊕ ⊕
Figure 6.1: CRC-CCITT Implementation
Theorem 1. For any CRC (independent of its divider polynomial) and for any
values a, b, c and d ∈ F2[x], it holds that:
CRC(a‖b)⊕ CRC(c‖d) = CRC(a⊕ c‖b⊕ d) (6.2)
Proof. From the definition in Equation 1 above, one can write:
CRC(a‖b) = (a · xN ⊕ b) · xN ⊕ d1(x) · p(x) (6.3)
CRC(c‖d) = (c · xN ⊕ d) · xN ⊕ d2(x) · p(x) (6.4)
for certain polynomials d1(x) and d2(x) ∈ F2[x]. Substituting these values
in the left side of Equation 2we obtain the following:
(a · xN ⊕ b) · xN ⊕ d1(x) · p(x)⊕ (c · xN ⊕ d) · xN ⊕ d2(x)· (x) (6.5)
Rearranging terms in this expression we get:
((a⊕ c) · xN ⊕ (b⊕ d)) · xN ⊕ (d1(x)⊕ d2(x)) · p(x) (6.6)
that is the corresponding expression for CRC(a⊕ c‖b⊕ d) (analogously to
Equation 3 and 4).
Corollary 1. In particular, if in Equation 1 we have a = c, then,
crc(a‖b)⊕ crc(a‖d) = crc(a⊕ a‖b⊕ d) = crc(0‖b⊕ d) =
= crc(b⊕ d) (6.7)
because 0 · xN ≡ 0 · p(x)
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This is the property we will use to our advantage in attacking Chien et al.’s
protocol (and, for that matter, any other protocol relying on the use of a
CRC as a means of concealing secrets). It is important to point out that this
holds for every CRC implementation, independently of its length and crc
polynomial (CRC-8, CRC-16, CRC-32, CRC-64, etc.).
6.2.1.2 Vulnerabilities of Chien’s Protocol
In this section we will analyze the most important vulnerabilities in Chien
et al.’s protocol:
1. Unequivocal Identification
There is a fundamental difference between barcode technology and RFID.
Barcodes use Universal Product Codes (UPC) to identify the class of items.
RFID technology replaces UPCwith the Electronic Product Code (EPC) that
allows the unequivocal identification of tagged items. The Tag Data Speci-
fication [67] does not provide any specific guidance for using EPCs in UHF
Class-1 Generation-2 tags. So in the following we assume that EPCs will be
managed in the same way as they were in the EPC-C1G1 standard. So the
EPC is composed of the following fields (identical to those of the General
Identifier, GID-96):
• Header is set to the fixed hexadecimal value 0x35 (8-bits).
• General manager identifies a company, manager or organization (28-
bits).
• Object class is used by an EPC managing entity to identify class or
“type” of thing (24-bits).
• Serial number is unique within each object class (36-bits).
Static identifiers (EPC-96) represent valuable information that should be
transmitted on the channel guaranteeing confidentiality and, at the same
time, avoiding the tracking of its holders. Researchers have proposed a
number of pseudonym-based solutions to provide privacy protection (data
and location). The most commonly used solution in the literature for
pseudonym updating consists of repeatedly applying a hash function to
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the static identifier (i.e. pseudonymi = hashi(EPC)). However, hash func-
tions have not been ratified by the EPC-C1G2 specification because of the
inherent computational limitations of low-cost RFID tags. As we saw in
Chapter 4, tags conforming to EPC-C1G2 only support on-board a 16-bit
Pseudo-RandomNumber Generator and a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code
(CRC) checksum.
In the inventory command, as described in the EPC-C1G2 specification,
tags transmit their EPC as plain text. Chien et al. propose that tags transmit
M1 = CRC(EPC||n1||n2) ⊕Kin instead, where the nonce n1 is generated
by the reader and the nonce n2 is generated by the tag. Message M1, con-
catenated with these two nonces n1 and n2 is sent to the back-end database.
This scheme presents a serious security failure.
An EPC has the first 8 bits of the header fixed, while the remaining 88
bits are variable. So, there are 288 possible identifiers. However, tags
support on-board a 16-bit CRC (ISO/IEC 13239, p(x)=x16 + x12 + x5 + 1,
Preset=0xFFFF, Residue=0x1D0F). So the 288 possible EPC values col-
lapse in only 216 possible values when the CRC is applied to the EPC
(M1 = CRC(EPC ||n1||n2)⊕Kin).
Weakness 1: Chien et al’s protocol does not guarantee the unequivocal identi-
fication of tagged items, which is an essential property in authentication pro-
tocols.
We have simulated a population of N tags. For each tag, the values of
EPC, K, P were randomly initialized. These values will be stored both in
each tag and at the back-end database. Upon initialization, we simulate the
reading of theseN tags. For each reading, the following process is repeated:
(1) Reading of tagx
(2)M1 = CRC(EPCx || n1 || n2) ⊕ Kx
(3) SendM1, n1, n2 to the back-end database
(4) for(x’==1,x’< N,x’++)
M1’= CRC(EPCx’ || n1 || n2) ⊕ Kx’
if ((x’ != x) && (M1’ ==M1)) collision++;
(5) if collision>0 "Failed Unequivocal Identification"
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I.E. Failed Unequivocal Identification
EPCx= 0xe48862a92b704993e0698583 EPCx′=0xf1af12caee0319f564f89098
Kx= 0x9cf5 Kx′= 0x2336
n1 = 0xbdc5 n1 = 0xbdc5
n2 = 0xa6f4 n2 = 0xa6f4
M1 = CRC(EPCx||n1||n2) ⊕ Kx M1’= CRC(EPCx′ ||n1||n2) ⊕ Kx′
M1 =M1’=0xa2b2
The above process is repeated T times (T = 104) in order to obtain an esti-
mation of the non-unequivocal identification probability (PNUI ). We have
simulated the above experiment with eight different values (N = 118, 226,
301, 397, 549, 626, 769, 800). The values obtained are summarized in Figure
6.2 (A), and fit perfectly with the values obtained for the birthday paradox
with a group of N tags and d = 216 boxes:
p(N ; d) =
{
1−∏N−1k=1 (1− kd ) N ≤ d
1 N > d
(6.8)
These results are hardly surprising, since each time a tag (tagx) is
read, we search if the equality M1 = CRC(EPCx||n1||n2) ⊕ Kx ==
CRC(EPCx′ ||n1||n2) ⊕ Kx′ = M ′1 holds for x′ 6= x. As specified in EPC-
C1G2, the CRC is 16-bits length. The kill and access passwords are 32-bits
length in the specification. However, only one half (MSB or LSB) is in-
cluded in each message. Chien et al. do not state the key length of the
authentication key (kx) nor that of the access key (Px). From the above, we
can assume that these keys are 16-bit length. Moreover, the keys are xored
with a CRC of 16-bit length, so the previous assumption seems consistent
with their usage. Finally, if we assume that the CRC() and Ki are uni-
formly distributed (which may well not be the case, specially in the case of
CRCs), the probability that at least two of N randomly selected tags have
the same index (M1 =M ′1), is exactly that of the birthday paradox with pa-
rametersN and d = 216. Therefore, we have demonstrated that tags cannot
be unequivocally identified under these conditions. For example, with a
population of tags greater than 300, we have at least one non-unequivocal
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(a) Fig. 6.2 (A) (b) Fig. 6.2 (B)
Figure 6.2: Non Unequivocal Identification and Failed Authentication
identification with a probability over 0.5 (PNUI > 0.5). Similarly, even for
a relatively low number of tags (600) the probability of non-unequivocal
identification rises to more than 90% (see Figure 6.2 (A)).
Finally, even if we considerably relax the requirements of our RFID sys-
tem even allowing the existence of collisions in the identification process
(although if the collision probability is low, this seems a very unusual de-
cision), Chien’s protocol could present serious operational problems as the
number of tags increases, because the probability of failed authentication
rises quickly. To verify this, we carried out an experiment similar to that
described above, although in this case each time a tag is read the absolute
number of collisions in the database is computed. The experiment has been
simulated with six different values (N = 27, 210, 212, 214, 215, 216), and re-
peated T times (T = 104). The obtained results are displayed in Figure 6.2
(B). So, the probability of failed identifications in a population of N tags, is
described by the following equation:
PFI(N) =
{
2log2(N)−16 N ≤ 216
1 N > 216
(6.9)
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I.E. Several Failed Identification of Tag0x29a51b66cf66663d2dc9f16f
Messages Transmitted
Reader↔ Tag0x38304699082162af23df77a1: M1 n1 n2 M2
Reader↔ Tag0x9f52dc22daa678fe85d68b23: M1′ n1′ n2′ M2′
Reader↔ Tag0xdb58b949c3a24a24484999a8: M1′′ n1′′ n2′′ M2′′
EPCx = 0x38304699082162af23df77a1 EPCx′′′ = 0x29a51b66cf66663d2dc9f16f
Kx = 0xabd8 Kx′′′ = 0xa27b
n1 = 0x1b17 n2 = 0x2b72 n1 = 0x1b17 n2 = 0x2b72
M1 = CRC(EPCx||n1||n2) ⊕ Kx M1′′′ = CRC(EPCx′ ||n1||n2) ⊕ Kx′′′
M1 =M1
′′′
=0xe5ce
EPCx′ = 0x9f52dc22daa678fe85d68b23 EPCx′′′ = 0x29a51b66cf66663d2dc9f16f
Kx′ = 0x61b8 Kx′′′ = 0xa27b
n1
′
= 0x8eac n2
′
= 0xfb81 n1
′
= 0x8eac n2
′
= 0xfb81
M1
′
= CRC(EPCx′ ||n1′ ||n2′ ) ⊕ Kx′ M1′′′ = CRC(EPCx′′′ ||n1′ ||n2′ ) ⊕ Kx′′′
M1
′
= M1
′′′
=0x5b41
EPCx′′ = 0xdb58b949c3a24a24484999a8 EPCx′′′ = 0x29a51b66cf66663d2dc9f16f
Kx′′ = 0xc14e Kx′′′ = 0xa27b
n1
′′
= 0x8017 n2
′′
= 0xf1c3 n1
′′
= 0x8017 n2
′′
= 0xf1c3
M1
′′
=CRC(EPCx′′ ||n1′′ ||n2′′ ) ⊕ Kx′′ M1′′′=CRC(EPCx′′′ ||n1′′ ||n2′′ ) ⊕ Kx′′′
M1
′′
= M1
′′′
=0x7058
2. Tag Impersonation and Forward Secrecy
Each tag shares with the reader some private information: EPC, authen-
tication key (kx) and the access key (Px). This information is used to build
messagesM1 andM2 in order to prove its authenticity. However, a passive
attacker eavesdropping the backward and forward channel (see [182] for
a eavesdropping range classification) will be able to supplant a legitimate
tag as described below:
6.2. CRYPTANALYSIS 131
Weakness 2: Chien et al’s protocol does not guarantee the non-impersonation
of legitimate tags.
Proof: In order to accomplish this attack, an adversary only needs to listen
to an iteration between the reader and the legitimate tag.
(1) R→ T : n1
(2) T → R : M1 = CRC(EPCx||n1||n2)⊕Kx, n2
At this point, the attacker isolates the legitimate tag, preventing it from
operating. He has the following information: M1, n1, and n2. With this, the
attacker should be able to buildmessageM ′1 = CRC(EPCx||n1′||n2′)when
queried by the reader. Although the attacker does not know the private
information stored in the tag (EPC,Kx, and Px), messageM ′1 can be easily
computed as described below. Corollary 1 states:
crc(a||b)⊕ crc(a||d) = crc(b⊕ d) (6.10)
As this holds for every a, b, d ∈ F2[x], if b and d are the concatenation of
some other variables (b = b1||b2, d = d1||d2), the above expression also
holds and can be rewritten as:
crc(a‖b)⊕ crc(a‖d) = crc(a‖b1‖b2)⊕ crc(a‖d1‖d2) =
crc((b1‖b2)⊕ (d1‖d2)) = crc(b1⊕ d1‖b2⊕ d2) (6.11)
So the difference between the known valueM1 and the new challenge M ′1
is exactlyM1 ⊕M ′1 = CRC(EPC||n1||n2) ⊕ CRC(EPC||n′1||n′2) and, sub-
stituting in Equation 6.11, we get
CRC(EPC||n1||n2)⊕ CRC(EPC||n′1||n′2) = CRC(n1 ⊕ n′1||n2 ⊕ n′2) (6.12)
So, message M ′1 can be obtained doing an XOR between message M1 and
the easily computable value CRC(n1 ⊕ n′1||n2 ⊕ n′2) (because all nonces
are transmitted in clear and the CRC function is public). Therefore, the
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identity of a legitimate tag could be easily impersonated. An ANSI-C code
with the implementation of this attack is available in http://163.117.
149.208/rfid/chien/attack2.c.
I.E. Tag Impersonation
EPCx = 0x52c3e4175b97de07f22f9db0 Kx = 0xf6dd Px = 0xca39
EPCx = 0xe34f5cdd919f4f2f9211678fe Kx = 0xb224
Reader→ Tag: n1 = 0xb3e2
Tag→ Reader: M1 = 0x21b4, n2 = 0x5fa4
(Isolate the tag)
Reader→ Attacker: n1′ = 0x77d8
Attacker→ Reader: M1′ = M1 ⊕ CRC(n1⊕ n1′ ||n2⊕ n2′ ) =
0x21b4 ⊕ 0x5e73 = 0x7fc7
n2
′
= 0xf0e2
Database: Check M1
′
= CRC(EPC||n1′ || n2′ ) ⊕ Kx =
= 0xcde3 ⊕ 0xb224 = 0x7fc7
Tag is impersonated!
Additionally, the scheme does not provide forward secrecy protection.
Suppose that an adversary listens to an iteration between a legitimate
reader and a legitimate tag (M1, n1, n2, M2) and stores these values. Then,
the tag which is not resistant to physical attacks is compromised, the EPC
being obtained by the attacker. At this point, the attacker will be able to
obtain the secret keys (Kx and Px) and to generate future M1
′
, M1′′, etc. A
detailed explanation of this attack is described below:
I.E. Forward Secrecy
Database: Check M1
′
= CRC(EPC||n1′ || n2′ ) ⊕ Kx = 0x7fc44447
EPCx = 0x4d3174f00cf844e4ce5fb064 Kx = 0x1479 Px = 0xe04d
Reader→ Tag: n1 = 0x119b
Tag→ Reader: M1 = 0x1b36, n2 = 0x8a4b
Reader→ Tag: M2 = 0xc57a
...
Tag is compromised obtaining its EPC
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Database: Check M1
′
= CRC(EPC||n1′ || n2′ ) ⊕ Kx = 0x7fc44447
Attacker: M1, M2, n1, n2, EPCx are known
Obtaining the keys:
Kx=CRC(EPC || n1 || n2) ⊕M1 = 0x1479
Px=CRC(EPC || n2 ) ⊕M2 = 0xe04d
Kx′ = PRNG(Kx) = 0xa586
M1
′
= CRC(EPC || n1’ || n2’) ⊕ Kx′
The attacker is able to generate future M1 messages
i.e. n1’ = 0xfa4b n2’ = 0x4b88
M1
′
= CRC(EPC || n1’ || n2’) ⊕ Kx′ =
= 0x3c64 ⊕ 0xa586 = 0x99e2
3. Back-end Database Impersonation
In the above section we focused on message M1 sent by the tag when
queried by the reader. In this case we concentrate on message M2, gener-
ated by the back-end database. The attacker should be able to generate this
message in order to impersonate a legitimate back-end database.
Weakness 3: Chien et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to back-end database imper-
sonation.
Proof: For the attacker, it is enough to listen to an iteration between a
legitimate tag and a reader-database in order to exploit this vulnerability:
(1) R→ T : n1
(2) T → R : M1 = CRC(EPCx||n1||n2)⊕Kx, n2
(3) R→ Database : M1 , n1, n2
(4) Database→ R : M2 = CRC(EPCx||n2)⊕ Px
(5) R→ T : M2
The attacker has to block or disrupt the radio channel to obstruct the correct
reception of message 5. The objective of this is to prevent the legitimate tag
from updating its key. At this point, the attacker could supplant the back-
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end database without knowing all its private information. In the next tag
reading, the database will receiveM ′1, n′1, n′2. The fraudulent database has
to compute the messageM ′2. But from Corollary 1, the following expression
can be derived:
M2 ⊕M ′2 = CRC(EPC||n2)⊕ CRC(EPC||n2′)
CRC(EPC||n2)⊕ CRC(EPC||n2′) = CRC(n2⊕ n2′) (6.13)
So, messageM ′2 can be obtained by means of an XOR between the previous
M2 message listened to in the air channel and the easily computed value
CRC(n2 ⊕ n′2). MessageM ′2 will be sent to the tag, which will authenticate
the fraudulent back-end database and update its keys. An ANSI-C code
with the implementation of this attack is available in http://163.117.
149.208/rfid/chien/attack3.c.
I.E. Database Impersonation
EPCx = 0x52c3e4175b97de07f22f9db0 Kx = 0xf6dd Px = 0xca39
Reader→ Tag: n1 = 0x04a6
Tag→ Reader: M1 = 0x7a98, n2 = 0xa833
Reader→ Tag: M2 = 0x25f6 (blocked!)
...
Attacker→ Tag: n1′ = 0xf556
Tag→ Attacker: M1′ = 0x47dc, n2′ = 0xae5c
Attacker→ Tag: M2′= M2 ⊕ CRC(n2 ⊕ n2′ ) = 0x1219
Tag: Check M2
′
= CRC(EPC || n2′ ) ⊕ Px =
= 0xd820 ⊕ 0xca39 = 0x 1219
Back-end database is impersonated!
4. Tracking or Private Location
Protection against tracking is not guaranteed when tags answer reader
queries with the same identifier. In Chien et al.’s protocol, nonces n1 and
n2 are employed in each session to ensure freshness. With this, it seems
that the tag’s private location is assured. This is not the case, as explained
below:
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Weakness 4: Chien et al.’s protocol does not guarantee the location privacy of
tags
Proof: The success of this attack depends on preventing tag key updating.
Moreover, if the population of tags is greater than 216, the normal operation
of the protocol will hamper the key update operation (non-unequivocal
identification). In the back-end database a pair of keys (new, old) are
stored for each tag key. Chien et al. claim that the storage of these
two keys frustrates DoS attacks. To provide this property, the fact that
a tag may sometimes use the same key (message M2 was incorrectly re-
ceived) to compute the message M1 is considered as a normal operation.
In fact, Chien does not specify the maximum number of times that a
tag can be authenticated with the same authentication key. Imagine that
the reader captures two non-consecutive iterations, upon non-updating
key condition (an ANSI-C code with the implementation of this attack
is available in http://163.117.149.208/rfid/chien/attack4.c):
(1) R→ T : n1
(2) T → R : M1 = CRC(EPCx||n1||n2)⊕Knx , n2
....
(1) R→ T : n1′
(2) T → R : M ′1 = CRC(EPCx||n′1||n′2)⊕Knx , n′2
....
Now, the attacker computes the XOR of messagesM1 andM ′1. If messages
M1 andM ′1 came from the same tag, the keyKnx is cancelled when the XOR
is computed. By means of Equation 6.11, the attacker can verify if answers
arise from the same tag:
M1 ⊕M ′1 = CRC(n1 ⊕ n′1||n2 ⊕ n′2) (6.14)
I.E. Private Location Jeopardized
Attacker A==B⇒ Tag answers provide for the same tag!
EPCx = 0x26d4caaaaa59d9AAAa3afbeaf871fb35c Kx = 0x650b
Upon non-updating key condition ...
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Reader→ Tag: n1 = 0x1305
Tag→ Reader: M1 = 0x6b3c, n2 = 0xb642
...
Reader→ Tag: n1′ = 0x1ea4
Tag→ Reader: M1′ = 0x1e33, n2′ = 0xf4a7
...
Attacker: A = M1 ⊕M1’ = 0x750f
B = CRC (n1⊕ n1′ ||n2⊕ n2′ ) = 0x750f
A==B⇒ Tag answers provide for the same tag!
A similar attack can be accomplished using messages sent by the database
(M2). Suppose that a crooked reader interrogates a tag: reader sends the
messageM1 to the database. The database authenticates the tag, and sends
back message M2. M2 is stored by the reader, and a wrong M2 message
is sent to the tag avoiding its key updating. Then, the above process is
repeated obtaining messages M ′1, and M ′2 with nonces n′1 and n′2. At this
point, the attacker computes the XOR of messages M2 and M ′2 to check if
they came from the same tag. From Corollary 1, the following equality has
to be fulfilled:
M2 ⊕M ′2 = CRC(n2 ⊕ n′2) (6.15)
5. Back-end Database Auto-desynchronization
To defend against a DoS attack, Chien et al. propose that the back-end
database maintains a pair of keys (new, old) for each tag key. This assump-
tion allows the server to authenticate tags and re-synchronize these each
time they suffer a DoS attack. However, the normal operation of the proto-
col results in synchronization loss between the database and the tags due
to the non-unequivocal identification property.
Weakness 5: Chien et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to auto-desynchronization
attacks.
We have simulated a population ofN tags. For each tag theEPC,K, and P
values are randomly initialized. These values will be stored both in the tag
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and in the back-end database. Upon initialization, we simulate the reading
of N tags. For each reading, the following process is repeated:
(1) Reading of tagx
(2) M = CRC(EPCx || n1 || n2) ⊕ Kx
(3) SendM , n1, n2 to the back-end database
(4) while ((x’<N)&&(output==0))
{M’= CRC(EPCx’ || n1 || n2) ⊕ Kx’
if (M’ ==M) autodesyn[x’]++; output=1
x’++;}
Upon the reading of theN tags, we compute the number of times that auto-
desynchronization occurred. After the reading of a tag its keys are updated
both in the database and in the tag. An additionally wrong update, during
the reading of a different tag, will cause a loss of synchronization for that
tag. Therefore, the number of tags whose keys have been updated two or
more times constitute the number of desynchronized tags. So the probabil-
ity of auto-desynchronization (PADS) can be defined as:
PADS =
1
N
N∑
x=1
(autodesyn[x]− 1) (6.16)
The above process is repeated T times (T = 103) in order to obtain an es-
timation of the PADS . We have simulated the experiment with different
values (N = 214, 215, 216 ... 218), as displayed in Figure 6.3. The results
indicate that if we have a population of N ≥ 217 tags, the probability of
auto-desynchronization is greater than 0.5. This probability increases to
0.93 if the population is N ≥ 218.
6.2.1.3 Remarks
We have shown that all these security weaknesses of Chien protocol are
related to the use of the CRC. Some of them (non-unequivocal identification
and autodesynchronization) could have been solved simply by using larger
CRCs (well above the 16-bit CRC proposed in the standard). The rest of
the security problems highlighted are due to the bad (linear) properties of
CRCs and will not be solved by changing the CRC length. Indeed, we
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Figure 6.3: Auto-desynchronization Probability
doubt that CRCs should be used in any security protocol at all, and its use
should be confined to guarantee an error-free communication channel.
6.2.2 Konidala and Kim Protocol
A first initiative by Konidala and Kim [124] tried to solve the security short-
comings of the EPC-C1G2 specification by presenting a mutual authentica-
tion scheme (TRMA) to protect the tag’s access password. However, Lim
and Li showed how a passive attacker can recover this [143]. Recently,
Konidala and Kim proposed a new version of the TRMA scheme (TRMA+)
in which the tag access and kill password are used for authentication [125].
6.2.2.1 The Original TRMA Scheme and its Extension
For completeness and readability we will first provide a brief description
of the original TRMA scheme and its extended version TRMA+.
Original TRMA Scheme
A brief description of the TRMA scheme follows. For further details, the
reader is referred to the original work in [124].
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Tag⇒ Reader: EPC, RNTag1 , RNTag2
First the tag is singulated and backscatters its EPC num-
ber. Then the reader sends two ReqRN commands to the
tag, which responds by backscattering two generated 16-bit
random numbers: RNTag1 and RN
Tag
2 .
Reader⇒ Tag: RNRdr1 , RNRdr2 , CCPwdM1, CCPwdL1, RNRdr3 , RNRdr4
The reader also generates two 16-bit random numbers:
RNRdr1 and RNRdr2 . The four random numbers and the
access password are used to construct CCPwdM1 and
CCPwdL1 responses:
CCPwdM1 = APWDM ⊕ PAD1 (6.17)
CCPwdL1 = APWDL ⊕ PAD2 (6.18)
where APWDM and APWDL are the 16 most significant
and 16 least significant bits of the access password, re-
spectively. PADi = PadGen(RN
Tag
i , RN
Reader
i )[APWD],
where PadGen(.) is a specially designed pad generation
function. Next, two 16-bit random numbers (RNRdr3 ,
RNRdr4 ), which will be used in tag authentication, are gen-
erated and transmitted to the tag.
Tag: Verify CCPwdM1 and CCPwdL1. If both values are correct,
the process continues. Otherwise, the process is aborted.
Tag⇒ Reader: RNTag3 , RNTag4 , CCPwdM2, CCPwdL2
The tag also generates two new random numbers (RNTag3 ,
RNTag4 ), and builds answers CCPwdM2 and CCPwdL2.
CCPwdM2 = APWDM ⊕ PAD3 (6.19)
CCPwdL2 = APWDL ⊕ PAD4 (6.20)
These new random numbers and answers are sent to the
reader.
Reader: Verify CCPwdM2 and CCPwdL2. If both values are correct,
the tag is authenticated. Otherwise an alarm is raised.
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TRMA+ Scheme
In [143], Lim and Li uncovered weaknesses in Konidala and Kim’s TRMA
scheme. It was found that a passive attacker can recover the tag’s access
password by eavesdropping over a single run of the protocol and perform-
ing correlation analysis on the captured information. In [125], Konidala
and Kim proposed an improved version that uses the tag’s access and kill
passwords. The authors proposed using a PadGen chain of length 2. The
outer PadGen is computed over the kill password, while the inner PadGen
over the access password. The new scheme is essentially the same as the
original TRMA scheme, but the cover-coding pad PADi (i = {1, 2, 3, 4}) is
computed differently, as follows:
PADi = PadGen(PadGen(RN
Tag
i , RN
Reader
i )[APWD], RN
Tag
i )[KPWD] (6.21)
Pad Generation Function - PadGen(.)
The PadGen is a pad generation function that produces a 16-bit pad
used to cover-code the two 16-bit access password halves (APWDM and
APWDL). PadGen takes two 16-bit input arguments and operates on a 32-
bit password (KPWD or APWD) according to the input. The two input
arguments are used as location indexes to retrieve individual bits from the
access/kill password stored in those locations.
A detailed description of PadGen is provided bellow. The 32-bit XPWD
(where XPWD ∈ {APWD, KPWD}) is represented in binary (or Base 2)
as
XPWD = XPWDM || XPWDL
XPWDM = b0b1b2......b13b14b15
XPWDL = b16b17b18......b29b30b31
where each bi ∈ {0, 1}. Let us also represent the 16-bit random numbers
RNTagi and RN
Rdr
i in hexadecimal (or Base 16) representations as
RNTagi = H
Tag
i,0 H
Tag
i,1 H
Tag
i,2 H
Tag
i,3
RNRdri = H
Rdr
i,0 H
Rdr
i,1 H
Rdr
i,2 H
Rdr
i,3
where eachHTagi,j andH
Rdr
i,j is a hexadecimal digit, i.e. H
Tag
i,j ,H
Rdr
i,j ∈H16 =
{0x0, 0x1, 0x2, ..., 0xD = 13, 0xE = 14, 0xF = 15}.
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PadGen(RNTagi , RN
Rdr
i )[XPWD]would then be computed as follows:
PadGen(RNTagi , RN
Rdr
i )[XPWD]
= b
HTagi,0
b
HTagi,1
b
HTagi,2
b
HTagi,3
|| b
HTagi,0 +16
b
HTagi,1 +16
b
HTagi,2 +16
b
HTagi,3 +16
||
bHRdri,0
bHRdri,1
bHRdri,2
bHRdri,3
|| bHRdri,0 +16bHRdri,1 +16bHRdri,2 +16bHRdri,3 +16 [Base 2]
= P0P1P2P3 [Base 16]
for some P0, P1, P2, P3 ∈H16.
As an example, let us consider PadGen(7E2Bh, 2B5Fh)[XPWD] with
XPWDM = 1110 0101 0100 10002 and XPWDL = 1110 1000 1100 10102.
• 7E2Bh = 7th 14th 2nd 11th location of XPWDM = 10102
• 7E2Bh = 7th 14th 2nd 11th location of XPWDL = 01102
• 2B5Fh = 2nd 11th 5th 15th location of XPWDM = 10102
• 2B5Fh = 2nd 11th 5th 15th location of XPWDL = 10002
Combining the 4 results above, we have a 16-bit pad value PadGen(7E2Bh,
2B5Fh)[XPWD] = 1010 0110 1010 1000 = A6A8h
6.2.2.2 Attacks on TRMA+
In this section we describe how an attacker can recover the 32 bits of the
tag’s access and kill passwords in the TRMA+ scheme.
Access Password Attack (LSB)
The attack is outlined in the following figure. T , R and A represent the tag,
the reader and the attacker respectively.
(1) T → R: {EPC,RNTag1 , RNTag2 }
(2) ...
(3) A→ R: {EPC,RNTag1
′
, RNTag2
′}
(4) R→ A: {CCPwdM1, CCPwdL1, RNRdr1 , RNRdr2 , RNRdr3 , RNRdr4 }
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Scenario: An adversary eavesdrops on an authentication session between
a genuine reader and a genuine tag to obtain a valid EPC. This tag then
becomes the target of the attack. With the obtained EPC, the adversary per-
forms an active attack by masquerading as the target tag and participating
in the TRMA+ protocol with a genuine reader. The adversary sends the
message {EPC,RNTag1
′
, RNTag2
′} to the reader such that all the hexadeci-
mal digits in each of RNTag1
′
and RNTag2
′
have the same value:
RNTagi
′
= RRRRh [Base 16] (6.22)
where R ∈ H16 and RNTag1
′
may or may not equal RNTag2
′
.
Next, the adversary receives the response provided by the reader
{CCPwdM1, CCPwdL1, RNRdr1 , RNRdr2 , RNRdr3 , RNRdr4 }, where
CCPwdM1 = APWDM ⊕ PAD1 (6.23)
CCPwdL1 = APWDL ⊕ PAD2 (6.24)
and for i ∈ {1, 2},
PADi = PadGen(PadGen(RN
Tag
i
′
, RNRdri )[APWD], RN
Tag
i
′
)[KPWD] (6.25)
Let PadGen(RNTagi
′
, RNRdri )[APWD] = V0V1V2V3 for some hexadecimal
digits V0, V1, V2, V3 ∈H16. Substituting this and (6.22) into (6.25), we have
PADi = PadGen(V0V1V2V3, RRRR)[KPWD] [Base 16]
= kV0kV1kV2kV3 || kV0+16kV1+16kV2+16kV3+16 || kRkRkRkR ||
kR+16kR+16kR+16kR+16 [Base 2]
= P0P1P2P3 [Base 16]
where each kj is the jth bit in the kill password. We observe that all
the bits in each of the hexadecimal digits P2 and P3 are the same, i.e.
P2, P3 ∈ {0000b = 0h, 1111b =Fh}. This leads to P2P3 ∈ {00h,0Fh,F0h,FFh}.
Assuming that P2P3 takes each value with equal probability, the adver-
sary can then use this to obtain the 8 least significant bits of APWDL and
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APWDM by computing the following:
APWDM [8...15] =

CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0x00 with p = 2−2
CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0x0F with p = 2−2
CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0xF0 with p = 2−2
CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0xFF with p = 2−2
(6.26)
APWDL[8...15] =

CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0x00 with p = 2−2
CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0x0F with p = 2−2
CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0xF0 with p = 2−2
CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0xFF with p = 2−2
(6.27)
Summarizing, the adversary can obtain the 8 least significant bits ofAPWM
andAPWLwith probability 2−2 for each. The attack is more powerful if the
random numbers are such that RNTag1
′
= RNTag2
′
. Under this condition,
an adversary can also extract the following 16 bits of the access password
with probability 2−2:
APWDM [8...15] || APWDL[8...15]
=

CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0x00 || CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0x00 p = 2−2
CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0x0F || CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0x0F p = 2−2
CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0xF0 || CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0xF0 p = 2−2
CCPwdM1[8...15] ⊕ 0xFF || CCPwdL1[8...15] ⊕ 0xFF p = 2−2
(6.28)
Hence an active attacker can gather vast amounts of information about the
tag’s access password in a single run of the TRMA+ protocol.
Access Password Attack (MSB)
The attack is outlined in the following figure. Details are provided below.
(1) T → A: {EPC,RNTag1 , RNTag2 }
(2a) A→ R: {EPC,RN,RN}
(2b) R→ A: {CCPwdM1, CCPwdL1, RNRdr1 , RNRdr2 , RNRdr3 , RNRdr4 }
(3a) A→ R: {EPC,RNTag1 , RNTag2 }
(3b) R→ A: {CCPwdM1′, CCPwdL1′, RNRdr1 ′, RNRdr2 ′, RN3Rdr ′, RN4Rdr ′}
(4) A→ T : {CCPwdM1′, CCPwdL1′, RNRdr1 ′, RNRdr2 ′, RN,RN}
(5) T → A: {RNTag3 , RNTag4 , CCPwdM2, CCPwdL2}
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Scenario: An adversary intercepts and modifies the content of the message
sent by a genuine tag. The random numbers picked up by the adversary
are then set to RN before being forwarded to the reader. Specifically, the
random number RN must satisfy the following equation:
RN = RRRRh [Base 16] (6.29)
where R ∈ H16. The adversary receives the response provided by the le-
gitimate reader: {CCPwdM1, CCPwdL1, RNRdr1 , RNRdr2 , RNRdr3 , RNRdr4 },
where
CCPwdM1 = APWDM ⊕ PAD1 (6.30)
CCPwdL1 = APWDL ⊕ PAD2 (6.31)
and for i ∈ {1, 2},
PADi = PadGen(PadGen(RN,RNRdri )[APWD], RN)[KPWD] (6.32)
In a different, parallel authentication session, the ad-
versary forwards the initial message sent by the tag
{EPC,RNTag1 , RNTag2 } to the legitimate reader. The reader’s response
{CCPwdM1′, CCPwdL1′, RNRdr1 ′, RNRdr2 ′, RNRdr3 ′, RNRdr4 ′} is received by
the adversary, who then sets the random numbers RNRdr3
′ and RNRdr4
′
to RN . (Note that these two random numbers will be used by the tag
to compute its response to the reader). The modified message is then
forwarded to the genuine tag, which responds by sending the message:
{CCPwdM2, CCPwdL2, RNTag3 , RNTag4 }, where
CCPwdM2 = APWDM ⊕ PAD3 (6.33)
CCPwdL2 = APWDL ⊕ PAD4 (6.34)
and for i ∈ {3, 4},
PADi = PadGen(PadGen(RN
Tag
i , RN)[APWD], RN
Tag
i )[KPWD](6.35)
In such an attack scenario, the adversary can derive the following:
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1. Information from the computation of PADi∈{1,2}
PadGen(RN,RNRdri )[APWD]
= PadGen(RRRR,HRdri,0 H
Rdr
i,1 H
Rdr
i,2 H
Rdr
i,3 )[APWD] [Base 16]
= aRaRaRaR || aR+16aR+16aR+16aR+16 || aHRdri,0 aHRdri,1 aHRdri,2 aHRdri,3 ||
aHRdri,0 +16
aHRdri,1 +16
aHRdri,2 +16
aHRdri,3 +16
[Base 2]
= V0V1V2V3 [Base 16] (6.36)
where we observe that all four bits in each of V0 and V1 have the same
value, i.e. V0, V1 ∈ {0h,Fh} or V0V1 ∈ {00h,0Fh,F0h,FFh} (as in the previous
attack on the LSB). Then,
PADi∈{1,2}
= PadGen(PadGen(RN,RNRdr1 )[APWD], RN)[KPWD]
= PadGen(V0V1V2V3, RRRR)[KPWD] [Base 16]
= kV0kV1kV2kV3 || kV0+16kV1+16kV2+16kV3+16 || kRkRkRkR ||
kR+16kR+16kR+16kR+16 [Base 2] (6.37)
Assuming that the values of V0 and V1 are taken randomly from the set
{0h,Fh}, they would be equal half of the time, i.e. with probability 0.5. If
V0 = V1, then kV0 = kV1 . On the other hand, if V0 6= V1, then assuming that
the bits in the kill password are perfectly random, wewould have kV0 = kV1
with probability 0.5. Hence:
Prob(kV0 = kV1) = (0.5)(1) + (0.5)(0.5) = 0.75 (6.38)
Similarly, Prob(kV0+16 = kV1+16) = 0.75.
2. Information from the computation of PADi∈{3,4}
PadGen(RNTagi , RN)[APwd]
= PadGen(HTagi,0 H
Tag
i,1 H
Tag
i,2 H
Tag
i,3 , RRRR)[APWD] [Base 16]
= a
HTagi,0
a
HTagi,1
a
HTagi,2
a
HTagi,3
|| a
HTagi,0 +16
a
HTagi,1 +16
a
HTagi,2 +16
a
HTagi,3 +16
||
aRaRaRaR || aR+16aR+16aR+16aR+16[Base 2]
= S0S1S2S3 [Base 16] (6.39)
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where S2, S3 ∈ {0h,Fh} or S2S3 ∈ {00h,0Fh,F0h,FFh}. Furthermore, we note
that V0 = S2 and V1 = S3. Next, we derive
PADi∈{3,4}
= PadGen(PadGen(RNTagi , RN)[APWD], RN
Tag
i )[KPWD]
= PadGen(S0S1S2S3,H
Tag
i,0 H
Tag
i,1 H
Tag
i,2 H
Tag
i,3 )[KPWD] [Base 16]
= kS0kS1kS2kS3 || kS0+16kS1+16kS2+16kS3+16 || kHTagi,0 kHTagi,1 kHTagi,2 kHTagi,3 ||
k
HTagi,0 +16
k
HTagi,1 +16
k
HTagi,2 +16
k
HTagi,3 +16
[Base 2] (6.40)
As in the earlier case for the computation of PADi∈{1,2}, assuming that
S2 = S3 half of the time, we would have Prob(kS2 = kS3) = 0.75 and
Prob(kS2+16 = kS3+16) = 0.75.
3. Combining both sets of information
Since V0 = S2 and V1 = S3, we then have
kV0 = kS2 = kV1 = kS3 p = 0.75
kV0 = kS2 6= kV1 = kS3 p = 0.25
and
kV0+16 = kS2+16 = kV1+16 = kS3+16 p = 0.75
kV0+16 = kS2+16 6= kV1+16 = kS3+16 p = 0.25
However, instead of considering these two sets of relations separately, we
combine them to give four possible cases. Their corresponding probabili-
ties are computed as follows:
• Case 1: kV0 = kS2 = kV1 = kS3 and kV0+16 = kS2+16 = kV1+16 =
kS3+16.
The two relations will always hold if V0 = V1 (which also implies
S2 = S3). When V0 6= V1 (and S2 6= S3), the probability that kV0 = kV1
(and kS2 = kS3) is 0.5. Similarly, the probability that kV0+16 = kV1+16
(and kS2+16 = kS3+16) is also 0.5. Hence the probability that this case
will occur is (0.5)(1) + (0.5)(0.5)(0.5) = 0.625.
• Case 2: kV0 = kS2 = kV1 = kS3 and kV0+16 = kS2+16 6= kV1+16 =
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kS3+16.
This case will only occur when V0 6= V1 (and S2 6= S3). In such a
situation, the probability that kV0 = kV1 (and kS2 = kS3) is 0.5, and the
probability that kV0+16 6= kV1+16 (and kS2+16 6= kS3+16) is 0.5. Hence
the probability that the two relations will hold is (0.5)(0.5)(0.5) =
0.125.
• Case 3: kV0 = kS2 6= kV1 = kS3 and kV0+16 = kS2+16 = kV1+16 =
kS3+16.
This case is similar to Case 2 and occurs when V0 6= V1 (S2 6= S3),
kV0 6= kV1 (kS2 6= kS3) but kV0+16 = kV1+16 (kS2+16 = kS3+16). The
resulting probability for this case is (0.5)(0.5)(0.5) = 0.125.
• Case 4: kV0 = kS2 6= kV1 = kS3 and kV0+16 = kS2+16 6= kV1+16 =
kS3+16.
This case is also similar to Case 2 and occurs when V0 6= V1 (S2 6= S3),
kV0 6= kV1 (kS2 6= kS3) and kV0+16 6= kV1+16 (kS2+16 6= kS3+16). It yields
a probability of (0.5)(0.5)(0.5) = 0.125.
Based on this information, the 8 most significant bits of APWDM and
APWDL can be given by
APWDM [0...7] || APWDL[0...7] = A ⊕ mask || B ⊕ mask (6.41)
where
A = (CCPwdM1[0..7] ∧ 0xCC) ∨ (CCPwdM2[0..7] ∧ 0x33)(6.42)
B = (CCPwdL1[0..7] ∧ 0xCC) ∨ (CCPwdL2[0..7] ∧ 0x33) (6.43)
and ∧ denotes the bitwise logical AND operation, ∨ denotes the bitwise
logical OR operation. The mask in (6.41) can take a number of probable
values depending on whether Case 1, 2, 3 or 4 holds:
• If Case 1 holds, i.e. kV0 = kS2 = kV1 = kS3 and kV0+16 = kS2+16 =
kV1+16 = kS3+16, thenmask ∈ {0x00, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0xFF}. In this case, if
the adversary were to select a mask from the specified set of values,
the probability of a successful attack to recover all 16 bits of the access
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password would be
Prob(successful recovery of all bits in APWDM [0...7] || APWDL[0...7])
= 0.625× 1/4
= 0.15625 (6.44)
• If Case 2 holds, thenmask ∈ {0x05, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0xFA} and the prob-
ability of a successful attack would be 0.125× 1/4 = 0.03125.
• If Case 3 holds, thenmask ∈ {0x50, 0x5F, 0xA0, 0xAF} and the prob-
ability of a successful attack would be 0.125× 1/4 = 0.03125.
• IfCase 4 holds, thenmask ∈ {0x55, 0x5A, 0xA5, 0xAA} and the prob-
ability of a successful attack would be 0.125× 1/4 = 0.03125.
In summary, with equations (6.41), (6.42) and (6.43), the probability of a
successful attack for any selected mask would be given by
Prob(successful recovery of all bits in APWDM [0...7] || APWDL[0...7])
=

5
25
= 0.15625 if mask ∈ {0x00, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0xFF}
1
25
= 0.03125 if mask ∈ {0x05, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x55, 0x5A, 0x5F,
0xA0, 0xA5,0xAA, 0xAF 0xF5, 0xFA}
Hence, in order to maximize the probability of success of an attack, the
adversary should select mask from the set {0x00, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0xFF}. In
any case, this attack results in 16 possible values for the most significant
bits of APWDM and APWDL. Together with the 4 possible values for the
least significant bits of APWDM and APWDL obtained from the earlier
attack, the adversary can narrow down the possible values for the access
password from 232 to 16× 4 = 26, which is a tremendous reduction.
Kill Password Attack
We have shown how an attacker is able to obtain the 8 least significant bits
of APWDM and APWDL, each with probability 2−2. This advantage can
be employed by an adversary to recover the full 32 bits of the kill password
with the same probability. The attack is described below.
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Given that the adversary knows the access password of the target tag, the
pads used to cover-code the MSB and LSB of the access password can be
obtained as follows:
PAD1[8...15] = CCPwdM1[8...15]⊕APWDM [8...15] (6.45)
PAD2[8...15] = CCPwdL1[8...15]⊕APWDL[8...15] (6.46)
PAD3[8...15] = CCPwdM2[8...15]⊕APWDM [8...15] (6.47)
PAD4[8...15] = CCPwdL2[8...15]⊕APWDL[8...15] (6.48)
where the 8 bits in each pad PADi are bits selected from different memory
locations in the kill password:
PADi = PadGen(−−−−, RNTagi )[KPWD]
= PadGen(−−−−,HTagi,0 HTagi,1 HTagi,2 HTagi,3 )[KPWD] [Base 16]
Hence,
PADi[8...15] = kHTagi,0
k
HTagi,1
k
HTagi,2
k
HTagi,3
||
k
HTagi,0 +16
k
HTagi,1 +16
k
HTagi,2 +16
k
HTagi,3 +16
[Base 2]
We now have the following equations relating a bit in the kill password to
a bit in each PADi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) :
k
HTagi,0
= PADi[8] HOLAMUNDO kHTagi,0 +16
= PADi[12]
k
HTagi,1
= PADi[9] HOLAMUNDO kHTagi,1 +16
= PADi[13]
k
HTagi,2
= PADi[10] HOLAMUNDO kHTagi,2 +16
= PADi[14]
k
HTagi,3
= PADi[11] HOLAMUNDO kHTagi,3 +16
= PADi[15]
where each bit PADi[n] can be computed using one of equations (6.45),
(6.46), (6.47) or (6.48). For example, k
HTag1,1
= PAD1[9] = CCPwdM1[9] ⊕
APWDM [9] and kHTag4,0 +16
= PAD4[12] = CCPwdL2[12] ⊕ APWDL[12].
Hence, once an adversary has obtained the LSB of the access password, he
can obtain the bits in the kill password. For a complete recovery of the
entire kill password, there are two possible approaches:
Passive Attacker In this case, an adversary eavesdrops over multiple ses-
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sions of the protocol in order to obtain the full 32 bits of the kill pass-
word. From our experiments, in which we simulated 20,000 execu-
tions of the attack, we find that the average number of sessions re-
quired to obtain the full kill password is 4. Fig. 6.4 (A) and 6.4 (C)
show the probability distribution and the cumulative distribution for
the number of sessions required.
Active Attacker In the active attack, the adversary modifies and manipu-
lates the random numbers RNTag1 and RN
Tag
2 to lead the legitimate
reader to select bits in the kill password such that those bit locations
where the value of the bit is already known are avoided. Hence, the
number of sessions required to obtain the full 32 bits of the kill pass-
wordwould be reduced. From the results of our experiments, we find
that the average number of attack sessions required to obtain the full
password is 2, i.e. a 50% reduction compared to the passive attack.
Fig. 6.4 (B) and 6.4 (D) show the results.
6.2.2.3 Additional Comments
The TRMA+ scheme uses the access and kill passwords defined in the EPC
specification, these being shared between legitimate entities (tags and read-
ers). The authors suggested the use of a PadGen chain to protect both
passwords. This function, however, is not secure enough, as the cover
codes generated depend on random numbers selected by the tag/reader.
We have found that there is a high probability of an attacker acquiring the
access and kill passwords after some computations. The most and least sig-
nificant eight bits of the access password can be obtained with a probability
of 2−5 and 2−2 respectively. Once the attacker knows the LSB of the access
password, the 32 bits of the kill password can be derived with a probabil-
ity of 2−2. The efficiency of the attack on the kill password depends on
whether the attack is passive or active. A passive attacker has to eavesdrop
on an average of 4 protocol rounds, and this number is reduced to 2 when
the attacker can modify and manipulate the exchanged messages.
In summary, the security of the EPC-C1G2 specification is inadequate. So
far, most of the proposals that aim to increase security whilst conforming
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(a) Fig. 6.4 (A) Passive Attacker (b) Fig. 6.4 (B) Active Attacker
(c) Fig. 6.4 (C) Passive Attacker (d) Fig. 6.4 (D) Active Attacker
Figure 6.4: Probability and cumulative distributions for the number of ses-
sions required for a successful attack.
to the standard have failed. Providing greater security in future standards
is indeed an important challenge.
6.3 Passive Attacks
We believe, as do many other authors, that the security of low-cost RFID
tags can be greatly improved without using classic cryptographic prim-
itives (i.e. block/stream ciphers, hash functions, etc.). This is why we
present Gossamer, a new protocol inspired in the recently published SASI
scheme [46], which constituted an advancement on the UMAP family of
protocols. Despite doing so, SASI was not designed with sufficient care
and a passive attacker can obtain the secret static identifier of the tag (ID)
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after observing several consecutive authentication sessions, as shown in
Section 6.3.2.1.
6.3.1 A Family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Proto-
cols
In 2006, Peris et al. proposed a family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authen-
tication Protocols (henceforth referred to as the UMAP family of protocols).
Chronologically, M2AP [163] was the first proposal, followed by EMAP
[162] and LMAP [161].
These protocols are based on the use of pseudonyms to guarantee tag
anonymity. Specifically, an index-pseudonym is used by an authorized
reader to retrieve the information associated with a tag (tag identification
phase). Additionally, a key -divided in several subkeys- is shared between
legitimate tags and readers (back-end database). Both readers and tags use
these subkeys to construct the messages exchanged in the mutual authen-
tication phase.
In line with their real processing capabilities, tags only support on-board
simple operations. Indeed, these protocols are based on bitwise XOR (⊕),
bitwise OR (∨), bitwise AND (∧) and addition mod 2m. By contrast, only
readers need to generate pseudorandom numbers; tags only used them for
creating fresh messages to the protocol.
In the UMAP family of protocols, the proposed scheme consists of three
stages. First, the tag is identified by means of the index-pseudonym. Sec-
ondly, the reader and the tag are mutually authenticated. This phase is also
used to transmit the static tag identifier (ID) securely. Finally, the index-
pseudonym and keys are updated (the reader is referred to the original
papers for more details).
6.3.1.1 Security Analysis of the UMAP Protocols
Since the publication of the UMAP family of protocols, their security has
been analyzed in depth by the research community. In [140, 141] a desyn-
chronization attack and a full disclosure attack are presented. These require
an active attacker and several incomplete run executions of the protocol to
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disclose the secret information on the tag. Later, Chien et al. proposed -
based on the same attack model- a far more efficient full-disclosure attack
[48]. Additionally, Bárász et al. showed how a passive attacker (an attack
model that may be, in certain scenarios, much more realistic) can find out
the static identifier and particular secrets shared by the reader and the tag
after eavesdropping on a few consecutive protocol rounds [28, 29].
This leads us to the following conclusions: first, we must define what kind
of attack scenarios are applicable. In our opinion, ultralightweight RFID
tags have to be resistant to passive attacks but not necessarily to active
attacks, because of their severe restrictions (storage, circuitry and power
consumption, etc.). Regarding passive attacks, we can affirm the following:
• The UMAP family of protocols is based on the composition of simple
operations like bitwise AND, XOR, OR and summod 2m. Because all
of these are triangular functions (T-functions) [123], the information
does not propagate well from left to right. In other words, the bit in
position i in the output only depends on bits j = 0,..., i of the input
words.
• The use of the bitwise AND or OR operations to build public sub-
messages is a weakness common to all these protocols. When a bit-
wise AND (OR) operation is computed even over random inputs, the
probability of obtaining a one (zero) is 34 . In other words, the result is
strongly biased. This poor characteristic is the basis of all the passive
attacks proposed so far.
6.3.2 SASI Protocol
In 2007 Chien proposed a very interesting ultralightweight authentication
protocol providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity (SASI) for
very low-cost RFID tags [46]. We briefly describe the messages exchanged
between the reader (or back-end database) and the tag (see Figure 6.5).
An index-pseudonym (IDS), the tag’s private identification (ID), and two
keys (k1/k2) are stored both on the tag and in the back-end database. Sim-
ple bitwise XOR (⊕), bitwise AND (∧), bitwise OR (∨), addition 2m and left
rotate (Rot(x,y)) are required on the tag. Additionally, random number gen-
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Tag Identification:
1.1. “hello”
1.2. “IDS”
Mutual Authentication:
With IDS finds a match entry 
in the database. 
2.1.  “A||B||C”
The tag answers with its next IDS,  
and the old IDS if necessary.
A = IDS ⊕ k1 ⊕ n1
B = (IDS ∨ k2) + n2;
D’ = (k2* + ID) ⊕ ((K1 ⊕ k2) ∨ k1*)
If D’ =  D 
Pseudonym updating and key updating:
IDSnext= (IDS+ID) ⊕ (n2 ⊕ k1*)
k1 = k1*; k2 = k2*
Extract n1 from A, and n2 from B
k1* = Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, k1)
k2* = Rot(k2 ⊕ n1, k2)
C’ = (k1 ⊕ k2*) + (k1* ⊕ k2)
If C’ =  C  
D = (k2*+ID) ⊕ ((K1 ⊕ k2) ∨ k1*)
Pseudonym updating and key updating:
IDSold = IDS; IDSnext= (IDS+ID) ⊕ (n2 ⊕ k1*)
K1old = k1; k1next = k1*;
K2old = k2; k2next = k2*;
Reader Tag
2.2. “D”
k1* = Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, k1)
k2* = Rot(k2 ⊕ n1, k2)
C = (k1 ⊕ k2*) + (k1* ⊕ k2)
Figure 6.5: SASI Protocol
eration (i.e. n1 and n2) is required on the reader. The protocol is divided
into three states: tag identification, mutual authentication and updating
phase. In the identification phase, the reader (R) sends a “hello”message to
the tag (T ), and the tag answers with its IDS. The reader then finds, in the
back-end database, the information associated with the tag (ID and k1/k2),
and the protocol continues to the mutual authentication phase. In this, the
reader and the tag authenticate each other, and the index-pseudonym and
keys are subsequently updated:
R→ T : A||B||C with
The reader generates nonces n1 and n2 to build the submessages as
follows:
A = IDS ⊕ k1 ⊕ n1; B = (IDS ∨ k2) + n2; C = (k1 ⊕ k∗2) + (k2 ⊕ k∗1);
where k∗1 = Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, k1); k∗2 = Rot(k2 ⊕ n1, k2);
Tag From messages A and B, the tag can obtain values n1 and n2 respec-
tively. Then it locally computes C ′ and checks if the result is equal
to the received value. If this is the case, it sends D and updates the
values of IDS, k1 and k2:
D = (k∗2 + ID)⊕ ((k1 ⊕ k2) ∨ k∗1);
IDSnext = (IDS + ID)⊕ (n2 ⊕ k∗1); knext1 = k∗1 ; knext2 = k∗2 ;
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T→ R : D with
Reader Verifies D and, if it is equal to the result of its local computation,
updates IDS, k1 and k2 in the same way as the tag.
6.3.2.1 Cryptanalysis of the SASI Protocol
It is important to note that the way in which rotations should be performed
is not specified in the original paper. The first researchers to publish a
weakness (two desynchronization attacks) in the protocol needed to con-
tact the author to clarify this [204]. After a private communication, the
author stated that the rotation used in the protocol is:
• Rot(A,B) = A << wht(B), where wht(B) stands for the Hamming
weight of vector B, instead of the more natural and common defini-
tion:
• Rot(A,B) = A << (B modN) for a given value ofN (96 in our case).
An important observation is that the number of positions rotated, which
is guided by the Hamming weight of its second argument, is far from be-
ing uniform. In fact, if we assume this second argument B to be random,
then the probability that the rotation amount takes value k is given by the
formula:
Prob(wht(B) = k) =
(
96
k
)
296
which attains a maximum for k = 962 = 48 with an associated probability
of 0.0812219, or around 8% of the times.
Firstly, for simplicity, we will work with the second definition of Rot, i.e.
the usual one. We will then be able to show how both definitions result in
the same security weaknesses, and that the attack presented here can reveal
the secret ID in both cases.
6.3.2.2 Analytical Results
From the analysis of the UMAP family of protocols, we conclude that it is
necessary to incorporate a non-triangular function in order to increase the
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security of ultralightweight protocols. At first sight, the SASI protocol com-
plies with this requirement as it includes the left rotate operation (which is
non triangular). However, a logical way of attacking SASI is to consider
what happens when rotations are not performed, that is, when the amount
of rotation given by the second argument is zero modulo 96. In these cases,
the proposed protocol uses exactly the same set of operations that enable
attacks on the UMAP family of protocols. We therefore have:
k∗1 = Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, k1) = Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, k1 mod 96) =
= Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, 0) = k1 ⊕ n2
(6.49)
Similarly,
k∗2 = Rot(k2 ⊕ n1, k2) = k2 ⊕ n1 (6.50)
This has a particularly adverse impact on the index pseudonym (IDS) up-
date process, since:
IDSnext = (IDS + ID)⊕ (n2 ⊕ k∗1) = (IDS + ID)⊕ (n2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2)
= (IDS + ID)⊕ k1
(6.51)
Sowe are left with ID = IDSnext⊕k1−IDS andwe can take full advantage
of the knowledge that k1 = k2 = 0 mod 96 to conclude that, with a given
probability (see Table 6.2), which in turn only depends on the value of N
(N = 96 in this case, although other values could be used for recovering
more bits), it holds that:
ID mod 96 ≈ (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96 (6.52)
As both values IDSnext and IDS are public and easily observable
by snooping on two consecutive authentication sessions, relation (6.52)
allows us to recover the log2(96) ≈ 6.58 less significant bits of the secret ID.
The only question that remains is recognizing when the conditions k1 =
0 mod 96 and k2 = 0 mod 96 hold, since k1 and k2 are secrets that only the
tag and the reader should know. Fortunately, this is possible by simply
checking if certain relations hold that only involve public values. If K1 =
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K2 = 0 mod 96 then expressions (6.49) and (6.50) hold, so:
C = (k1 ⊕ k∗2) + (k2 ⊕ k∗1) = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ n1 + k2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2 (6.53)
which implies that:
C mod 96 = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ n1 + k2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2 mod 96 ≈ n1 + n2 mod 96
(6.54)
The value of n1 + n2 mod 96 can also be probabilistically obtained from the
observed values of public messages A, B and IDS because:
A = IDS ⊕ k1 ⊕ n1 ⇒ n1 = A⊕ IDS ⊕ k1 (6.55)
and then we can get that:
n1 mod 96 = A⊕ IDS ⊕ k1 mod 96 ≈ A⊕ IDS mod 96 (6.56)
since by hypothesis, k1 = 0 mod 96.
Similarly, we can obtain that, as B = (IDS ∨ k2) + n2, then:
n2 ≈ (B − IDS) mod 96 (6.57)
Summarizing, we can conclude that if k1 = k2 = 0 mod 96 then, with the
probability given in Table 6.2:
C mod 96 ≈ n1 + n2 mod 96 ≈ (A⊕ IDS) + (B − IDS) mod 96 (6.58)
What remains is to passively snoop on multiple authentication sessions
and, for each one, verify if condition (6.58) holds. If this is the case, one
can compute the value (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96 and, from this, directly
approximate ID mod 96.
Only one last tweak is needed to perform a successful attack: just by
chance, expression (6.58) will be true even if the two preconditions k1 =
0 mod 96 and k2 = 0 mod 96 are not simultaneously true, and this will lead
us to a possibly wrong estimation for ID mod 96. This is, however, easily
fixed by simply observing many values of (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96 when
equation (6.58) holds, since the true value of ID mod 96 is likely to be the
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Table 6.2: Probabilities of expressions (6.52), (6.54), (6.56), (6.57) and (6.58)
simultaneously holding for different forms of N , given that K1 = K2 =
0 mod N
N 2t 3 ∗ 2t 4 ∗ t+ 10 2 ∗ t+ 5
Probability 1.00 0.33 2 ∗N−1 N−1
1. For i = 0 to 96
2. Observations[i] = 0
3. Repeat a sufficiently high number of times the following steps:
4. Observe an authentication session and get IDS, A, B and C
5. Check expression (6.58) for these values
6. If this is not the case, go to step 4
7. Perform the following tasks:
8. Wait for the authentication session to finish
9. Send the tag a hello message to obtain IDSnext
10. Compute x = (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96
11. Increment Observations[x]
12. Findm, the maximum of the values in Observations
13. Conjecture thatm = ID mod 96
Figure 6.6: Outline of the Attack
most common. This fact has been experimentally verified and leads to the
attack described in Figure 6.6.
6.3.2.3 Efficiency Analysis
The attack presented could be performed not only for recovering log2(96)
bits of the secret value ID, but also works for other moduli, with varying
probabilities as in Table 6.2. In particular, expressions (6.52), (6.54), (6.56),
(6.57) and (6.58) all hold with probability one for moduli that are a power
of two, so this allows us to recover many more bits (i.e. log2(256) = 8,
log2(512) = 9, log2(1024) = 10, etc.) if necessary. In these cases, we need, of
course, to observe more authentication sessions to recover more ID bits.
As a rule of thumb guide, we have concluded, after extensive experimen-
tation, that an attacker following this procedure is able, on average, to re-
cover the log2(S) least significant bits of ID after observing around O(S)
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Table 6.3: Attack Success Probabilities
Number of sessions Prob. Prob.
Modular rotation Hamming rotation
25 0.08 0.12
26 0.09 0.12
27 0.16 0.19
28 0.19 0.25
29 0.5 0.36
210 0.5 0.53
211 0.76 0.58
212 0.93 0.74
213 0.97 0.92
214 1.00 0.99
authentication sessions.
6.3.2.4 The Case of the Hamming Rotation
We have found through experiment that exactly the same approach as de-
scribed above can break the version of this protocol that uses rotation to
the left by the amount given by the hamming weight of its second argu-
ment. In this case, the efficiency of the attack is is slightly less efficient –see
Table 6.2 for an exact description of the probabilities of the main equations
to hold. Some overall figures are given in Table 6.3, which shows the prob-
ability of success for recovering 5 = log2(32) ID bits for different rotation
definitions.
6.3.2.5 Additional Remarks
We have presented an attack against a new and quite interesting ultra-
lightweight authentication protocol. Even though the definition of the ro-
tation in the original paper was a little obscure, we have found experimen-
tally that the attack is successful for both definitions.
The inclusion of rotations in these very lightweight protocols appears nec-
essary to guarantee security, but it is not enough in itself. Certain changes
in the design would, however, have hindered our attack considerably. We
briefly describe these:
• The IDS update should be improved as it is dependent on n2 and k∗1 ,
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which is again a function of n2. This is instrumental in our attack and,
in any case, leads to a variety of poor statistical properties.
• The definition of k∗1 and k∗2 should be rethought, as in their current
form there is a kind of distributive property (k∗1 = Rot(k1 ⊕ n2, k1) =
Rot(k1, k1) ⊕ Rot(n2, k1) ) that could facilitate attacks. This could be
avoided by, for example, using addition instead of XOR as the inner
operation, though part of the problem remains. Ideally, a more com-
plex key scheduling should be devised, but of course this will mean
additional cost.
• The use of the bitwise OR operation should be performed with ex-
treme care, as the resulting messages are strongly biased. As an ex-
ample, in the current protocol definition, n2 could be approximated
with very good precision simply by computing n2 ≈ B−1. Note that
message D suffers from a similar problem.
• The use of bitwise AND operation would produce similar undesir-
able effects. These two operations should only be included in the
inner parts of the algorithm, and every effort should be made to dis-
guise their output into seemingly random output when constructing
public messages such as B and D.
In fact, a more general version of this attack is even possible. This alterna-
tive is, however, significantly less efficient than the attack scheme described
previously. It simply consists of observing and storing the different values
of equation (6.52). In a well-designed protocol, these should approximately
follow a uniform distribution, but we have observed experimentally that
this is far from being the case. Following this extremely simple approach,
with neither approximations nor preconditions, we are able to recover up
to 4 bits of the secret ID after around 210 authentication sessions with a
100% success probability, a fact that could lead to a very straightforward
tracking attack.
Finally, we can conclude that SASI protocol is definitely an interesting step
in the right direction towards fully secure ultralightweight protocols, but it
still falls short of the security requirements for such schemes.
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6.3.3 Gossamer Protocol
As a consequence of observations in Section 6.3.2.5, we have derived a new
protocol, called Gossamer1, which is inspired by the SASI scheme but hope-
fully devoid of its weaknesses. Our main aim was to define a protocol with
adequate security level and which can be realistically be employed in ul-
tralightweight RFID tags.
6.3.3.1 Model Suppositions
Each tag stores a static identifier (ID), an index-pseudonym (IDS) and two
keys (k1/k2) in its memory. This information is also stored in the back-
end database. The IDS is employed as a search index to allocate, in the
database, all the information linked with each tag. These elements have
a length of 96 bits, compatible with all the encoding schemes (i.e. GTIN,
GRAI) defined by EPCGlobal. Additionally, tags are given the added re-
quirement of storing the old and potential new values of the tuple (IDS, k1,
k2), to avoid desynchronization attacks. In spite of this, resiliency against
attacks which involve tag manipulation are not considered as these devices
are not at all tamper-resistant.
For the implementation of the proposed protocol, only simple operations
are available on tags, in accordance with their restrictions: specifically, bit-
wise XOR (⊕), addition mod 2m (+), and Rot(x, y). To avoid ambiguity,
Rot(x, y) is defined to perform a circular shift on the value of x, (y mod N )
positions to the left for a given value of N (in our case 96).
Random number generation, required in the protocol to supply freshness,
is a costly operation, so it is performed by the reader. Moreover, random
numbers cannot be indiscriminately employed because their use increases
both memory requirements and message counts (which could be costly in
certain applications). To significantly increase security, we have also added
a specially designed and very lightweight function calledMixBits. In [94],
a detailed description of the methodology used -basically, to evolve com-
positions of extremely light operands by means of genetic programming,
1Gossamer: Noun describing a thin film of cobwebs floating in the air (this meaning
dates from the 14th century) and an adjective meaning light, delicate, thin enough to let
light through, nearly transparent.
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in order to obtain highly non-linear functions- is included. MixBits has an
extremely lightweight nature, as only bitwise right shift (>>) and addition
operations are employed. Specifically,
Z = MixBits(X,Y)
----------------------------
Z = X;
for(i=0; i<32; i++) {
Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y ;}
----------------------------
Communications have to be initiated by readers, since tags are passive.
The communication channel between the reader and the database is gener-
ally assumed to be secure, but the channel between the reader and the tag
can be eavesdropped on. Attacks involving modification of the exchanged
messages, the insertion of fraudulent new messages, or message blocking
(active attacks), can be discounted.
6.3.3.2 The Protocol
The protocol comprises three stages: tag identification phase, mutual au-
thentication phase, and updating phase. Figure 6.7 shows the exchanged
messages.
Tag Identification The reader first sends a “hello” message to the tag,
which answers with its potential next IDS. With it, the reader tries
to find an identical entry in the database. If this search succeeds, the
mutual authentication phase starts. Otherwise the identification is
retried but with the old IDS, which is backscattered by the tag upon
request.
Mutual Authentication With IDS, the reader acquires the private infor-
mation linked to the tag, identified from the database. Then the
reader generates nonces n1 and n2 and builds and sends to the tag
A||B||C (see Figur 6.7). Note that the equations used in the generation
of public messages, as do those used in the computation of internal
values, generally follow the scheme bellow:
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1. Tag Identification:
1.1. “hello”
1.2. “IDS”
2. Mutual Authentication:
With IDS finds a match entry 
in the database. 
2.1.  “A||B||C”
The tag answers with its next IDS,  
and the old IDS if necessary.
A = ROT((ROT(IDS+K1+π+n1, K2)+K1, K1); 
B = ROT((ROT(IDS+K2+π+n2, K1)+K2, K2); 
n3=MIXBITS(n1,n2);
K1* = ROT((ROT(n2+K1+π+n3, n2)+K2⊕n3, n1)⊕n3
K2* = ROT((ROT(n1+K2+π+n3, n1)+K1+n3, n2)+n3
n1' = MIXBITS(n3,n2);
C = ROT((ROT(n3+K1*+π+n1', n3)+K2*⊕n1', n2)⊕n1'
D’ = ROT((ROT(n2+K2*+ID+n1',n2)+K1*+n1', n3)+n1'
If D’ =  D 
3. Back-end database Updating
Extract n1 from A, and n2 from B
n3=MIXBITS(n1, n2);
K1*=ROT((ROT(n2+K1+π+n3, n2)+K2⊕n3, n1)⊕n3
K2*=ROT((ROT(n1+K2+π+n3, n1)+K1+n3, n2)+n3
n1'=MIXBITS(n3, n2);
C’=ROT((ROT(n3+K1*+π+n1', n3)+K2*⊕n1', n2)⊕n1'
If C’ =  C  
D=ROT((ROT(n2+K2*+ID+n1',n2)+K1*+n1', n3)+n1'
3. Tag Updating
Reader Tag
3. Tag Updating: 
n2‘ = MIXBITS(n1',n3);
IDSold = IDS; IDSnext= ROT((ROT(n1'+K1*+IDS+n2', n1')+K2*⊕n2', n3)⊕n2'
K1old = K1; K1next= ROT((ROT(n3+k2*+π+n2', n3)+K1*+n2', n1')+n2'
K2old = K2; K2next= ROT((ROT(IDSnext+K2*+π+K1next, IDSnext)+K1*+K1next, n2')+K1next
3. Back-end database Updating
n2‘ = MIXBITS(n1', n3);
IDS = ROT((ROT(n1'+K1*+IDS+n2', n1')+K2*⊕n2', n3)⊕n2'
K1= ROT((ROT(n3+K2*+π+n2', n3)+K1*+n2', n1')+n2'
K2= ROT((ROT(IDS+K2*+π+K1, IDS)+K1*+K1, n2')+K1
2.2. “D”
† pi = 0x3243F6A8885A308D313198A2 (L = 96 bits)
Figure 6.7: Gossamer Protocol
ni+2 = MIXBITS(ni, ni+1) (6.59)
Mi = ROT ((ROT (ni+1 + ki + PI + ni+2, ni+1) +Ki+1 ⊕ ni+2, ni)⊕ ni+2 (6.60)
Mi+1 = ROT ((ROT (ni +Ki+1 + PI + ni+2, ni) +Ki + ni+2, ni+1) + ni+2 (6.61)
From submessages A and B, the tag extracts nonces n1 and n2. Then
it computes n3/n′1 and k∗1/k∗2 and builds a local version of submes-
sage C ′. This is compared with the received value. If it is verified,
the reader is authenticated. Finally, the tag sends message D to the
reader. On receiving D, this value is compared with a computed
local version. If comparison is successful, the tag is authenticated;
otherwise the protocol is abandoned.
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Index-Pseudonym and Key Updating After successfully completing the
mutual authentication phase between reader and tag, they locally up-
date IDS and keys (k1/k2) as indicated in Figure 6.7. As we have
just seen, submessages C/D allow reader/tag authentication, respec-
tively. Moreover, the use of submessagesC/D results in confirmation
of synchronization for the internal secret values (n3/n′1 and k∗1/k∗2)
used in the updating phase, preventing straightforward desynchro-
nization attacks.
6.3.3.3 Security Analysis
We will now analyze the security of the proposed scheme against relevant
attacks:
Data Confidentiality All public messages are composed of at least three
secret values shared only by legitimate readers and genuine tags.
Note that we consider private information (ID, k1, k2), random num-
bers (n1, n2), and internal values (n3, n′1, n′2, k∗1 , k∗2) as secret values.
The static identifier and the secret keys cannot, therefore, be easily
obtained by an eavesdropper.
Tag anonymity Each tag updates IDS and private keys (k1, k2) after
successful authentication, and this update process involves random
numbers (n3, n′1, n′2). When the tag is interrogated again, a fresh IDS
is backscattered. Additionally, all public submessages (A||B||C|| and
D) are anonymized by the use of random numbers (n1, n2, n3, n′1).
Tag anonymity is thus guaranteed, and location privacy of the tag
owner is not compromised.
Mutual Authentication and Data Integrity The protocol provides mutual
authentication. Only a legitimate reader possessing keys (k1, k2), can
build a valid message A||B||C. Similarly, only a genuine tag can de-
rive nonces n1, n2 from A||B||C, and then compute message D.
Messages C and D, which involve the internal secret values (n3, n′1,
k∗1 , k∗2) and nonces (n1, n2), allow data integrity to be checked. Note
that these values are included in the updating equations (potential
next index-pseudonym and keys).
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Replay attacks An eavesdropper could store all the messages exchanged
in a protocol run. To impersonate the tag, he could replay messageD.
However, this response would be invalid as different nonces are em-
ployed in each session -this will frustrate this naive attack. Addition-
ally, the attacker could pretend that the reader has not accomplished
the updating phase in the previous session. In this scenario, the tag
is identified by the old index-pseudonym and the attacker may for-
ward the eavesdropped values of A||B||C. Even if this is successful,
no secret information is disclosed and the internal state is unchanged
in the genuine tag, so all these attacks are unsuccessful.
Forward Security Forward security is the property that guarantees the se-
curity of past communications even when a tag is compromised at
a later stage. Imagine that a tag is exposed one day, making public
its secret information (ID, k1, k2). The attacker still cannot infer any
information from previous sessions as two unknown nonces (n1, n2)
and five internal secret values (n3, n′1, n′2, k∗1 , k∗2) are involved in the
message creation (mutual authentication phase). Additionally, these
internal values are employed in the updating phase. Consequently,
past communications cannot be easily jeopardized.
Updating Confirmation The Gossamer protocol assumes that tags and
readers share certain secret values. As these values are locally up-
dated, synchronization is mandatory. Submessages C and D provide
confirmation of the internal secret values (n3, n′1, k∗1 , k∗2) and nonces
(n1, n2). These values are employed in the updating stage. So the
correct update of values IDS and keys (k1, k2) is implicitly ensured
by submessages C and D.
Unintentional transmission errors can happen in the received mes-
sages since a radio link is used. This is an extremely serious issue for
message D, since it can result in a loss of synchronization. However,
the tuple (IDS, k1, k2) is stored twice in the tag memory -once with
the old values, the other with the potential next values. With this
mechanism, even in the event that message D is incorrectly received,
the tag and the reader can still authenticate with the old values. So
the reader and the tag will be able to recover their synchronized state.
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Table 6.4: Performance Comparison of Ultralightweight Authentication
Protocols
U-MAP family SASI [46] Gossamer
[163, 162, 161]
Resistance to Desynchronization Attacks No No Yes
Resistance to Disclosure Attacks No No Yes
Privacy and Anonymity Yes Yes Yes
Mutual Authentication and Forward Security Yes Yes Yes
Total Messages for Mutual Authentication 4-5L 4L 4L
Memory Size on Tag 6L 7L 7L
Memory Size for each Tag on Database 6L 4L 4L
Operation Types on Tag ⊕, ∨, ∧, + ⊕, ∨, ∧, +, Rot2 ⊕, +, Rot3,
MixBits
1 L designates the bit length of variables used
2 Rot(x, y) = x << wht(y), being wht(y) the Hamming weight
of vector y
3 Rot(x, y) = x << (ymod L) for a given value of L -in our case
L = 96
6.3.3.4 Performance Analysis
Our proposed protocol is now examined from the point of view of compu-
tational cost, storage requirements and communication cost. Additionally,
Table 6.4 compares the most relevant ultralightweight protocol proposals
from a performance perspective.
Computational cost The protocol we have proposed only requires simple
bitwise XOR, addition 2m, left rotation, and the MixBits function
on tags. These operations are very low-cost and can be efficiently
implemented in hardware.
When comparing Gossamer with the protocol SASI, we can observe
that the bitwise AND and OR operations are eliminated, and the light
MixBits operation is added for increased security. MixBits is very
efficient from a hardware perspective. The number of iterations of
this function is optimized to guarantee a good diffusion effect. Specif-
ically, it consumes 32 × 4 × (96/m) clock cycles, m being the word
length used to implement the protocol (i.e. m = 8, 16, 32, 64, 96).
As this may have a cost impact on temporal requirements, we have
minimized the number ofMixBits calls.
Storage requirement Each tag stores its static identifier (ID) and two
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records of the tuple (IDS, k1, k2) -with old and potential new values.
A 96-bit length is assumed for all elements in accordance with EPC-
Global. The ID is a static value, thus stored in ROM. The remaining
values (96× 6 = 576 bits) are stored in a rewritable memory because
they need to be updated.
In the protocol SASI, two temporal nonces are linked to each session.
We include an additional value derived from the previous nonces
(ni+2 = MixBits(ni, ni+1)). As these nonces are updated three times
in the internal steps of the protocol, our scheme is roughly equiva-
lent to the use of five fresh random numbers. So, with the relatively
light penalty of storing an extra nonce, the security level seems to be
notably increased.
Communication cost The proposed protocol performs mutual authentica-
tion and integrity protection with only four messages, so in this sense
it is similar to the SASI scheme. In the identification phase, a “hello”
and IDS message are sent over the channel. MessagesA||B||C andD
are transmitted in the authentication phase. So a total of 424 bits are
sent over the channel - considering 5 bytes for the “hello” message.
6.3.4 Concluding Comments
From the UMAP family of protocolos, we can infer the following:
Interest The protocols arouse interest in the design of new ultra-
lightweight protocols. Indeed, they have inspired the proposal of
other protocols [46, 142]. Additionally, as can be seen below, the se-
curity of the UMAP family of protocols has been carefully examined
by the research community.
Security Weaknesses The security of the UMAP family of protocols has
been analyzed under different assumptions. First, security vulner-
abilities were revealed under the hypothesis of an active attacker
[140, 141, 48]. Secondly, Bárász et al. showed how a passive attacker
can disclose part of the secret information stored in the tag’s memory
[28, 29].
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As mentioned in Section 6.3.3.1, only attacks that do not alter or inter-
fere with communications are considered a real threat in most scenar-
ios. In other words, active attacks are discounted when designing a
protocol to meet the requirements of ultralightweight RFID tags.
Operations Only bitwise AND, XOR, OR and sum mod 2m are required
for the implementation of the UMAP protocol family. At first sight,
the choice seems well-conceived as these operations can be efficiently
implemented in hardware. However, they are all T-functions, which
have a very poor diffusion effect; the information does not propagate
well from left to right. Also, as a consequence of the use of bitwise
AND and OR operations in the generation of certain messages, the
latter were highly biased. These two operands should therefore be
avoided in messages passed on the channel, but may be used in inner
parts of the protocol.
The protocol SASI was a step further towards a secure protocol compliant
with real ultralightweight tag requirements. However, as shown in Sec-
tion 6.3.2.1, a passive attacker can obtain the secret ID by observing several
consecutive authentications sessions. Despite this, we consider that the
protocol design shows some interesting new ideas (specifically, the inclu-
sion of rotations). The analysis of SASI and the UMAP protocol family has
led to the proposal of Gossamer, a new protocol inspired by SASI and ex-
amined here both from the security and performance perspective. Indeed,
the resources needed for the implementation of Gossamer are very similar
to those of SASI the scheme, but Gossamer seems to be considerably more
secure because of the use of dual rotation and the MixBits function. The
price to be paid, of course, is the throughput (number of authenticated tags
per second) of the Gossamer protocol. However, preliminary estimations
seem to show that the commonly required figure of 100 responses per sec-
ond is still achievable.
6.4 Active Attacks
In Section 6.3we have seen how the security level of low-cost RFID tags can
be increased using non-cryptographic primitives. Since the publication of
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Table 6.5: Specifications for Moderate-cost RFID Tags
Moderate-cost
RFID Tag
Power Source Passively powered
Storage 32 - 1K bits
Circuitry Up to 6K gates
(security processing) Lightweight cryptographic primitives
Reading Distance Up to 3 m
(comercial devices)
Physical Attacks Not resistant
Resistance to Passive Attacks Yes
Resistance to Active Attacks Yes
the predecessors of Gossamer protocol (UMAP family and SASI) the inter-
est by non-cryptographic primitives (lightweight protocols) have increased
[47, 125, 124, 134, 137].
On the other hand, as we see in Chapter 3, the security level of the different
RFID tags classes should not necessarily be equal. In Section 6.1, we point
out that low-cost RFID tags should be resistant to passive attacks but not to
active attacks. However, high-cost RFID tags are designed to be resistant
to passive and active attacks as tradicional cryptographic primitives are
supported on-board.
In this section we are going to see a different class of RFID tags, in the
following denominated as “moderate-cost” RFID tags. This class of tags
should not be vulnerable both passive and active tags. However, moderate-
cost tags do not support on-board standard cryptographic primitives dif-
ferently fromwhat it happens in high-cost RFID tags. Its security resides on
lightweight cryptographic primitives. So, for this purpose, the designing of
new lightweight cryptographic primitives is imperative. The specifications
of these tags are similar to low-cost RFID tags with the particularity that
the number of logic gates devoted to security tasks is superior. This limit
is fixed to 4K gates for low-cost RFID tags. We consider that around 6K
gates can be dedicated to security for moderate-cost RFID tags, that means
an increase of around 50%. Table 6.5 summarizes the characteristics of this
class of tags.
The standard EPC-C1G2 ratified the use of PRNG for low-cost RFID tags,
so its use for moderate-cost RFID tags is completely justified. Addition-
ally, another primitive like a keyed hash function or a cipher should be
employed in the protocol design. Indeed, the research area of designing
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lightweight primitives is becoming importance. The ECRYPT Stream Ci-
pher Project (profile-2 for embedded devices) is only an example of it [14].
Instead of beginning from scratch, we have tried to avoid past errors in the
designing of our protocol. The kind of attacks applicable to RFID technolo-
gies are not much different to those that can happen in wireless, bluetooth,
or smart-card systems. In deed, we have found interesting resemblances in
the field of smart-card security, which is by now a consolidated technology.
Since the pioneer work of Lamport (1981) where he proposed a remote au-
thentication scheme, many researchers suggested alternative schemes im-
proving the efficiency and security of remote authentication processes. Re-
cently, Shieh et al. have proposed a very interesting scheme in their work
entitled “Efficient remote mutual authentication and key agreement” [196].
This protocol is considered to be one of the most secure an efficient security
protocols for smart-cards. Taking advantage of this work, we have updated
their protocol to the special features of RFID systems. The resulting proto-
col is not only resistant to the standard passive attacks, such as privacy,
tracking and eavesdropping, etc. but also to active attacks.
6.4.1 Review of Shieh et al.’s Scheme
The security of Shieh et al.’s scheme (2006) is based on the use of secure
one-way hash functions (Merkle, 1989; NIST FIPS PUB 180, 1993; Rivest,
1992). Time stamps are used but no time-synchronization is required. The
scheme consists of two phases: the registration phase, and the login and
key agreement phase.
6.4.1.1 Registration Phase
Assume an user Ui submits his identity IDi and password PWi to the
server over a secure channel for registration. If the request is accepted,
the server computes Ri = h(IDi ⊕ x) ⊕ PWi and issues Ui a smart-card
containing Ri and h(), where h() is a one-way hash-function, x is the secret
key maintained by the server, and the symbol “⊕” denotes the exclusive-
OR operation.
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(1) Ui → Server: IDi, Tu,MACu
(2) Server → Ui: Tu, Ts,MACs
(3) Ui → Server: Ts,MAC′′u
ai = h(IDi ⊕ x) MACu = h(Tu||ai)
MACs = h(Tu||Ts||a′i) MAC′′u = h(Ts||(ai + 1))
Figure 6.8: Messages Transmitted in Shieh’s Scheme
6.4.1.2 Login and Key Agreement Phase
Figure 6.8 is an illustration of messages transmitted during the login and
key agreement phase in Shieh’s scheme. When user Ui wants to login to
the server, he first inserts his smart-card into a card reader then inputs his
identity IDi and password PWi. Next, the smart-card performs the follow-
ings steps:
1. Compute ai = Ri ⊕ PWi.
2. Acquire current time stamp Tu, store Tu until the end of the session,
and computeMACu = h(Tu||ai).
3. Send message (IDi, Tu,MACu) to the server.
After receiving message (IDi, Tu,MACu) from Ui, the server performs the
following steps to assure the integrity of the message, answer to Ui, and
challenge Ui to avoid replay attacks:
1. Check the freshness of Tu. If Tu has already appeared in a current
execution session of user Ui, reject Ui’s login request and stop the
session. Otherwise Tu is fresh.
2. Compute a′i = h(IDi ⊕ x), MAC ′u = h(Tu||a′i) and check whether
MAC ′u is equal to the receivedMACu. If it is not, reject Ui’s login and
stop the session.
3. Acquire current time stamp Ts. Store temporarily paired time stamps
(Tu, Ts) and IDi for freshness checking until the end of the session.
Compute MACs = h(Tu||Ts||a′i) and session key Ks = h((Tu||Ts) ⊕
a′i). Then, send the message (Tu, Ts,MACs) back to Ui.
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On receiving the message (Tu, Ts,MACs) from the server, the smart-card
performs the following steps to authenticate the server, achieves a session
key agreement, and answers to the server.
1. Check if the received Tu is equal to the stored Tu to assure the fresh-
ness of the received message. If is not, report login failure to the user
and stop the session.
2. Compute MAC ′s = h(Tu||Ts||ai) and check whether it is equal to the
receivedMACs. If not, report login failure to the user and stop. Oth-
erwise conclude that the responding party is the real server.
3. ComputeMAC ′′u = h(Ts||ai+1) and session keyKs = h((Tu||Ts)⊕ai),
then send the message (Ts,MAC ′′u) back to the server.
When the message (Ts,MAC ′′u) from Ui is received, the server performs the
following steps to authenticate Ui and achieve key agreement:
1. Check if the received Ts is equal to the stored Ts. If it fails reject U ′i
login request and stop the session.
2. Compute MAC ′′′u = h(Ts||(a′i + 1)) and check whether this is equal
to MAC ′′u . If it is not, reject Ui’s login request and stop the session.
Otherwise, Ui is a legal user and Ui’s login is permitted. At this mo-
ment, mutual authentication and session key agreement between Ui
and the server are achieved.
6.4.2 Our scheme
In this section, a new protocol adapted to RFID systems and resistant to
passive and active attacks (inspired in Shieh et al.’s protocol) is proposed.
First, we will mention some peculiarities of RFID systems which should
be considered in the new design. These will force changes in the protocol
which will be presented next.
In Shieh et al.’s protocol, when the user wants to login in the server “he first
inserts the card into a card-reader...”. In a RFID system, tags (T ) will be equiv-
alent to smart-cards and readers to card-readers respectively. Note RFID
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readers (R) are assumed to be connected to back-end databases (B) over a
secure channel. Additionally, both devices have “non-limited” computing
and storing capabilities. In the following, when we refer to a RFID reader
an entity composed by a reader and a back-end database is considered.
Additionally, there are significant differences between smart-card and
RFID systems. RFID technology operates through the radio channel, so
communication could be eavesdropped. Another particularity is the asym-
metry of the communication channel, which allows monitorization of the
forward channel (reader-to-tag) from a long-range distance than the back-
ward channel (tag-to-reader). Smart-cards are usually tamper resistant de-
vices, which is not the case of RFID tags. Furthermore, when then smart-
card is inserted in the reader an user intervention is necessary, entering his
identity and password. In RFID technology, however, interactions between
tags and readers are automatic.
Taking into account all these considerations, Shieh et al’s scheme has been
adapted. Our proposed scheme consists of two phases: the registration
phase, and themutual authentication and index-pseudonym update phase.
The following symbols have been used:
xi: secret key maintained by the reader Nz : random number generated by z
h(): secure one-way hash function ⊕: exclusive-OR operation
||: string concatenation operation
6.4.2.1 Registration Phase
The user or holder of the tag submits his static identifier IDi2 and a freely
chosen password PWi to the reader over a secure channel for registration.
If the request is accepted, the reader generates a random index-pseudonym
IDS0i and computes ai = h(IDi ⊕ xi)2. The tag will replace its identifier
IDi by IDS0i and store ai. The IDS
n
i will be used as searching-index of a
database in which all the sensitive information (IDi, xi, PWi) and the tem-
porary data session (NTi , NR) associated with each tag are stored. IDS
new
i
2A 64-bit length identifier is compatible with all the encoding schemes (SGTIN, SSCC,
GLN, etc) defined by EPCGlobal [61]. Due to this reason, we assume that tag static identifier
(IDi), and index-pseudonyms (IDSni ) are 64-bit length. Additionally, the secret key xi is
xored with IDi to compute ai, so xi length is also set to 64-bits.
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(1) R → Ti: hello
(2) Ti → R: h(NTi ||IDSni ),NTi ,MACTi
(3) R → Ti: NR,MACR
(4) Ti → R: MAC′′Ti
(5) R → Ti: MUCR
ai = h(IDi ⊕ xi) MACTi = h(NTi ||ai)
MACR = h(NTi ||NR||a′i) MAC′′Ti = h(NR||(ai + 1))
MUCR = h((NTi ⊕NR)||IDSnewi )
IDSn+1i = h((NTi ||NR)⊕ ai ⊕ IDSni )
Database Record-Tagi
IDSnewi IDi xi PWiIDSoldi
NTi NR
Tag Memory
IDSni NTi NTR
ai
RAM
Static Identifier - ID
MRC
Figure 6.9: Messages Transmitted in our Protocol
and IDSoldi are initially set to IDS
0
i . The password PWi will be used by
the holder of the tag (over a secure channel) to temporarily deactivate the
tag. In this case, ai will be replaced by Ri = ai ⊕ PWi.
6.4.2.2 Mutual Authentication and Index-Pseudonym Update
The messages exchanged in our scheme are shown in Figure 6.9. First, the
reader usually applies a probabilistic (i.e. Aloha-based algorithm) or de-
terminist (i.e. Binary tree-walking protocol) collision avoidance protocol to
singulate a tag out of many [193]. Upon singulation condition, the reader
will send a “hello” message to the tag. To start the mutual authentication,
the tag accomplishes the following steps:
1. Generate a random number NTi
3, and store NTi temporarily until the
end of the session.
3Tags conforming with EPC Class-1 Gen-2 specification support a 16-bit PRNG [67]. We
suggest that 32-bit PRNGs should be supported, asmentioned in [100, 158]. So, 32-bit length
could be an adequate value to NTi and NR.
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2. Compute h(NTi ||IDSni ), andMACTi = h(NTi ||ai).
3. Sendmessage (h(NTi ||IDSni ),NTi ,MACTi) to the reader and wait for
response.
Once the previous message is received, its integrity is checked and the
reader answer includes a challenge to avoid replay attacks:
1. Check the newness of NTi . If NTi has already come out in a current
mutual authentication, the protocol is stopped at this point. Other-
wise NTi is fresh.
2. Compute p′ = h(NTi ||IDSnewi ) and p′′ = h(NTi ||IDSoldi ) and check
wether any of the two values is equal to the received h(NTi ||IDSni ).
The above procedure is repeated for each entry (row) in the database
until a match is found. If not found, the protocol is stopped at this
point.
3. Compute a′i = h(IDi ⊕ xi), MAC ′Ti = h(NTi ||a′i), and check if it is
equal to MACTi . If not, the protocol is stopped and a check over
tag deactivation is taken by computing R′i = a
′
i ⊕ PWi, MAC ′Ti =
h(NTi ||R′i) and verifying if it is equal toMACTi . A match will imply
that the tag has been deactivated temporally by its holder.
4. Acquire a fresh random number NR2. For avoiding replay attacks,
the pair (NTi , NR) is stored until the end of the session.
5. Compute MACR = h(NTi ||NR||a′i). Then, send the message (NR,
MACR) back to the tag and wait for response.
After receiving the message (NR, MACR), the following steps are accom-
plished to authenticate the reader, achieve new material to update the
index-pseudonym, and finally answer to the reader:
1. Compute MAC ′R = h(NTi ||NR||ai) and check if its value is equal to
the receivedMACR. If not, stop the protocol at this point. Note that
the newness of this message is guaranteed by NTi . For preventing
loss of synchronization attacks, NR is also stored in the tag.
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2. ComputeMAC ′′Ti = h(NR||(ai + 1)) and send it back to the reader.
When the message MAC ′′Ti is received, the reader computes MAC
′′′
Ti
=
h(NR||(a′i+1)) and checks whether it is equal toMAC ′′Ti . If not, the protocol
is stooped. At this point, both the reader and the tag havemutually authen-
ticated. Additionally, both possess two nonces (NTi , NR), which have been
exchanged. Shieh et al. proposed using this fresh material to establish a
session key agreement. In our case this material is employed to update the
index-pseudonym. Obviously, the tag and reader have to be synchronized.
The glib solution for the synchronization problem will be to update the
index-pseudonym in the tag when message 4 is sent, and this updating
will be performed in the reader when checking this message. Under this
scenario an attacker (active attack) could intercept message 4 avoiding the
update of the index-pseudonym in the reader with the consequently losing
of synchronization. A naïve solution will consist of assuming that after the
end of the protocol, completion messages are sent between the involved
entities. However, these messages could be also intercepted. Additionally,
note that tags are much more constrained devices than readers. For this
reason, a new message 5 has been added to the protocol (Message Update
Code - MUC), and readers will have to store the old and the new index-
pseudonym to prevent the interception of this message. To complete the
protocol, the following steps are performed by the reader:
1. Store the current session index-pseudonym IDSoldi = IDS
new
i to
avoid desynchronization attacks.
2. Compute the new index-pseudonym IDSnew
′
i = h((NTi ||NR) ⊕ a′i ⊕
IDSnewi ).
4
3. Compute MUCR = h((NTi ⊕ NR)||IDSnew
′
i ) and send it to the tag,
including the two nonces exchanged between reader and tag and the
new index-pseudonym.
When the message MUCR is received from reader, the tag accomplishes
the following steps to verify a successfully index-pseudonym update has
4If tags support on board the proposed Tav-128 hash function, ai’s length will be fixed
to 128-bits (ai = h(IDi ⊕ xi)). In this case, we suggest the following update equation:
IDSnew
′
i = h((NTi ||NR)⊕ a′i[0:63]⊕ a′i[64:127]⊕ IDSnewi ).
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been performed in the reader:
1. Compute the potential-new index-pseudonym IDSn+1i =
h((NTi ||NR)⊕ ai ⊕ IDSni )4.
2. Compute MUC ′′R = h((NTi ⊕ NR)||IDSn+1) and check whether
MUC ′′R is equal to MUCR. If this is the case, update the index-
pseudonym.
6.4.2.3 Security Analysis
The robustness of the proposed protocol against themain important attacks
is analyzed in the following.
1. User Privacy
Tag IDi must be kept secure to guarantee user’s privacy. In order to
protect it, both the tag’s memory and the radio channel have been
taken into account. In the registration phase, the static identifier
IDi and the password PWi are submitted to the reader over a se-
cure channel. To avoid physical access to the static identifier, IDi
is replaced by the hash of IDi ⊕ xi. Note, xi is a secret key only
known by the reader. Additionally, and similarly to what happens
in e-passports, we recommended the IDi to be printed as a machine-
readable code as illustrated in Figure 6.9. In the radio channel, the
value of IDSni is protected by the use of a secure one-way hash func-
tion h(). In the same way, ai can not be derived from the messages
authentication codesMACTi ,MACR andMAC
′′
Ti
.
2. Location Privacy
The secure protection of tag information does not ensure location pri-
vacy. Constant answers would allow an attacker to identify each
tag with its holder. To protect the index-pseudonym only its hash
is transmitted. As the index-pseudonym is not updated until the
completion of the protocol and the protocol may be accidentally or
intentionally interrupted, the hash of the IDSi concatenated with
nonce NTi is really sent. Similarly, ai is anonymized by means of
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the use of message authentication codes where a kind of challenge-
response nonces are included. Finally, sending the message update
code MUCR = h((NTi ⊕ NR)||IDSn+1), the new index-pseudonym
is hidden. So, in order to avoid tracking, all the information is
anonymized.
3. Data Integrity
Based on the use of a mutual authentication approach, our proto-
col guarantees data integrity between tag and reader. On the other
hand, tag’s memory is rewritable so modifications are possible. In
this memory, both ai and the index-pseudonym IDSni are stored. If
an attacker does succeed in modifying this part of the memory, the
reader would not recognize the tag, having to carry out the registra-
tion phased again (see Section 6.4.2.1).
4. Mutual Authentication
Due to the fact that both tag and reader authenticate each other, by
means of message authentication codes MACR and MAC ′′Ti , mutual
authentication is accomplished. These message authentication codes
include ai, a secret only shared between them, preventing any other
to create correctMACs, and in this way guaranteeing the legitimacy
of each part. Therefore it is infeasible for a fraudulent reader or tag to
impersonate another entity.
5. Replay Attack
Our protocol is based on a challenge-response scheme, so replay at-
tacks are prevented because challenges are different each time and
long enough to prevent attacks based on storing them. In our
scheme, any replay attack will not be able to correctly answer the
challenges that form part of the protocol. In message 2, the tag sends
(h(NTi ||IDSni ), NTi , MACTi) where a nonce NTi is included. There-
fore, the reader must include NTi in the answer message, so in mes-
sage 3 the reader sends (NR,MACR = h(NTi ||NR||a′i)), including not
only the response nonce NTi but also the challenge nonce NR. Then,
the tag sends MAC ′′Ti = h(NR||(ai + 1)) back, including NR, to the
reader. So, only legitimate parties (reader+tag) can send valid an-
swers as challenge nonces are joined with the message authentication
codes requiring the knowledge of ai.
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6. Forgery Resistance
All the sensitive information stored in the tag (IDSni , ai) is never sent
in clear over the communication channel. In all cases, this informa-
tion is concatenated with a nonce and hashed before passed on the
channel. So the simple copy of information by eavesdropping is not
useful to an adversary.
7. Active Attacks
(a) Man-in-the-middle Attack: If an attacker tries to impersonate a
legitimate reader to obtain information from a tag, perhaps to
be able to impersonate it in a future. This kind of attack is not
feasible because all messages include a message authentication
code, which requires the knowledge of the secret ai shared only
between the tag and the reader. In the previous scenario, the
fraudulent reader will not be able to generate message 3, so the
capture of the message 4 sent back by the tag will be a vain at-
tempt. Moreover, in future sessions, a new challenge would be
used by the reader preventing any advantage from knowing old
messages.
(b) Parallel Session: Because of the asymmetric structure of the mes-
sage authentication codes MACTi = h(NTi ||ai) and MAC ′′Ti =
h(NR||ai + 1) this attack fails. Another important point is that
both reader and tag store the session nonces, NTi and NR.
(c) Synchronization Loss: The tag updates the index-pseudonym
only when the message update code (MUC) is received. An
attacker could interrupt this message, trying to desynchronize
reader and tag. To avoid this sort of attack, each time the reader
updates the index-pseudonym, the old index-pseudonym is still
maintained. Under the interception of theMUC from the reader,
the tagwill use the old index-pseudonym to build h(IDSni ||NTi).
When the reader checks its integrity, it first will try with the new
index-pseudonym, and if it fails, then he will try with the old
index-pseudonym. Next, the rest of the protocol will be accom-
plished ensuring the recovery of synchronization loss.
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6.4.3 Lightweight Hash-Function
Informally, a cryptographic hash function is a transformation that takes a
variable-length input and returns a fixed-size string, which is called the
hash value. Specifically, it is commonly assumed that a cryptographic hash
function should meet the following prerequisites:
• Preimage resistant: given h, it should be hard to find anym such that
h = hash(m).
• Second preimage resistant: given an input m1, it should be hard
to find another input, m2 (not equal to m1) such that hash(m1) =
hash(m2).
• Collision-resistant: it should be hard to find two different messages
m1 andm2 such that hash(m1) = hash(m2).
For a hash output of n bits, compromising these should require 2n, 2n, and
2n/2, respectively. Additionally, some precautions should be taken when
a new protocol is designed. Since most hash functions are built using the
Merkle-Damgard construction, these are vulnerable to length-extension at-
tacks: given h(m) and length(m) but not m, by choosing a suitable m′ an
attacker can calculate h(m||m′), where || denotes concatenation.
Because a key is not necessary, hash functions are considered a better choice
from the implementation point of view in the RFID security community. As
a result, most of the proposed protocols are based on the use of hash func-
tions. However, traditional cryptographic primitives excess the capabilities
of low-cost RFID tags, and even that of moderate-cost RFID tags. As the
protocol we proposed in Section 6.4.2 is based on the use of a hash function,
a new lightweight hash function, named Tav-128, is proposed. Next, the
code of this functions is included:
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/******************************************************************************/
Process the input a1 modifying the accumulated hash a0 and the state
/******************************************************************************/
void tav(unsigned long *state, unsigned long *a0, unsigned long *a1)
{ unsigned long h0,h1; int i,j,r1,r2,nstate;
/* Initialization */
r1=32; r2=8; nstate=4;
h0=*a0; h1=*a0;
/* A - Function */ for(i=0;i<r1;i++){h0=(h0<<1)+((h0+(*a1))>>1);}
/* B - Function */ for(i=0;i<r1;i++){h1=(h1>>1)+(h1<<1)+h1+(*a1);}
/* C and D - Function */ for(j=0;j<nstate;j++) {
for(i=0;i<r2;i++)
{
/* C - Function */
h0^=(h1+h0)>>3;
h0=((((h0>>2)+h0)>>2)+(h0<<3)
+(h0<<1))^0x736B83DC;
/* D - Function */
h1^=(h1^h0)>>1;
h1=(h1>>4)+(h1>>3)+(h1<<3)+h1;
} // round-r2
state[j]+=h0;
state[j]^=h1;
} // state
/* a0 updating */
*a0=h1+h0;
}
/******************************************************************************/
Initialization of the state and a0 with random values obtained from
www.random.org
/******************************************************************************/
void init_state(unsigned long *state, unsigned long *a0)
{
state[0]=0xa92be51d;
state[1]=0xba9b1ef0;
state[2]=0xc234d75a;
state[3]=0x845c2e03;
a0[0]=0x768c7e74;
}
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6.4.3.1 Tav-128 Design and Security Analysis
Some of the recent cryptanalytic attacks on many of the most important
hash functions [218, 219] rely on the fact that these constructions gener-
ally use a very linear (LFSR-based) message expansion algorithm. In or-
der to avoid this, we have decided to make the expansion of the Tav-128
hash function (corresponding to algorithms C and D) highly nonlinear.
As, on the other hand, the resulting function should be very efficient and
lightweight both from the gate count and the throughput point of view,
we have found these functions by evolving compositions of extremely
lightweight operands by means of genetic programming, as described in
[94].
We have also tried to include a filter phase (corresponding to algorithms A
and B in the code) in the input of the Tav-128 function, to avoid giving the
attacker direct access to any bit of the internal state. Without this possibility,
some attacks that have been found on other cryptographic primitives in the
past are precluded: decreasing the control that the attacker has over the
hash functions inputs complicates his task significantly.
An output length of 128 bits was found to be a reasonable compromise
between speed and robustness to realistic attacks in the intended scenar-
ios. Additionally, we propose the use of eight rounds in the internal loop
(r2 parameter) for having an adequate security margin, although we have
found that even with six rounds (which will significantly improve its per-
formance) the overall scheme seems to be secure.
We have performed an additional security analysis of Tav-128, consisting
of examining the statistical properties of its output over a very low en-
tropy input. Specifically, 225 32-bit inputs have been generated by means
of an incremental counter (x, x + 1, x + 2, etc.). After randomly initializ-
ing (with values obtained from http://randomnumber.org) the inter-
nal state and the accumulated hash a0 value, we compute the output of
Tav-128 for each counter value input (Tav(x), Tav(x+ 1), Tav(x+ 2), etc.).
The resulting hashes have been analyzed with two well-known suites of
randomness tests, namely ENT [216] and DIEHARD [149]. The results are
presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Tav-128 also passed the very demanding
-because it is oriented to cryptographic applications- NIST [205] statistical
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Table 6.6: Results Obtained with ENT (Tav-128)
Test Tav-128
Entropy 7.999999 bits/byte
Compression Rate 0%
χ2 Statistic 269.73 (50%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.4993
Monte Carlo pi Estimation 3.14178848 (0.01%)
Serial correlation Coefficient -0.000073
battery. We have computed 100 p-values for each test, being all the re-
sults compatible with a uniform U(0, 1). The whole report is available in
http://163.117.149.137/tav/ due to the huge amount of p-values
generated.
The author of this thesis acknowledges that successfully passing these sta-
tistical batteries, even over a very low-entropy input, does not prove secu-
rity, but it does point out the nonexistence of trivial weaknesses.
6.4.3.2 Hardware Complexity
One of the most relevant aspects considered in the design of Tav-128 was
the sort of operations that can be employed. As tags are very restricted
computationally, only simple operations have been used. For example,
multiplication has been ruled out due to its high cost [144]. Specifically,
the following operators have been finally used: right shifts, bitwise XOR,
and additionmod 232. The necessary architecture to implement Tav-128 can
be divided into two main blocks:
• Memory Blocks. All the used variables are stored in this part: state
(128-bits), accumulated hash a0 (32-bits), internal variables h0 (32-
bits) and h1 (32-bits), and the input a1 (32-bits).
• Arithmetic Logic Unit. In this unit the addition mod 232 and the
bitwise XOR operation are implemented. As the h0 and h1 functions
consist of three or more components, an auxiliary register to store the
intermediate results is necessary.
Although we have not implemented Tav-128 in hardware, an overestima-
tion of its gate count can be easily obtained. The function bitwise XOR
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Table 6.7: Results Obtained with the Diehard Suite (Tav-128)
Tav-128
Test p-value
Birthday Spacings 0.725
0.868
GCD 0.229
0.138
Gorilla 0.779
Overlapping Permutations 0.823
0.849
0.349
0.897
0.939
Ranks of 31×31 and 32×32 Matrices 0.556
0.241
Ranks of 6×8 Matrices 0.315
Monkey Tests on 20-bit Words 0.312
Monkey Test OPSO, OQSO, DNA OK
Count the 1’s in a Stream of Bytes 0.473
Count the 1’s in Specific Bytes OK
Parking Lot Test 0.235
Minimum Distance Test 0.580
Random Spheres Test 0.912
The Squeeze Test 0.487
Overlapping Sums Test 0.106
Runs Up and Down Test 0.147
The Craps Test 0.3211
0.067
0.775
0.261
Overall KS p-value 0.826
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requires 32 logic gates as we are operating with 32-bit variables. For im-
plementing the add with carry circuit, a parallel architecture is proposed.
Six logic gates are needed for each bit added in parallel5. The registers will
be implemented by means of flip-flops. A gate count of 8 has been chosen
for implementing a flip-flop as in [90]. So, 2304 logic gates are necessary
to store the memory block and the auxiliary register. Additionally, around
50 extra logic gates are employed to control the internal state of the hash
function. Therefore, 2578 logic gates are needed for implementing Tav-128.
Another key aspect to consider is throughput. We reckon that 1568 clock
cycles are consumed in executing one Tav-128 hash. Due to the fact that
low-cost RFID tags imply serious powers restrictions, we assume that the
clock frequency is set to 100 KHz. Under this conditions, the through-
put obtained by a tag that would have on-chip Tav-128 will be around 65
hashes/sec. It is generally accepted that at least between 50-100 tags should
be authenticated per second [187]. In order words, a tag may use up at the
most 2000 clock cycles (@100Khz) to answer a reader. In some applications
65 hashes/sec may not be enough, so we have analyzed how to increment
the speed of Tav-128. In the initial proposed scheme, we have a parameter
(r2), which fits the number of rounds computed in the C andD algorithms.
This parameter has been initially fixed to eight rounds in order to guaran-
tee a high avalanche effect. After accomplishing a deeper study, we have
determined that r2 may be reduced to six rounds. So the speed of the tag
will be incremented by 25% or in other words, the tagmay compute around
80 hashes/sec. Note that for non-high speed demanding applications, we
recommend to fix r2 to eight rounds.
Finally, an overestimation of the total number of gates needed to imple-
ment the proposed protocol can be computed. The protocol is based on a
hash functions and a PRNG. Tav-128 can be implementedwith around 2.6K
gates. As we will see in the next section, a lightweight PRNG, conforming
with EPC-C1G2 [61] specification, demands around 1.6K gates to be imple-
mented. Therefore, in total 4.2K gates are needed to security tasks, which
is inferior than limit fixed initially. In conclusion, the proposed protocol is
suitable for moderate-cost RFID tags.
5S = A⊕ [B ⊕ CENT ] CSAL = BCENT +ACENT +AB
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6.5 Pseudo-Random Number Generation
6.5.1 Introduction
The need for random and pseudo-random numbers arises in many crypto-
graphic applications. In fact, the usage of Pseudo-Random Number Gen-
erators (PRNGs) in RFID systems has been proposed almost from the start.
In 2003, Weis et al. proposed the randomized hash-locking scheme, based
on a hash function and a random number generator in order to prevent
tracking, but limiting its applicability only to small tag populations [224].
Molnar et al. proposed a simple protocol for enhancing passwords in RFID
tags [155]. There are others papers where the use of a PRNG has been pro-
posed [45, 59, 135, 183, 214]. Nowadays, the used of a PRNG has been rat-
ified by EPCGlobal (EPC-C1G2) and ISO (ISO/IEC 18000-6C). As we saw
in the Chapter 4, a generator conforming with these specifications [61, 104],
should meet the following randomness criteria:
• Probability of a single RN16: The probability that any RN16 drawn
from the RNG has value RN16 = j for any j, shall be bounded by:
0.8
216
< P(RN16 = j) <
1.25
216
(6.62)
• Probability of simultaneously identical sequences: For a tag pop-
ulation of up to 10,000 tags, the probability that any of two or more
tags simultaneously generate the same sequence of RN16s shall be
less than 0.1%, regardless of when the tags are energized.
• Probability of predicting an RN16: An RN16 drawn from a tag’s
RNG 10ms after the end of Tr, shall not be predictable with a proba-
bility greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from RNG,
performed under identical conditions, are known.
So far, no public algorithm conforming to EPC-C1G2 specification has been
published. On the other hand, one can find commercial tags that obey
this specification [101, 208]. However, the algorithms of the PRNGs sup-
ported are not public, and if you try to obtain them a negative answer is
received. Manufacturers should learn of past disasters, such as Texas DST
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and Philips Mifare cards, whose security resided on its obscurity and was
quickly broken [37, 117, 159]. Motivated by this necessity, a new PRNG
conforming to the standard has been proposed [166].
6.5.2 Experimentation Issues
The methodology to obtain the core of our PRNG is based on the use of
Genetic Programming (GP). GP is a stochastic population-based search
method devised in 1992 by John R. Koza [127]. The technique evolves com-
puter programs instead of just particular solutions to a specific problem as
in GA. As PRNGs are designed and implemented as computers programs,
the use of GP in the problem is justified.
We have used the lil-gp library [9] for our experimentation. Next, we
briefly describe how its parameters have been adjusted to our particular
problem.
Function Set These functions are the building blocks of the individual we
will obtain. We decided to include only very efficient operations easy
to implement in hardware: vrotd (one-bit right rotation), xor (addi-
tion mod 2), and (bitwise AND), or (bitwise OR), and not (bitwise
NOT). The sum (sum mod 232) operator is also necessary, in order to
avoid linearity. Multiplication was excluded due to its high cost [144].
Terminal Set The terminals will be represented by two 32-bit unsigned
integers (a0, a1). We also included Ephemeral Random Constants
(ERCs), which are constant values (in our problem, 32-bit random
values) that GP uses to try to generate better individuals.
Fitness Function We use the Avalanche Effect to evaluate the nonlinearity
of our generator. In fact, an even more demanding property will be
used: the Strict Avalanche Criterion [76], which can be mathemati-
cally described by:
∀x, y|H(x, y) = 1, H(F (x), F (y)) ≈ B
(
n,
1
2
)
(6.63)
To measure the proximity of the distribution of the computed Ham-
ming distances to the sought theoretical binomial B(n, 1/2) a χ2
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goodness-of-fit test statistic is employed. Specifically, the proposal
fitness function was the following:
Fitness = 106/χ2 (6.64)
It was necessary to amplify the fitness function (multiplying by 106)
because the initial values of the χ2 statistic were extremely high, mak-
ing the fitness negligible at the beginning of the evolution process. In
more detail, the fitness of each individual was calculated as follows:
we used the Mersenne Twister generator [151] to randomly generate
the pair (a0, a1). The output O0 for this input is stored. Then we ran-
domly flipped one single bit of this two 32-bit input and we obtained
a new output O1. Now we stored the Hamming distance between
those two output values H(O0, O1). This process is repeated a num-
ber of times (211 = 2048 was experimentally proved to be enough)
and each time a Hamming chi-square statistic is obtained.
Tree Size Limitations The depth and/or the number of nodes of the in-
dividuals should be limited. We tried both limiting the depth and
not limiting the number of nodes, and vice versa. The best results
were consistently obtained by using the latter option. We allowed
the PRNG to use up to 65 nodes for trying to ensure a high degree
of Avalanche Effect and robustness without exceeding the processing
and temporal requirements of a low-cost RFID tag.
When the parameters were adjusted, we ran 20 experiments with
different seeds for generating the initial population (seedi =
(pi ∗ 100000)i (mod 1000000)), with a population size of 500 individu-
als, a crossover probability of 0.8, a reproduction probability of 0.2, and
an ending condition of reaching 2000 generations. These parameters were
experimentally found to be adequate for our purposes. The best individual
found following the approach described above has an Avalanche Effect of
15.9707 (16.00 being the optimal value) and presents a χ2 goodness-of-fit
test statistic of 5.1175 for a χ2 probability distribution with 32 degrees
of freedom implying that, with probability 0,9999999853, the computed
Hamming distances come from a Binomial distribution B(32,1/2).
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=== BEST-OF-RUN ===
generation: 1172
nodes: 65
depth: 39
hits: 1597070
TOP INDIVIDUAL: -- #1 --
hits: 1597070
raw fitness: 195409.7232
standardized fitness: 195409.7232
adjusted fitness: 195409.7232
=== TREE: ===
(xor (sum a1 a0) (vrotd (vrotd (sum (xor a0 a1)(vrotd (xor a1 (vrotd (vrotd
(vrotd (vrotd (sum (sum a0 a1) (vrotd (vrotd (sum (vrotd (vrotd (vrotd
(xor (sum a1 a0) (vrotd (vrotd (sum (sum a0 a1) (vrotd (vrotd (sum (vrotd
(vrotd (vrotd (vrotd (xor (sum a1 a0) (vrotd (vrotd (vrotd (sum (xor a0 a1)
(vrotd (vrotd (vrotd (vrotd (vrotd (sum a1 a0))))))))))))))) a1))))))))))
a1))))))))))))))
6.5.3 Design Specification
The seed of the PRNG will consist of an initialization vector (iv) and a key
(s). The iv may be public, but it is very important that it is never reused
together with the same key. It can also be kept secret, effectively extending
the keylength up to 64-bits, depending on the security needs of the specific
application. The key is a secret only known by an authorized reader and
the tag. Usually, the secret (s) will be set at the time of manufacture, and
will be stored in the associate row of the back-end database. In Equation
6.65, and 6.66, we show the proposed update function for the internal state
of LAMED.
an+10 =
{
an1 + iv if n is odd
an1 ⊕ iv if n is even
(6.65)
an+11 =
{
0(an0 , a
n
1 )⊕ s if n is odd
0(an0 , a
n
1 ) + s if n is even
(6.66)
The output length is 32 bits. As the specification EPC-C1G2 proposes the
use of a 16-bit PRNG, we have designed a 16-bit version of our PRNG,
named LAMED-EPC, with an additional XOR operation before its final
output. The 32-bit output is divided in two halves, MSB31:16 and LSB15:0.
These two halves will then be xored in order to obtain a 16-bit output with
higher entropy. In this way, our proposal is EPC-C1G2 compliant and has
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the additional advantage that a 32-bit PRNG is also supported, which could
be relevant for certain applications and also increases its flexibility and,
probably, its longevity, as mentioned in [100, 158]. Furthermore, the access
and kill PIN are 32-bit values. The use of 32-bit random numbers would
avoid the complex multi-step procedure for using the access and kill com-
mand proposed in the standard. It is important to recall, however, that the
security margin of a protocol using a 16-bit PRNG is usually bounded by
1
216
. Moreover, a generic time-memory-data trade-off attack costs O(2
n
2 ),
see [34], where n is the number of inner state variables in the PRNG. In
LAMED-EPC, with a public iv, which is the weakest security configuration
possible, the total of state variables is 32. Thus, the expected complexity of
a time-memory is lower limited by O(216).
6.5.4 Standard Security Analysis
We have performed an extensive security analysis of LAMED6, consisting
of examining the statistical properties of the output over a random ini-
tialization of the initialization vector (iv) and the key (s) obtained from
http://randomnumber.org. Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove
randomness, because there is no efficient deterministic definition of this
rather abstract concept. Instead, scientists usually limit themselves to us-
ing batteries of randomness tests to verify that the output of a given func-
tion “seems” random, meaning the used tests cannot distinguish it from
a truly (theoretical) random variable. In 2001, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) proposed a comprehensive suite of ran-
domness tests suitable for the evaluation of PRNGs used in cryptographic
applications [190]. Additionally, there is another very stringent set of ran-
domness tests called Diehard, developed by Marsaglia [148, 149]. We have
also used a battery of tests named ENT [216], and a very recent set of ran-
domness tests proposed by Sexton [6]. However, none of these test suites
ensure, when successfully passed, that a given generator is useful for all
kind of applications. On the other hand, systematically passing the NIST
and Diehard batteries provides evidence in favour of a good degree of out-
put randomness.
6The whole report is available in http://163.117.149.208/rfid/lamed/
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Table 6.8: Results Obtained with ENT (LAMED)
Test LAMED LAMED-EPC
Entropy 7.999999 bits/byte 7.999999 bits/byte
Compression Rate 0% 0%
χ2 Statistic 256.90 (50%) 246.61 (50%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.5024 127.4980
Monte Carlo pi Estimation 3.141474228 (0.00%) 3.141796646 (0.01%)
Serial correlation Coefficient -0.000023 0.000015
Two files of 300MB and 4GB have been generated with LAMED and
LAMED-EPC, the latter only being used in Sexton’s battery as it needs
a huge amount of data to run. Results obtained with ENT, Diehard and
David Sexton’s battery are presented in Tables 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 respectively.
When several p-values were produced in the same test, we summarized
them by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-value (marked with *), that should be
greater than 0.05 to be considered successful. LAMED also passed the very
demanding (being angled to cryptographic applications) NIST statistical
battery. We have computed 100 p-values for every test in the statistical
suite; the proportion of successful ones is presented in Table 6.11. If this pro-
portion is lower than 0.96, the whole test is considered to have failed. From
these results, we can conclude that LAMED’s output successfully passed
all the randomness tests.
6.5.5 Compliance to EPC-C1G2 Security Requirements
In this section we will study the compliance of LAMED-EPC with EPC-
C1G2. This study will be started analyzing the probability of a single 16-bit
random number. The standard asks that “the probability that any RN16
drawn from the RNG has value RN16 = j for any j, shall be bounded by
0.8/216 < P(RN16 = j) < 1.25/216”. In order to verify this property, five
files of 230 bytes have been generated and analyzed. These files have been
obtained with different secret keys and initialization vectors, in every case
taken from http://random.org/. From this analysis, we can conclude
that the probability of any 16-bit random number drawn from LAMED-
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Table 6.9: Results Obtained with the Diehard Suite (LAMED)
LAMED LAMED-EPC
Test p-value p-value
Birthday Spacings 0.261 0.192
GCD and Gorilla 0.778* 0.608*
Overlapping Permutations 0.311* 0.564*
Ranks of 31×31 and 32×32 Matrices 0.699* 0.587*
Ranks of 6×8 Matrices 0.521 0.947
Monkey Tests on 20-bit Words 0.312* 0.758*
Monkey Test OPSO 0.436* 0.751*
Monkey Test OQSO 0.742* 0.835*
Monkey Test DNA 0.688* 0.231*
Count the 1’s in a Stream of Bytes 0.664 0.789
Count the 1’s in Specific Bytes 0.586* 0.680*
Parking Lot Test 0.433 0.117
Minimum Distance Test 0.411 0.03
Random Spheres Test 0.788 0.50
The Squeeze Test 0.841 0.449
Overlapping Sums Test 0.173 0.003
Runs Up and Down Test 0.191 0.859
The Craps Test 0.443* 0.539*
Overall KS p-value 0.778 0.792
Table 6.10: Results Obtained with David Sexton’s Battery (LAMED)
LAMED LAMED-EPC
Test p-value p-value
Bit Runs Test 0.925* 0.726*
Frequency Test 0.016* 0.962*
Bit Test 0.375* 0.748*
Sum Test 0.841* 0.18*
Matrix Test 0.432* 0.857*
Prediction Test 0.119* 0.529*
And Test 0.778* 0.856
Up/Down Test 0.699* 0.355*
Rect. Distance Test 0.018 0.798
Collision Test 0.577* 0.362*
Offset Xor Test 0.865* 0.723*
Mod Test 0.230* 0.637*
6.5. PSEUDO-RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION 193
Table 6.11: Results Obtained with the NIST Suite (LAMED)
LAMED LAMED-EPC
Test Proportion Proportion
Frequency 0.98 0.98
Block-frequency 0.98 1.00
Cumulative-sums 0.98, 0.98 0.98, 0.98
Runs 1.00 0.99
Longest-run 1.00 0.99
Rank 0.98 0.99
Fft 0.99 0.98
Overlapping-templates 0.98 1.00
Universal 0.96 0.98
Apen 0.99 1.00
Serial 0.97, 1.00 0.99, 0.97
Linear-complexity 0.99 0.98
Random-excursions 0.97, 0.98 0.97, 1.00
1.00, 0.97 0.97 0.96
1.00, 1,00 1.0, 0.98
0.97 1.00 0.97 0.98
Random-excursions-variant 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00
0.98, 1.00, 1.00 0.98, 0.98, 1.00
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 0.98, 0.98
1.00, 1.00, 1.00 1.00, 1.00, 1.00
1.00, 0.98, 0.97 1.00, 0.98, 0.98
0.98, 1.00, 0.97 1.00, 1.00, 1.00
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Table 6.12: Serial Correlation Test (LAMED-EPC)
LAMED-EPC
Experiment Bit Byte 16-bit
1-Experiment -0.000002 0.000154 0.000065
2-Experiment -0.000015 0.000028 0.000028
3-Experiment -0.000013 -0.000008 -0.000157
4-Experiment -0.000006 0.000079 0.000074
5-Experiment -0.000053 0.000088 0.000047
EPC is, in fact, bounded by:
0.96
216
< PLAMED−EPC(RN16 = j) <
1.05
216
(6.67)
Another interesting property asked for in the EPC-C1G2 standard concerns
the probability of predicting a random number. The specification in this
context determines that “a RN16 could not be predicted with probability
greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from RNG, performed
under identical conditions, are known”. In order to check if this property
holds, some tests have been completed:
Serial Correlation Test This quantity measures the extent to which each
n-bit output depends upon the previous n-bit output. For random
sequences, this value (which can be positive or negative) should be
very close to zero. As an example, a non-random n-bit stream such as
a counter will yield a serial correlation coefficient of about 0.5. Five
files of 225 bytes haven been generated (with different secret keys and
initialization vectors). From each file, the serial correlation (bit, byte,
16-bit) has been obtained. Table 6.12 shows the obtained results.
Bit-Byte Prediction Test from David Sexton’s battery Many algorithms
are used to predict the value of each bit (respectively, byte) of the
sequence from the beginning of the sequence to the end. Specifically,
various algorithms are used to predict the value of each bit (byte)
from the beginning of the sequence to the end. In a random sequence
the probability of success of any algorithm is 1/2 (respectively
1/256). The number of successes is counted and a chi-squared
statistic is computed. The following tests have been made:
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• Bit Prediction A Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in all the
previous bits are counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a
zero is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a one is pre-
dicted. Otherwise the prediction is the same as for the previous
bit.
• Bit Prediction B Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the pre-
vious 9 bits are counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero
is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a one is predicted.
• Bit Prediction C Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the previ-
ous 17 bits are counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero
is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a one is predicted.
• Bit Prediction D Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the pre-
vious 33 bits are counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero
is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a one is predicted.
• Bit Prediction E Test: the numbers of zeros and ones in the previ-
ous 65 bits are counted. If the ones outnumber the zeros, a zero
is predicted; if the zeros outnumber the ones, a one is predicted.
• Byte Prediction A Test: the next byte is predicted to be equal to
all the previous bytes bitwise XORed together. The first byte of
the sequence is predicted to equal zero.
• Byte Prediction B Test: the next byte is predicted to be equal to
the sum of all the previous bytes, modulo 256. The first byte of
the sequence is predicted to equal zero.
• Byte Prediction C Test: the next byte value is predicted to be zero
until the first zero is found. From that point on, the next byte
value is predicted to be the byte value whose last appearance
was furthest back in the sequence.
• Byte Prediction D Test: a given byte value is predicted to be fol-
lowed by the same byte value it was followed by the last time
it appeared in the sequence. A byte value that has not previ-
ously appeared in the sequence is predicted to be followed by
the byte value of the first byte in the sequence. The first byte of
the sequence is predicted to equal zero.
• Byte Repetition Test: This test is equivalent to a byte prediction
test where each byte is predicted to be equal to its preceding
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Table 6.13: Prediction Tests as in David Sexton’s Battery (LAMED-EPC)
LAMED-EPC
Test p-value
Bit Prediction A Test 0.8421
Bit Prediction B Test 0.6966
Bit Prediction C Test 0.8499
Bit Prediction D Test 0.8081
Bit Prediction E Test 0.4742
Byte Prediction A Test 0.3263
Byte Prediction B Test 0.6074
Byte Prediction C Test 0.5686
Byte Prediction D Test 0.3254
Byte Repetition Test 0.4184
byte. The first byte of the sequence is predicted to equal the last
byte of the sequence.
A file of 232 bytes was generated to check these prediction tests, and
the results obtained are summarized in Table 6.13.
Lineal Predictor Another interesting approach for finding a good predic-
tor for a given function is to try to approximate it by a linear rela-
tion, similarly to what is done in linear cryptanalysis for block ciphers
[150, 202]. In order to obtain the linear bias of LAMED-EPC, the fol-
lowing experiment has been accomplished: two 16-bit masks (A, B)
have been randomly picked, and two consecutive outputs have been
generated (Oi, Oi+1). With these two masks and outputs, the equal-
ity A ∗ Oi = B ∗ Oi+1 is evaluated. The process is repeated 2n times,
counting the numbers of successes (m). The ∗ symbolizes scalar prod-
uct, with a mod 2 operation being carried out after addition. The bias
is defined as:
BIAS =
1
2−log2(|
m
2n
− 1
2
|) (6.68)
We have randomly testedmany pairs of differentmasks,A andB. For
each pair, 225 16-bit outputs have been generated, and for consecutive
outputs the previous expression (A ∗ Oi = B ∗ Oi) was evaluated.
From the above results, we can gather that the bias of LAMED-EPC
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is limited by:
BIASLAMED−EPC <
1
211.77
(6.69)
which implies that the security margin, given by the number of ob-
servations needed for predicting the next output value with a good
accuracy is around (211.77)2, which is well over the 2−16 limit that any
protocol using this PRNG will have (see [150, 202]).
Differential Analysis A differential analysis is a form of attack in which
the differences between consecutive values are used to gain addi-
tional knowledge about the system. Two different analysis have been
proposed, where Oi refers to the ith output provided by LAMED-
EPC:
• The simpler and generally most useful is the XOR analysis
where Oi ⊕Oi+1 is studied.
• Another standard analysis is that of the difference (Oi − Oi+1)
mod 216.
For each of the two analysis, the following experiments were carried
out four times: First, the secret key and initialization vector were ran-
domly set. Next, a sequence consisting of 225 outputs was generated.
Finally, the xor and difference values were computed. In Table 6.14,
the statistical properties are summarized.
Summarizing, the probabilities associated with LAMED output are well
within the limits set by the specification. Our prediction analysis gives
no indication that the output could be predicted significantly better by the
knowledge of prior outputs without knowing the secret key and the IV,
than just by chance. Although the period of LAMED has not been exactly
determined, in Section 6.5.4 a file of 230 bytes (4 Gb) was analyzed with-
out finding any evidence that those bytes behave differently from what
would be expected from a random variable, thus proving that the period
was greater and, in any case, sufficiently great for the intended application.
Let’s consider the following simple scenario: a tag having LAMED-EPC on
chip, and a reader which interrogates this tag every 5 milliseconds. Un-
der these conditions, the reader could continuously interrogate the tag for
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Table 6.14: Analysis of the XOR and Substraction (LAMED-EPC)
Experiment Xor (0i ⊕ 0i+1) Difference (0i − 0i+1)
Experiment #1
Entropy 7.999999 bits/byte 7.999999 bits/byte
Compression Rate 0% 0%
χ2 Statistic (byte) 267.81 (50%) 259.79 (50%)
χ2 Statistic (16-bit) 65370.5898 (67.55%) 65209.1562 (62.26%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.5060 127.4997
Monte Carlo pi Estimation 3.141522675 (0.00%) 3.141581433 (0.00%)
Serial correlation Coefficient -0.000041 -0.000093
Experiment #2
Entropy 7.999999 bits/byte 7.999999 bits/byte
Compression Rate 0% 0%
χ2 Statistic (byte) 247.43 (50%) 267.88 (50%)
χ2 Statistic (16-bit) 65484.3281 (55.60%) 65607.109375 (42.14%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.4969 127.4977
Monte Carlo pi Estimation 3.142054749 (0.01%) 3.141537534 (0.01%)
Serial correlation Coefficient 0.000097 0.000049
Experiment #3
Entropy 7.999999 bits/byte 7.999999 bits/byte
Compression Rate 0% 0%
χ2 Statistic (byte) 240.76 (50%) 264.96 (50%)
χ2 Statistic (16-bit) 65673.964844 (35.09%) 65182.406250 (83.56%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.4910 127.4954
Monte Carlo pi Estimation 3.141983490 (0.01%) 3.141622471 (0.00%)
Serial correlation Coefficient -0.000078 0.000112
Experiment #4
Entropy 7.999999 bits/byte 7.999999 bits/byte
Compression Rate 0% 0%
χ2 Statistic (byte) 259.95 (50%) 259.79 (50%)
χ2 Statistic (16-bit) 65346.839844 (69.88%) 65614.957031 (41.29%)
Arithmetic Mean 127.4997 127.5001
Monte Carlo pi Estimation 3.142095337 (0.02%) 3.141177521 (0.01%)
Serial correlation Coefficient 0.000064 0.000044
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at least fifteen days, which clearly meets the needs of the vast majority of
applications.
6.5.6 Hardware Complexity
In this section, we explain in detail one architectural design for LAMED.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Class-1 Generation-2 tags have severe tempo-
ral requirements, for around 450 tags should be readable every second.
Power consumption is another important restriction. Tags are passive, so
we should limit their power consumption as much as possible. One of the
parameters with a major influence on this target is clock frequency. Fol-
lowing other authors in the RFID area [72], we assume that clock frequency
must be in the range of KHz, at some value around 100 KHz, implying a
clock cycle consumption of 0.01 ms. With these conditions, a tag can use up
to 200 clock cycles (2 ms) for the whole random number generation phase.
To obey all these restrictions, we have decided to process 32-bit streams in
parallel. Next, a code for the implementation of LAMED is included, where
ˆ is the xor operator and vrotdk(v,k)means rotations of v, k times.
-----------------------------------------------------------
#1 If n is odd
#2 a0=a1+iv
#3 a1=out^s
#4 If n is even
#5 a0=a1^iv
#6 a1=out+s
-----------------------------------------------------------
#1 aux1 = a0 + a1; #12 aux3 = aux3 ^ aux1;
#2 aux2 = a0 ^ a1; #13 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,3);
#3 aux3 = vrotdk(aux1,5); #14 aux3 = aux3 + a1;
#4 aux3 = aux3 + aux2; #15 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,2);
#5 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,3); #16 aux3 = aux3 + aux1;
#6 aux3 = aux3 ^ aux1; #17 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,4);
#7 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,4); #18 aux3 = aux3 ^ a1;
#8 aux3 = a1 + aux3; #19 aux3 = vrotd(aux3);
#9 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,2); #20 aux3 = aux3 + aux2;
#10 aux3 = aux3 + aux1; #21 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,2);
#11 aux3 = vrotdk(aux3,2); #22 out = aux1 ^ aux3;
-----------------------------------------------------------
The architecture of LAMED, see Figure 6.10, can be divided into four main
parts:
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Input Selection Unit The PRNG will be initialized with a 32-bit initializa-
tion vector (iv). Furthermore, the tag has s stored, a 32-bit secret
which is only known by the tag and authorized readers. After ini-
tialization, the state of the PRNGwill be updated as in Expression 6.65
and 6.66.
Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) Due to the structure of the PRNG, we have
only included the xor and sum operators.
Registers We have used three registers for the core of our PRNG. Two will
be used to store a0+a1 (aux1) and a0ˆa1 (aux2) for the generation
process of each 32-bit output. Additionally, once an output has been
obtained, these registers will be used for the temporal storage of the
new two inputs (updated state) to the PRNG. The third register will
be used to execute the right rotations and to store the intermediate
results. aux1 and aux2 must be updated after the generation of a
new 32-bit stream. Moreover, two additional registers will be used to
store the initialization vector (iv) and the secret (s).
16-bit Unit Output This unit performs a split XOR operation. The 32-bit
output is divided in two halves, MSB31:16 and LSB15:0, and the XOR
of these two halves will be outputted.
Directly derived from all of the above, we reckon that 186-194 clock cycles
(1.86-1.94 ms) are needed for generating each 32-16 output with LAMED
or LAMED-EPC. Besides, these results imply a throughput of between 17.2
and 8.2 kbps respectively. We can then conclude that the temporal require-
ments are accomplished with enough margin in both cases.
Another important aspect we should consider its gate counting. An over-
estimation of this factor is presented in Table 6.15. In this calculation, an
extra 20% of logic gates are added for control functions, and 8 additional
gates are needed for implementing a flip flop as in [90].
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Table 6.15: Number of Logic Gates (LAMED)
LAMED LAMED-EPC
Architecture Units Gate Counting Gate Counting
Arithmetic Logic Unit XOR 32 LG XOR 32 LG
SUM 192 LG SUM 192 LG
16-bit Unit —- 16 LG
Update Unit 10 LG 10 LG
Registers Aux1-2 512 LG Aux1-2 512 LG
Aux3 264 LG Aux3 264 LG
Aux4-5 512 LG Aux4-5 512 LG
Control (20%) 44 LG 50 LG
Total 1566 Logic Gates 1585 Logic Gates
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
Barcodes are currently the dominant identification system. They are an es-
tablished technology, and this is tending to delay the implantation of RFID
technology. However, RFID technology offers important advantages, al-
though these advantages came with a cost, which is payed in, for example,
various types of security drawbacks.
One of the main obstacles for the widespread adoption of RFID systems is
its cost. At the moment, all costs occur in the production phase, which im-
plies a significant limitation. Experts believe that significant cost reduction
might be obtained by spreading it over the complete life cycle. Addition-
ally, all technological change brings companies associated costs. Compa-
nies are tackling the problem in different ways. Whereas some simply wait
to see what the competition does, some are looking at the Return of In-
version (ROI) associated with the introduction of RFID. Indeed, RFID pen-
etration highly differs from country to country. In Spain, companies are
mainly developing pilot projects to analyze this technology (i.e. Pascual
Group, KH Lloreda Group etc.).
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7.2 Attacking RFID Systems
There is some confusion about the real risks associated with RFID technol-
ogy. The vast majority of articles found in the mass media exaggerate them
significantly. However, this does not mean that RFID systems cannot be
attacked in multiple ways, some of them new. Indeed, RFID is a wireless
technology and the tags have circuitry limitations, so some of the attacks
are quite similar to those well-know from other technologies such as wire-
less and smart cards, respectively. Therefore only a little part of the attacks
associated with this technology are new.
When asking consumers about the security threats related to RFID technol-
ogy, most reveal a concern for “privacy”. It is an obvious response because
RFID is destined to be a very pervasive technology. However, these are not
the only problems that should be taken into account when designing an
RFID system. As RFID systems are composed of three main components
(tag, reader and back-end database), each component should be analyzed
in detail. Chapter 3made a comprehensive analysis of each possible risk for
any of the three main components.
Another important aspect is the varying security level needed for different
RFID systems. From a theoretical point of view, it would be useful for
all systems to be resistant to active and passive attacks. However, there
are different classes of RFID tags and their field of application may not
be the same. Indeed, a system’s security will be a compromise between
confidentiality, integrity and availability for the intended application at the
objective cost.
7.3 Standards and Proposed Solutions
The introduction of any technology is accompanied by the development of
standards. The EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard can be considered the
universal standard for low-cost RFID tags. In Chapter 4, the security of this
standard is analyzed in detail. Our analysis points out important security
faults. In spite of this, we see the specification as a good starting-point for
constructing a secure standard for low-cost RFID tags.
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Motivated by the unsatisfactory level of security of the EPC-C1G2 specifi-
cation, several researchers have published slight modifications to the stan-
dard. However, all of these schemes have proved unsuccessful from the
security perspective. In this thesis (see Chapter 6) we have presented the
cryptanalysis of the two most recent proposals in this area.
Apart from the EPC-C1G2, there are other standards associated with this
technology because of its heterogeneity. These standards can be classified
in five main groups (contactless integrated circuit cards, animal identifica-
tion, itemmanagement, near field and EPC), as detailed in Chapter 2. Addi-
tionally, regional regulations (ECC and ETSI in Europe) impose restrictions
on the implantation of these systems. These restrictions are mainly related
to the planning and use of the radio-electric spectrum.
RFID technology is not new; the first article about it was published in the
fifties. However, as a research subject on security, it has received consider-
able attention since 2003. In 2003 and 2004, around 10 and 30 papers respec-
tively were published in this research area. This increased to 75, 90, and
85 in the next three years (http://www.avoine.net/rfid/download/
bib/bibliography-rfid.pdf; consulted in June 2008).
Indeed, RFID is now a topic of interest in a great number of conferences.
Many of these works focus on security, and the range of the proposals is
very wide. Some authors have proposed the use of non-cryptographic so-
lutions, such as Faraday cage, active jamming, bill of rights, etc. Other au-
thors have proposed solutions based on cryptographic techniques. These
solutions are very diverse, some of them being based on block-ciphers,
pseudo-random number generators, and even public-key cryptography.
However, the most commonly proposed solution is based on hash func-
tions. All of these protocols share the common characteristic of being single
round protocols. In a different approximation, the family of human based
protocols are based on multiple execution of a very simple round.
Additionally, only three entities (back-end data base, reader and tag) are
involved in all of the aforementioned protocols. However, there are ad-
ditional applications areas beyond the mutual authentication such as the
protocols that are focused on the problem of providing a proof for the si-
multaneous reading of two or more RFID tags.
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7.4 Lightweight Protocols
The majority of proposals to make RFID tags secure make two important
errors. First, they propose a protocol for RFID tags without specifying for
which class of RFID tag the protocol is intended. This is a very important
point, as the number of available resources (memory, circuitry, power, etc.)
will highly depend on this. So not all tags will support the same kind of
operations. Additionally, each RFID class should have a different security
level. Secondly, the proposed protocols are not realistic about tag resources.
As we have alreadymentioned, the most widely-adopted proposal is based
on hash functions. In spite of this, many authors claim that their protocols
are appropriate for low-cost RFID tags. However, a maximum of 4K gates
can be devoted to security functions in this class of tag. As we saw in Chap-
ter 6, considerable resources (over 9K gates) are needed to implement tradi-
tional cryptographic hash functions. On the other hand, lightweight cryp-
tographic hash functions are not proposed. Therefore, lightweight cryptog-
raphy is an imperative.
In order to avoid past errors, the requirements and the restrictions of the
system were fixed at the start. In our work, we have discriminated be-
tween two classes of tags: low-cost and moderate-cost RFID tags. For each
class, the following characteristics have been specified: power source, cir-
cuitry, reading distance, price, etc. (see Chapter 6). The main difference
between these two tag classes is the number of logic gates that can be dedi-
cated to security processes. Low-cost tags only use efficient operations and
moderate-cost tags support lightweight cryptographic primitives. Due to
this considerable difference, low-cost RFID are only resistant to passive at-
tacks, but moderate-cost RFID tags are resistant to passive and active at-
tacks.
A new ultralightweight authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags,
named Gossamer, has been proposed by the author of this thesis. Gos-
samer is inspired by the UMAP family of protocols and the recently pro-
posed SASI protocol. Indeed, Gossamer attempts to avoid the errors of its
predecessors. The main weak points of the UMAP family were that they
were completely based on triangular functions and there was an incorrect
use of the bitwise OR and AND operations. SASI was a novel proposal that
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introduced rotation within the set of operations supported on the tag. This
initially impeded attack against SASI because rotation is a non-triangular
function. However, SASI was not designed with sufficient care and a pas-
sive attacker can disclose the secret ID, as shown in Chapter 6. Addition-
ally, active attacks against it have just been published (desynchronization,
identity disclosure, etc.). Our protocol Gossamer is a response to all these
previous failings. Due to the severe restrictions of low-cost RFID tags, only
simple operations were employed. Specifically, the protocol requires sim-
ple bitwise XOR, addition and left rotation on tags. Random number gener-
ation is demanded of the reader because of its computational cost. Finally,
a specifically designed and very lightweight operation namedMixBits has
been added to tag operations in order to introduce a diffusion effect in the
messages generated by these restricted devices. Storage requirements are
of the same order as SASI. From the perspective of communication cost,
Gossamer is very efficient; only 4 messages (424 bits) are transmitted over
the channel for each authentication phase. In conclusion, Gossamer is very
efficient from a performance perspective, and the use of a dual rotation and
MixBits function seems to guarantee an adequate security level.
A new protocol conforming to moderate-cost tag specifications has also
been proposed. It should be resistant to passive attacks but also to ac-
tive attacks. Another interesting feature is that tags could be deactivated
temporarily without loss of data. The protocol is inspired in a remote au-
thentication protocol for smart cards. Smart-card technology is a mature
technology that has important similarities with RFID technology. The pro-
posed protocol is inspired specifically in Shieh et al.’s protocol, which is
considered one of the most secure and efficient. The protocol has been
adapted to moderate-cost RFID systems. As in Shieh et al.’s protocol, it
is based on the use of a secure hash function. However, traditional cryp-
tographic hash functions, such as SHA-256 or MD5, exceed the capabilities
of this class of tag. A new lightweight hash function, named Tav-128, has
been proposed. Tav-128 can be implemented with around only 2.6K gates,
and 1568 clock cycles are needed. Although further security analysis of the
new hash function is necessary, the preliminary analysis indicates an ad-
equate security level for the intended application (mutual authentication
of moderate-cost tags). Additionally, it is assumed that tags can gener-
ate random numbers. The use of pseudo-random number generators for
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low-cost RFID tags was ratified in the EPC-C1G2 specification. The stan-
dard specifies three randomness conditions that the generators must meet.
However, no algorithm is proposed and so far no public algorithm con-
forming to EPC-C1G2 has been published. This was the motivation for the
proposal of the new PRNG conforming to the standard. A 32-bit PRNG
(LAMED) and a 16-bit PRNG (LAMED-EPC) has been designed. The gen-
erators passed some very demanding batteries of randomness tests (ENT,
DIEHARD, NIST, and SEXTON). In addition, LAMED-EPC’s conformation
to the specification was considered. Finally, the hardware complexity was
analyzed, reckoning 1.6K gates for implementation. So less than 5K gates
are needed to support a lightweight hash function and lightweight PRNG.
In short, the proposed protocol is considered adequate for moderate-cost
RFID tags.
7.5 Social Problems
Even if technological problems can eventually be solved, widespread adop-
tion of RFID systems will not occur unless the public is educated as to their
potential benefits and risks, and unless security can be guaranteed.
Gunter et al. performed an interesting empirical study about RFID and per-
ception control from the consumer’s perspective [87]. Perception control
deals with the belief people have that the electronic environment will only
act in ways explicitly allowed. Two main factors are considered responsi-
ble for the perception of loss of privacy. Firstly, “being accessed” reflects a
need to control entry to the environment. An attacker may determine per-
sonal behavior and trackmovements of tag owners without being detected.
Secondly, “information dissemination, use, and maintenance”, refers to the
vast amount of data pertaining to individuals that can be collected. Two
different Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PET) were offered to users. In
the user model, users have full control over the system (i.e. authentica-
tion mechanism). In the agent model, on the other hand, access control is
delegated to an agent (i.e. a privacy-preserving identity-management sys-
tem). They analyzed empirically which of these two mechanisms would
increase consumer acceptance of RFID technology. Figure 7.1 shows the
perceived control for each model. Additionally, the study pointed out that
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Figure 7.1: Perception of Control [87]
users preferred to deactivate tags after buying a product (73.4%). 18% of
users trusted in PET (user or agent model), and a further 8.6% were unde-
cided.
In conclusion, technological advances should be smoothly integrated into
society. It is a point that the industry ought not neglect. It is, after all,
consumers who decide the fate of any given technology.
7.6 Future Works
Our future work includes several research lines, as described in the follow-
ing:
Lightweight Protocols An important part of our research activity is cen-
tered on the design of ultralightweight protocols for low-cost RFID
tags. Different schemes were proposed, broken (often by other re-
searchers), and later improved to make the scheme immune to the
particular attacks. The Gossamer protocol constitutes our last pro-
posal and has not been broken yet. We have analyzed its security
against all the standard attacks: privacy, tracing, replay attacks, etc.
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This analysis should be completed by a formal analysis. Belief logics
(BAN, GNY, etc.) or formal frameworks based on other verification
paradigms (i.e. Casper/FDR, OFMC, etc.) may be employed for this
task.
A natural direction for further research is also the design of a new
protocol based on a provably-hard problem (i.e. NP-Complete). An
example of this family of protocols are the human protocols (HB and
their variants). Specifically, the aforementioned protocols are based
on the problem of learning parity with noise (LPN). In spite of the
fact that the vas majority of the HB variants are currently broken,
this research area is certainly promising and should be analyzed in
depth, as other (and perhaps more appropriate) hard problems could
be employed as the basis of new lightweight protocols.
Cryptographic Primitives The most common solution to the mutual au-
thentication problem (which is central in RFID security) found in
the literature is based on the use of a hash function. However,
lightweight cryptographic hash functions are not suggested and stan-
dards solutions exceed by far the capabilities of low-cost RFID tags.
On the other hand, the use of PRNGs has been ratified by the EPC-
C1G2 specification, but no specific algorithm is proposed. Recently,
the Philips Mifare cards have been broken in part due to the weak-
nesses in the underlying PRNG (which was a proprietary algorithm)
[77, 117, 159]. This justifies too the necessity of lightweight PRNGs,
and also points out that algorithms should be made as widely
known as possible for general scrutiny. Summarizing, the design of
lightweight primitives (particularly hash functions and PRNGs) for
low-cost RFID tags is therefore imperative. We have made some in-
teresting progress in this research area, and keep on working along
these lines.
EPC-C1G2 Standard Without significantly altering the framework of the
EPC-C1G2 standard, some authors have proposed new schemes to
correct its unsatisfactory security level. However, all of these schemes
have proved unsuccessful from a security perspective, in some cases
due to our attacks. The design of protocols attempting to obtain a
satisfactory security level within the framework of this specification
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is a though-provoking challenge.
New Problems Two entities (a tag and a reader) are involved in the ma-
jority of RFID protocols. Some, however, consider the simultane-
ous reading of multiple tags (the so-called “yooking proofs” and
its variants). A close inspection of these protocols should be ac-
complished. Additionally, more research effort should be made on
distance-bounding protocols [157] (schemes mainly used to avoid re-
lay attacks).
Noisy cryptography RFID technology uses the radio channel for commu-
nications. The inherent noise affecting the communication link may
be employed to design an authentication protocol. This is an area
where almost no work has been published. A good starting point
could be the study of the works by Chabanne et al. [44] and by
Casteluccia et al. [42].
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